Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?

Despite mounting evidence that supports the pro-poor benefits of migration, it has not been easy to unlock doors into development country labor markets. This is largely because both labor sending and receiving countries are unsure that such program...

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Main Author:	Luthria, Manjula
Format:	Brief
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ADVERTISING BLACK MARKET BROKER CAPACITY BUILDING CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CREDIBILITY DEBT DEBT SERVICE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPLACEMENT DUE DILIGENCE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC THEORY EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY EXPORT GROWTH FACTOR PRICE FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COSTS FOREIGN LABOR FOREIGN WORKERS GAME THEORY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBAL TRADE GLOBALIZATION GROWTH POLICY GROWTH THEORY HOST COUNTRIES HOST COUNTRY HOST GOVERNMENT HOST GOVERNMENTS INCOME INTANGIBLES INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS LABOR MARKET NEEDS LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOBILITY LABOR MOVEMENTS LABOR PROGRAMS LABOR SHORTAGES LABOR SUPPLY LABOUR LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL MARKETS MARKET ACCESS MARKET FAILURES MARKET RESTRICTIONS MARKETING MOTIVATION MULTILATERAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PRECEDING DISCUSSION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE TRAINING PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GAINS PUBLIC GOOD REMITTANCE REMITTANCES RETURN RETURNS RETURNS TO SCALE REVOLVING FUNDS SAFETY SEASONAL WORKERS SKILLED WORKERS SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL NETWORKS SPREAD SUBSTITUTION TACIT COLLUSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEMPORARY WORKER TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADING TRAINING COSTS TRAINING PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT UNSKILLED JOBS UNSKILLED LABOR UNSKILLED WORKERS VOLATILITY WAGES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/13474158/labor-mobility-poor-really-possible http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10112

id	okr-10986-10112
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-101122021-04-23T14:02:48Z Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible? Luthria, Manjula ADVERTISING BLACK MARKET BROKER CAPACITY BUILDING CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CREDIBILITY DEBT DEBT SERVICE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPLACEMENT DUE DILIGENCE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC THEORY EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY EXPORT GROWTH FACTOR PRICE FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COSTS FOREIGN LABOR FOREIGN WORKERS GAME THEORY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBAL TRADE GLOBALIZATION GROWTH POLICY GROWTH THEORY HOST COUNTRIES HOST COUNTRY HOST GOVERNMENT HOST GOVERNMENTS INCOME INTANGIBLES INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS LABOR MARKET NEEDS LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOBILITY LABOR MOVEMENTS LABOR PROGRAMS LABOR SHORTAGES LABOR SUPPLY LABOUR LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL MARKETS MARKET ACCESS MARKET FAILURES MARKET RESTRICTIONS MARKETING MOTIVATION MULTILATERAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PRECEDING DISCUSSION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE TRAINING PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GAINS PUBLIC GOOD REMITTANCE REMITTANCES RETURN RETURNS RETURNS TO SCALE REVOLVING FUNDS SAFETY SEASONAL WORKERS SKILLED WORKERS SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL NETWORKS SPREAD SUBSTITUTION TACIT COLLUSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEMPORARY WORKER TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADING TRAINING COSTS TRAINING PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT UNSKILLED JOBS UNSKILLED LABOR UNSKILLED WORKERS VOLATILITY WAGES Despite mounting evidence that supports the pro-poor benefits of migration, it has not been easy to unlock doors into development country labor markets. This is largely because both labor sending and receiving countries are unsure that such programs can be designed or executed in a manner that considers their respective (and often competing) interests. This note offers guidance on how to design and implement scheme that is win-win for both host and source countries. 2012-08-13T10:27:15Z 2012-08-13T10:27:15Z 2011-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/13474158/labor-mobility-poor-really-possible http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10112 English Economic Premise; No. 45 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ADVERTISING BLACK MARKET BROKER CAPACITY BUILDING CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CREDIBILITY DEBT DEBT SERVICE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPLACEMENT DUE DILIGENCE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC THEORY EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY EXPORT GROWTH FACTOR PRICE FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COSTS FOREIGN LABOR FOREIGN WORKERS GAME THEORY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBAL TRADE GLOBALIZATION GROWTH POLICY GROWTH THEORY HOST COUNTRIES HOST COUNTRY HOST GOVERNMENT HOST GOVERNMENTS INCOME INTANGIBLES INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS LABOR MARKET NEEDS LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOBILITY LABOR MOVEMENTS LABOR PROGRAMS LABOR SHORTAGES LABOR SUPPLY LABOUR LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL MARKETS MARKET ACCESS MARKET FAILURES MARKET RESTRICTIONS MARKETING MOTIVATION MULTILATERAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PRECEDING DISCUSSION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE TRAINING PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GAINS PUBLIC GOOD REMITTANCE REMITTANCES RETURN RETURNS RETURNS TO SCALE REVOLVING FUNDS SAFETY SEASONAL WORKERS SKILLED WORKERS SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL NETWORKS SPREAD SUBSTITUTION TACIT COLLUSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEMPORARY WORKER TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADING TRAINING COSTS TRAINING PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT UNSKILLED JOBS UNSKILLED LABOR UNSKILLED WORKERS VOLATILITY WAGES
spellingShingle	ADVERTISING BLACK MARKET BROKER CAPACITY BUILDING CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS COMPETITIVENESS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CREDIBILITY DEBT DEBT SERVICE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPLACEMENT DUE DILIGENCE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC THEORY EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY EXPORT GROWTH FACTOR PRICE FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COSTS FOREIGN LABOR FOREIGN WORKERS GAME THEORY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GLOBAL ECONOMY GLOBAL TRADE GLOBALIZATION GROWTH POLICY GROWTH THEORY HOST COUNTRIES HOST COUNTRY HOST GOVERNMENT HOST GOVERNMENTS INCOME INTANGIBLES INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS LABOR MARKET NEEDS LABOR MARKETS LABOR MOBILITY LABOR MOVEMENTS LABOR PROGRAMS LABOR SHORTAGES LABOR SUPPLY LABOUR LEGAL FRAMEWORK LOCAL MARKETS MARKET ACCESS MARKET FAILURES MARKET RESTRICTIONS MARKETING MOTIVATION MULTILATERAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE PERFECT COMPETITION PRECEDING DISCUSSION PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE TRAINING PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GAINS PUBLIC GOOD REMITTANCE REMITTANCES RETURN RETURNS RETURNS TO SCALE REVOLVING FUNDS SAFETY SEASONAL WORKERS SKILLED WORKERS SOCIAL COSTS SOCIAL NETWORKS SPREAD SUBSTITUTION TACIT COLLUSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEMPORARY WORKER TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADING TRAINING COSTS TRAINING PROGRAMS UNEMPLOYMENT UNSKILLED JOBS UNSKILLED LABOR UNSKILLED WORKERS VOLATILITY WAGES Luthria, Manjula Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?
relation	Economic Premise; No. 45
description	Despite mounting evidence that supports the pro-poor benefits of migration, it has not been easy to unlock doors into development country labor markets. This is largely because both labor sending and receiving countries are unsure that such programs can be designed or executed in a manner that considers their respective (and often competing) interests. This note offers guidance on how to design and implement scheme that is win-win for both host and source countries.
format	Publications & Research :: Brief
author	Luthria, Manjula
author_facet	Luthria, Manjula
author_sort	Luthria, Manjula
title	Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?
title_short	Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?
title_full	Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?
title_fullStr	Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?
title_full_unstemmed	Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?
title_sort	labor mobility for the poor : is it really possible?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/01/13474158/labor-mobility-poor-really-possible http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10112
_version_	1764411893197307904

Labor Mobility for the Poor : Is it Really Possible?

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