Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform

A weak tax administration encourages corruption that benefits both government officials and businesses at the expense of overall tax revenue. Collusive corruption is at the heart of most, if not all, problems related to tax administration. This not...

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Main Author:	Rahman, Aminur
Format:	Brief
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	ABUSE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARREARS AUDITORS BANKS BRIBE BRIBERIES BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS BUSINESS TRANSACTION CAPACITY BUILDING CHECKS CODE OF CONDUCT COMPLAINT COMPLIANCE COST CONFIDENCE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCRETION ENABLING ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ETHICS EXTORTION FRAUD GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE POLICY INCOME INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE INVESTMENT POLICY JUDICIAL SYSTEM LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORMS MICRO-ENTERPRISES PENALTIES POLITICAL CORRUPTION PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SPENDING RETURN RISK PROFILES SERVICE DELIVERY SETTLEMENT SMALL BUSINESSES TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ASSESSMENT TAX AUDITS TAX LAWS TAX OBLIGATIONS TAX POLICIES TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TAXPAYER TAXPAYERS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRANSACTION TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TRIALS WEAK ENFORCEMENT ZERO TOLERANCE
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/04/10501243/tackling-corruption-through-tax-administration-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10564

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spelling	okr-10986-105642021-04-23T14:02:51Z Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform Rahman, Aminur ABUSE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARREARS AUDITORS BANKS BRIBE BRIBERIES BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS BUSINESS TRANSACTION CAPACITY BUILDING CHECKS CODE OF CONDUCT COMPLAINT COMPLIANCE COST CONFIDENCE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCRETION ENABLING ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ETHICS EXTORTION FRAUD GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE POLICY INCOME INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE INVESTMENT POLICY JUDICIAL SYSTEM LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORMS MICRO-ENTERPRISES PENALTIES POLITICAL CORRUPTION PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SPENDING RETURN RISK PROFILES SERVICE DELIVERY SETTLEMENT SMALL BUSINESSES TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ASSESSMENT TAX AUDITS TAX LAWS TAX OBLIGATIONS TAX POLICIES TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TAXPAYER TAXPAYERS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRANSACTION TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TRIALS WEAK ENFORCEMENT ZERO TOLERANCE A weak tax administration encourages corruption that benefits both government officials and businesses at the expense of overall tax revenue. Collusive corruption is at the heart of most, if not all, problems related to tax administration. This note examines the drivers of corruption and suggests good-practice measures for reforming tax administration. It is one in a series addressing issues that governments of developing countries face in reforming their tax systems. 2012-08-13T12:05:10Z 2012-08-13T12:05:10Z 2009-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/04/10501243/tackling-corruption-through-tax-administration-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10564 English Investment Climate in Practice; No. 3 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	ABUSE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARREARS AUDITORS BANKS BRIBE BRIBERIES BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS BUSINESS TRANSACTION CAPACITY BUILDING CHECKS CODE OF CONDUCT COMPLAINT COMPLIANCE COST CONFIDENCE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCRETION ENABLING ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ETHICS EXTORTION FRAUD GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE POLICY INCOME INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE INVESTMENT POLICY JUDICIAL SYSTEM LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORMS MICRO-ENTERPRISES PENALTIES POLITICAL CORRUPTION PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SPENDING RETURN RISK PROFILES SERVICE DELIVERY SETTLEMENT SMALL BUSINESSES TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ASSESSMENT TAX AUDITS TAX LAWS TAX OBLIGATIONS TAX POLICIES TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TAXPAYER TAXPAYERS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRANSACTION TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TRIALS WEAK ENFORCEMENT ZERO TOLERANCE
spellingShingle	ABUSE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ANTI-CORRUPTION ARREARS AUDITORS BANKS BRIBE BRIBERIES BRIBERY BRIBES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS BUSINESS TRANSACTION CAPACITY BUILDING CHECKS CODE OF CONDUCT COMPLAINT COMPLIANCE COST CONFIDENCE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CORRUPT CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPTION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DISCRETION ENABLING ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ETHICS EXTORTION FRAUD GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCE POLICY INCOME INTEGRITY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT CLIMATE INVESTMENT POLICY JUDICIAL SYSTEM LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGAL REFORMS MICRO-ENTERPRISES PENALTIES POLITICAL CORRUPTION PROCUREMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SPENDING RETURN RISK PROFILES SERVICE DELIVERY SETTLEMENT SMALL BUSINESSES TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ASSESSMENT TAX AUDITS TAX LAWS TAX OBLIGATIONS TAX POLICIES TAX POLICY TAX RATE TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TAXPAYER TAXPAYERS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRANSACTION TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TRIALS WEAK ENFORCEMENT ZERO TOLERANCE Rahman, Aminur Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform
relation	Investment Climate in Practice; No. 3
description	A weak tax administration encourages corruption that benefits both government officials and businesses at the expense of overall tax revenue. Collusive corruption is at the heart of most, if not all, problems related to tax administration. This note examines the drivers of corruption and suggests good-practice measures for reforming tax administration. It is one in a series addressing issues that governments of developing countries face in reforming their tax systems.
format	Publications & Research :: Brief
author	Rahman, Aminur
author_facet	Rahman, Aminur
author_sort	Rahman, Aminur
title	Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform
title_short	Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform
title_full	Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform
title_fullStr	Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform
title_full_unstemmed	Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform
title_sort	tackling corruption through : tax administration reform
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/04/10501243/tackling-corruption-through-tax-administration-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/10564
_version_	1764413558004645888

Tackling Corruption Through : Tax Administration Reform

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