id okr-10986-11184
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-111842021-04-23T14:02:54Z Reforming Inspections Coolidge, Jacqueline ACCOUNTABILITY ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES BROKERS BUSINESS REGULATION COMPETITOR COMPETITORS COMPLIANCE POLICY COMPLIANCE STRATEGY COST-EFFECTIVENESS DISASTERS ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT INSPECTION INCOME INSPECTION PROGRAMS INSPECTIONS INSPECTORS INVESTIGATIONS NONCOMPLIANCE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PERFORMANCE MEASURES PROBABILITY PROGRAMS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC POLICY REFORMS REGULATORY COMPLIANCE REGULATORY REFORM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS RISK ASSESSMENT SAFETY SAVINGS TRANSITION ECONOMIES Government inspections of firms are important for enforcing regulations to protect public health, safety, and the environment and to carry out economic functions such as tax collection and banking regulation. But most inspection regimes in developing countries impose excessive costs on firms while failing dismally to prevent accidents or mitigate losses from disasters. There is a strong interest in models of reform that will reduce the burden of government inspections while improving standards. This paper offers solutions that do both. 2012-08-13T14:22:59Z 2012-08-13T14:22:59Z 2006-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/7039416/reforming-inspections http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11184 English Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 308 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
BROKERS
BUSINESS REGULATION
COMPETITOR
COMPETITORS
COMPLIANCE POLICY
COMPLIANCE STRATEGY
COST-EFFECTIVENESS
DISASTERS
ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT INSPECTION
INCOME
INSPECTION PROGRAMS
INSPECTIONS
INSPECTORS
INVESTIGATIONS
NONCOMPLIANCE
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
PROBABILITY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC POLICY
REFORMS
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
REGULATORY REFORM
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
RISK ASSESSMENT
SAFETY
SAVINGS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
BROKERS
BUSINESS REGULATION
COMPETITOR
COMPETITORS
COMPLIANCE POLICY
COMPLIANCE STRATEGY
COST-EFFECTIVENESS
DISASTERS
ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT INSPECTION
INCOME
INSPECTION PROGRAMS
INSPECTIONS
INSPECTORS
INVESTIGATIONS
NONCOMPLIANCE
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
PROBABILITY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC POLICY
REFORMS
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
REGULATORY REFORM
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
RISK ASSESSMENT
SAFETY
SAVINGS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
Coolidge, Jacqueline
Reforming Inspections
relation Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 308
description Government inspections of firms are important for enforcing regulations to protect public health, safety, and the environment and to carry out economic functions such as tax collection and banking regulation. But most inspection regimes in developing countries impose excessive costs on firms while failing dismally to prevent accidents or mitigate losses from disasters. There is a strong interest in models of reform that will reduce the burden of government inspections while improving standards. This paper offers solutions that do both.
format Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author Coolidge, Jacqueline
author_facet Coolidge, Jacqueline
author_sort Coolidge, Jacqueline
title Reforming Inspections
title_short Reforming Inspections
title_full Reforming Inspections
title_fullStr Reforming Inspections
title_full_unstemmed Reforming Inspections
title_sort reforming inspections
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2012
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/06/7039416/reforming-inspections
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11184
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