The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets
Many Asian, African and Eastern European countries freeing up their electricity markets are preserving an artificial monopoly over the wholesale trading of electricity even after the vertically integrated national power company is unbundled. Eviden...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/1346420/single-buyer-model-dangerous-path-toward-competitive-electricity-markets http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11409 |
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okr-10986-114092021-06-14T10:57:03Z The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets Lovei, Laszlo MARKET COMPETITION PROCUREMENT INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CORRUPTION PAYMENTS CONTINGENT LIABILITY ELECTRICITY TRADE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS ENERGY PRICES ENERGY DEMAND WHOLESALE TRADE AGGREGATION COAL DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY COMPANY ELECTRICITY FROM GENERATORS ELECTRICITY MARKETS ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY PURCHASES ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ELECTRICITY TRADE ELECTRICITY TRADING EXTERNALITIES GENERATION GENERATION CAPACITY GENERATORS INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS LAWS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MARKET RISK NATIONAL UTILITY PAYMENT COLLECTION POWER PLANTS POWER PURCHASE POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENTS PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY WHOLESALE PRICES Many Asian, African and Eastern European countries freeing up their electricity markets are preserving an artificial monopoly over the wholesale trading of electricity even after the vertically integrated national power company is unbundled. Evidence so far suggests that this single buyer model has major disadvantages in developing countries: it invites corruption, weakens payment discipline, and imposes contingent liabilities on the government. These disadvantages in most cases overshadow the higher short-term costs of a bilateral contracts model where generators contract with customers. 2012-08-13T14:59:25Z 2012-08-13T14:59:25Z 2000-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/1346420/single-buyer-model-dangerous-path-toward-competitive-electricity-markets Viewpoint. -- Note no. 225 (December 2000) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11409 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
MARKET COMPETITION PROCUREMENT INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CORRUPTION PAYMENTS CONTINGENT LIABILITY ELECTRICITY TRADE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS ENERGY PRICES ENERGY DEMAND WHOLESALE TRADE AGGREGATION COAL DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY COMPANY ELECTRICITY FROM GENERATORS ELECTRICITY MARKETS ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY PURCHASES ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ELECTRICITY TRADE ELECTRICITY TRADING EXTERNALITIES GENERATION GENERATION CAPACITY GENERATORS INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS LAWS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MARKET RISK NATIONAL UTILITY PAYMENT COLLECTION POWER PLANTS POWER PURCHASE POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENTS PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY WHOLESALE PRICES |
| spellingShingle |
MARKET COMPETITION PROCUREMENT INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CORRUPTION PAYMENTS CONTINGENT LIABILITY ELECTRICITY TRADE POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS ENERGY PRICES ENERGY DEMAND WHOLESALE TRADE AGGREGATION COAL DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES ELECTRICITY ELECTRICITY COMPANY ELECTRICITY FROM GENERATORS ELECTRICITY MARKETS ELECTRICITY PRICES ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION ELECTRICITY PURCHASES ELECTRICITY SUPPLY ELECTRICITY TRADE ELECTRICITY TRADING EXTERNALITIES GENERATION GENERATION CAPACITY GENERATORS INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS LAWS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MARKET RISK NATIONAL UTILITY PAYMENT COLLECTION POWER PLANTS POWER PURCHASE POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENTS PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY WHOLESALE PRICES Lovei, Laszlo The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets |
| relation |
Viewpoint |
| description |
Many Asian, African and Eastern European
countries freeing up their electricity markets are
preserving an artificial monopoly over the wholesale trading
of electricity even after the vertically integrated national
power company is unbundled. Evidence so far suggests that
this single buyer model has major disadvantages in
developing countries: it invites corruption, weakens payment
discipline, and imposes contingent liabilities on the
government. These disadvantages in most cases overshadow the
higher short-term costs of a bilateral contracts model where
generators contract with customers. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
| author |
Lovei, Laszlo |
| author_facet |
Lovei, Laszlo |
| author_sort |
Lovei, Laszlo |
| title |
The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets |
| title_short |
The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets |
| title_full |
The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets |
| title_fullStr |
The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Single-Buyer Model : A Dangerous Path toward Competitive Electricity Markets |
| title_sort |
single-buyer model : a dangerous path toward competitive electricity markets |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/12/1346420/single-buyer-model-dangerous-path-toward-competitive-electricity-markets http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11409 |
| _version_ |
1764416630483320832 |