Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment

The objective of Chile's port reform, is to encourage investments for improved port equipment, in the hope that this will lead to more efficient service, in part by attracting larger, more modern ships. The first four major concessions, under...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Foxley, Juan, Mardones, José Luis
Format:	Viewpoint
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	PORTS CONCESSIONALITY CONTRACT FORMULATION PORT MANAGEMENT REFORM POLICY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES PORT FACILITIES SERVICES DELIVERY MODERNIZATION PRIVATE COMPANY OPERATING EFFICIENCY FREE ENTRY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA PROCUREMENT MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION INVESTMENT REGULATION REDUNDANCY COSTS AUTHORITY BERTHING BERTHS BREAK BULK CARGO CARGO TRAFFIC CONTAINER TERMINAL CONTAINER TERMINALS CRANES DISPATCH FREIGHT INCOME LIQUID BULK CARGOES NAVIGATION PENALTIES PORT PORT ASSETS PORT CONCESSIONS PORT EQUIPMENT PORT INDUSTRY PORT OPERATIONS PORT REFORM PORT SERVICES RESTRICTIONS REVENUE SHARING SAFETY SAFETY REGULATIONS SHIP SHIPPING SHIPPING AGENTS SHIPPING COMPANY SHIPS SIGNS SMALLER PORTS STEVEDORES STEVEDORING TONNAGE VESSELS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/10/729359/port-concessions-chile-contract-design-promote-competition-investment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11418

id	okr-10986-11418
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-114182021-06-14T11:01:39Z Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment Foxley, Juan Mardones, José Luis PORTS CONCESSIONALITY CONTRACT FORMULATION PORT MANAGEMENT REFORM POLICY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES PORT FACILITIES SERVICES DELIVERY MODERNIZATION PRIVATE COMPANY OPERATING EFFICIENCY FREE ENTRY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA PROCUREMENT MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION INVESTMENT REGULATION REDUNDANCY COSTS AUTHORITY BERTHING BERTHS BREAK BULK CARGO CARGO TRAFFIC CONTAINER TERMINAL CONTAINER TERMINALS CRANES DISPATCH FREIGHT INCOME LIQUID BULK CARGOES NAVIGATION PENALTIES PORT PORT ASSETS PORT CONCESSIONS PORT EQUIPMENT PORT INDUSTRY PORT OPERATIONS PORT REFORM PORT SERVICES PORTS RESTRICTIONS REVENUE SHARING SAFETY SAFETY REGULATIONS SHIP SHIPPING SHIPPING AGENTS SHIPPING COMPANY SHIPS SIGNS SMALLER PORTS STEVEDORES STEVEDORING TONNAGE VESSELS The objective of Chile's port reform, is to encourage investments for improved port equipment, in the hope that this will lead to more efficient service, in part by attracting larger, more modern ships. The first four major concessions, under which integrated terminals are run exclusively by private companies, started operations in January 2000. The integrated approach to port services replaces a system of free entry of multiple stevedoring companies. This note reviews how the concessions were designed: the criteria for the winning bids, the rules to prevent concessionaires' abusing their monopoly power, the rules to encourage investment, and the provisions for redundant workers. 2012-08-13T15:00:50Z 2012-08-13T15:00:50Z 2000-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/10/729359/port-concessions-chile-contract-design-promote-competition-investment Viewpoint. -- Private infrastructure notes ; no. 223 (October2000) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11418 English Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 223 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Chile
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	PORTS CONCESSIONALITY CONTRACT FORMULATION PORT MANAGEMENT REFORM POLICY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES PORT FACILITIES SERVICES DELIVERY MODERNIZATION PRIVATE COMPANY OPERATING EFFICIENCY FREE ENTRY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA PROCUREMENT MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION INVESTMENT REGULATION REDUNDANCY COSTS AUTHORITY BERTHING BERTHS BREAK BULK CARGO CARGO TRAFFIC CONTAINER TERMINAL CONTAINER TERMINALS CRANES DISPATCH FREIGHT INCOME LIQUID BULK CARGOES NAVIGATION PENALTIES PORT PORT ASSETS PORT CONCESSIONS PORT EQUIPMENT PORT INDUSTRY PORT OPERATIONS PORT REFORM PORT SERVICES PORTS RESTRICTIONS REVENUE SHARING SAFETY SAFETY REGULATIONS SHIP SHIPPING SHIPPING AGENTS SHIPPING COMPANY SHIPS SIGNS SMALLER PORTS STEVEDORES STEVEDORING TONNAGE VESSELS
spellingShingle	PORTS CONCESSIONALITY CONTRACT FORMULATION PORT MANAGEMENT REFORM POLICY INVESTMENT INCENTIVES PORT FACILITIES SERVICES DELIVERY MODERNIZATION PRIVATE COMPANY OPERATING EFFICIENCY FREE ENTRY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA PROCUREMENT MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION INVESTMENT REGULATION REDUNDANCY COSTS AUTHORITY BERTHING BERTHS BREAK BULK CARGO CARGO TRAFFIC CONTAINER TERMINAL CONTAINER TERMINALS CRANES DISPATCH FREIGHT INCOME LIQUID BULK CARGOES NAVIGATION PENALTIES PORT PORT ASSETS PORT CONCESSIONS PORT EQUIPMENT PORT INDUSTRY PORT OPERATIONS PORT REFORM PORT SERVICES PORTS RESTRICTIONS REVENUE SHARING SAFETY SAFETY REGULATIONS SHIP SHIPPING SHIPPING AGENTS SHIPPING COMPANY SHIPS SIGNS SMALLER PORTS STEVEDORES STEVEDORING TONNAGE VESSELS Foxley, Juan Mardones, José Luis Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Chile
relation	Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector; Note No. 223
description	The objective of Chile's port reform, is to encourage investments for improved port equipment, in the hope that this will lead to more efficient service, in part by attracting larger, more modern ships. The first four major concessions, under which integrated terminals are run exclusively by private companies, started operations in January 2000. The integrated approach to port services replaces a system of free entry of multiple stevedoring companies. This note reviews how the concessions were designed: the criteria for the winning bids, the rules to prevent concessionaires' abusing their monopoly power, the rules to encourage investment, and the provisions for redundant workers.
format	Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author	Foxley, Juan Mardones, José Luis
author_facet	Foxley, Juan Mardones, José Luis
author_sort	Foxley, Juan
title	Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment
title_short	Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment
title_full	Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment
title_fullStr	Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment
title_full_unstemmed	Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment
title_sort	port concessions in chile : contract design to promote competition and investment
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/10/729359/port-concessions-chile-contract-design-promote-competition-investment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11418
_version_	1764416661382758400

Port Concessions in Chile : Contract Design to Promote Competition and Investment

Similar Items