An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration
The World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. Corrupt actions include the unilateral theft of public property by its steward and multi-party transactions in which beneficiaries bribe officials. Corruption can exi...
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| Format: | Brief |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/10/1047352/anticorruption-strategy-revenue-administration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11458 |
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okr-10986-114582021-06-14T11:03:10Z An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration Das-Gupta, Arindam Engelschalk, Michael Mayville, William ADMINISTRATION REFORM ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGIES ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY BRIBES CITIZEN CITIZENS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PROBLEMS DISCRETION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ETHICS EVASION EXTORTION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HUMAN RESOURCE INCOME INTEGRITY INTERNAL AUDIT JUDICIARY MEDIA MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PENALTIES PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PRESIDENCY PROCUREMENT PROVISIONS PUBLIC INFORMATION REVENUE ADMINISTRATION SANCTIONS SOCIAL SECURITY STATE REVENUE TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ADMINISTRATIONS TAX ASSESSMENT TAX BASE TAX EVASION TAX OBLIGATIONS TAX POLICY TAX RATES TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY CORRUPTION IN POLITICS CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION TAX ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AUTONOMY WAGES REWARD STRUCTURE SALARY RANGES SALARY INCREASES INCENTIVES SURVEYS TAXPAYERS BUDGET PROCESS COMPENSATION SANCTIONS EXTORTION PENALTIES PUBLIC AWARENESS TAX REFORMS WITHHOLDING TAXES ARMS LENGTH AGREEMENTS COMPUTERIZATION AUTOMATION PRIVATIZATION EXTERNAL AUDITORS INTERNAL AUDITORS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIME PREVENTION The World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. Corrupt actions include the unilateral theft of public property by its steward and multi-party transactions in which beneficiaries bribe officials. Corruption can exist at all levels of public administration--from the highest officeholder to the lowest functionary. Because tax and customs administration often figure among the corrupt government agencies in developing countries, Bank projects that reform these administrations should include anti-corruption efforts. Any strategy to combat corruption must limit the motives and opportunities for public officeholders to abuse their positions. This should be done directly for unilateral corruption, while for multi-party corruption it can also be done indirectly by focusing on the supply side of bribes. Although we do not know enough to identify optimal anti-corruption strategies for different country situations, there is no one-size-fits-all strategy. Various elements from the menu of possibilities must be integrated into a coherent package. The Bank's approach in this area, outlined in this report, is in broad agreement with that of the International Monetary Fund. This report examines the motives and opportunities for corruption, and discusses incorporating strategies in reform projects, current country approaches, and lessons learned from experience. 2012-08-13T15:07:38Z 2012-08-13T15:07:38Z 1999-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/10/1047352/anticorruption-strategy-revenue-administration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11458 English PREM Notes; No. 33 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Brief Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ADMINISTRATION REFORM ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGIES ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY BRIBES CITIZEN CITIZENS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PROBLEMS DISCRETION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ETHICS EVASION EXTORTION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HUMAN RESOURCE INCOME INTEGRITY INTERNAL AUDIT JUDICIARY MEDIA MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PENALTIES PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PRESIDENCY PROCUREMENT PROVISIONS PUBLIC INFORMATION REVENUE ADMINISTRATION SANCTIONS SOCIAL SECURITY STATE REVENUE TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ADMINISTRATIONS TAX ASSESSMENT TAX BASE TAX EVASION TAX OBLIGATIONS TAX POLICY TAX RATES TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY CORRUPTION IN POLITICS CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION TAX ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AUTONOMY WAGES REWARD STRUCTURE SALARY RANGES SALARY INCREASES INCENTIVES SURVEYS TAXPAYERS BUDGET PROCESS COMPENSATION SANCTIONS EXTORTION PENALTIES PUBLIC AWARENESS TAX REFORMS WITHHOLDING TAXES ARMS LENGTH AGREEMENTS COMPUTERIZATION AUTOMATION PRIVATIZATION EXTERNAL AUDITORS INTERNAL AUDITORS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIME PREVENTION |
| spellingShingle |
ADMINISTRATION REFORM ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGIES ANTICORRUPTION STRATEGY BRIBES CITIZEN CITIZENS CONSENSUS CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PROBLEMS DISCRETION ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ETHICS EVASION EXTORTION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FISCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HUMAN RESOURCE INCOME INTEGRITY INTERNAL AUDIT JUDICIARY MEDIA MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PENALTIES PERFORMANCE INDICATORS PRESIDENCY PROCUREMENT PROVISIONS PUBLIC INFORMATION REVENUE ADMINISTRATION SANCTIONS SOCIAL SECURITY STATE REVENUE TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ADMINISTRATIONS TAX ASSESSMENT TAX BASE TAX EVASION TAX OBLIGATIONS TAX POLICY TAX RATES TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY CORRUPTION IN POLITICS CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION TAX ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AUTONOMY WAGES REWARD STRUCTURE SALARY RANGES SALARY INCREASES INCENTIVES SURVEYS TAXPAYERS BUDGET PROCESS COMPENSATION SANCTIONS EXTORTION PENALTIES PUBLIC AWARENESS TAX REFORMS WITHHOLDING TAXES ARMS LENGTH AGREEMENTS COMPUTERIZATION AUTOMATION PRIVATIZATION EXTERNAL AUDITORS INTERNAL AUDITORS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CRIME PREVENTION Das-Gupta, Arindam Engelschalk, Michael Mayville, William An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration |
| relation |
PREM Notes; No. 33 |
| description |
The World Bank defines corruption as the
abuse of public office for private gain. Corrupt actions
include the unilateral theft of public property by its
steward and multi-party transactions in which beneficiaries
bribe officials. Corruption can exist at all levels of
public administration--from the highest officeholder to the
lowest functionary. Because tax and customs administration
often figure among the corrupt government agencies in
developing countries, Bank projects that reform these
administrations should include anti-corruption efforts. Any
strategy to combat corruption must limit the motives and
opportunities for public officeholders to abuse their
positions. This should be done directly for unilateral
corruption, while for multi-party corruption it can also be
done indirectly by focusing on the supply side of bribes.
Although we do not know enough to identify optimal
anti-corruption strategies for different country situations,
there is no one-size-fits-all strategy. Various elements
from the menu of possibilities must be integrated into a
coherent package. The Bank's approach in this area,
outlined in this report, is in broad agreement with that of
the International Monetary Fund. This report examines the
motives and opportunities for corruption, and discusses
incorporating strategies in reform projects, current country
approaches, and lessons learned from experience. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Brief |
| author |
Das-Gupta, Arindam Engelschalk, Michael Mayville, William |
| author_facet |
Das-Gupta, Arindam Engelschalk, Michael Mayville, William |
| author_sort |
Das-Gupta, Arindam |
| title |
An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration |
| title_short |
An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration |
| title_full |
An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration |
| title_fullStr |
An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration |
| title_full_unstemmed |
An Anticorruption Strategy for Revenue Administration |
| title_sort |
anticorruption strategy for revenue administration |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/10/1047352/anticorruption-strategy-revenue-administration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11458 |
| _version_ |
1764416803049570304 |