Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?

Should a conceding authority auction off or negotiate a contract for an exclusive private infrastructure deal? Advocates of negotiation often argue that a formal competition may take too much time, that the costs of preparing bids may be excessive,...

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Main Author:	Klein, Michael
Format:	Viewpoint
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012
Subjects:	CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441576/infrastructure-concessions-auction-or-not-auction http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11526

id	okr-10986-11526
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-115262021-06-14T11:03:23Z Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction? Klein, Michael CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY Should a conceding authority auction off or negotiate a contract for an exclusive private infrastructure deal? Advocates of negotiation often argue that a formal competition may take too much time, that the costs of preparing bids may be excessive, and that innovation may be discouraged. But proponents of competitive bidding argue that there are ways to address theses concerns without sacrificing the bidding process. Moreover, they argue, competition may yield a better deal for the conceding authority and enhance the transparency of the process, making the transaction more politically sustainable. This Note examines the arguments. 2012-08-13T15:18:23Z 2012-08-13T15:18:23Z 1998-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441576/infrastructure-concessions-auction-or-not-auction Viewpoint. -- Note no. 159 (November 1998) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11526 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY
spellingShingle	CONCESSIONS AUCTIONS CONTRACT NEGOTIATION INFRASTRUCTURE BIDDING BIDDING PROCESS ECONOMIC COMPETITION AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTHORITY BARGAINING POWER BENCHMARK BENCHMARK PRICE BENCHMARKS BID BIDDERS BIDDING BIDS BONDS COMPETITIVE BIDDING COMPETITIVE TENDER CONSUMERS CORRUPTION DEREGULATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FINANCIAL STRENGTH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CONCESSIONS INNOVATIONS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEARNING MONOPOLIES RISK AVERSION TENDERING TOTAL COSTS TRANSPARENCY Klein, Michael Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
relation	Viewpoint
description	Should a conceding authority auction off or negotiate a contract for an exclusive private infrastructure deal? Advocates of negotiation often argue that a formal competition may take too much time, that the costs of preparing bids may be excessive, and that innovation may be discouraged. But proponents of competitive bidding argue that there are ways to address theses concerns without sacrificing the bidding process. Moreover, they argue, competition may yield a better deal for the conceding authority and enhance the transparency of the process, making the transaction more politically sustainable. This Note examines the arguments.
format	Publications & Research :: Viewpoint
author	Klein, Michael
author_facet	Klein, Michael
author_sort	Klein, Michael
title	Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
title_short	Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
title_full	Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
title_fullStr	Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
title_full_unstemmed	Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?
title_sort	infrastructure concessions : to auction or not to auction?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2012
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/11/441576/infrastructure-concessions-auction-or-not-auction http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11526
_version_	1764417052497412096

Infrastructure Concessions : To Auction or Not to Auction?

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