Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture
Privatized in 1984, British Telecommunications (BT) is the longest-standing privatized utility in the United Kingdom. Comparing BT's stock market returns over a long period with returns for a comparable sample of firms not affected by regulat...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2012
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1995/10/696999/post-privatization-performance-regulating-telecommunications-uk-testing-regulatory-capture http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11647 |
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okr-10986-116472021-06-14T11:04:39Z Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture Dnes, Antony DENATIONALIZATION MONOPOLIES MARKET COMPETITION MARKET RETURNS PRIVATE INTEREST PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATORY AGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST LAW CONSUMER INTERESTS CONSUMERS DECISIONMAKING DEREGULATION DUOPOLY ECONOMIC REGULATION ECONOMISTS ELECTRICITY MERGERS MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER NATURAL MONOPOLIES OLIGOPOLIES POSITIVE EFFECTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATOR REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROGRAMS TAX TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL OUTPUT TREASURY UTILITIES WELFARE ECONOMICS Privatized in 1984, British Telecommunications (BT) is the longest-standing privatized utility in the United Kingdom. Comparing BT's stock market returns over a long period with returns for a comparable sample of firms not affected by regulation, the author assesses whether the new telecommunications regulatory regime has been "captured" (unduly influenced) by consumer groups, BT, or BT's competitor. He concludes that some regulatory decisions have favored consumers, some have accommodated BT, and some have favored BT's competitor and that, overall, the regulatory regime has checked monopoly power. 2012-08-13T15:37:34Z 2012-08-13T15:37:34Z 1995-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1995/10/696999/post-privatization-performance-regulating-telecommunications-uk-testing-regulatory-capture Viewpoint. -- Note No. 60 (October 1995) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11647 English Viewpoint CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Viewpoint Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia United Kingdom |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
DENATIONALIZATION MONOPOLIES MARKET COMPETITION MARKET RETURNS PRIVATE INTEREST PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATORY AGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST LAW CONSUMER INTERESTS CONSUMERS DECISIONMAKING DEREGULATION DUOPOLY ECONOMIC REGULATION ECONOMISTS ELECTRICITY MERGERS MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER NATURAL MONOPOLIES OLIGOPOLIES POSITIVE EFFECTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATOR REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROGRAMS TAX TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL OUTPUT TREASURY UTILITIES WELFARE ECONOMICS |
| spellingShingle |
DENATIONALIZATION MONOPOLIES MARKET COMPETITION MARKET RETURNS PRIVATE INTEREST PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATORY AGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANTITRUST ANTITRUST LAW CONSUMER INTERESTS CONSUMERS DECISIONMAKING DEREGULATION DUOPOLY ECONOMIC REGULATION ECONOMISTS ELECTRICITY MERGERS MONOPOLY MONOPOLY POWER NATURAL MONOPOLIES OLIGOPOLIES POSITIVE EFFECTS PRICE CONTROLS PRIVATE SECTOR REGULATOR REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY AGENCY REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY CAPTURE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGULATORY PROCESS REGULATORY PROGRAMS TAX TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TOTAL OUTPUT TREASURY UTILITIES WELFARE ECONOMICS Dnes, Antony Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture |
| geographic_facet |
Europe and Central Asia United Kingdom |
| relation |
Viewpoint |
| description |
Privatized in 1984, British
Telecommunications (BT) is the longest-standing privatized
utility in the United Kingdom. Comparing BT's stock
market returns over a long period with returns for a
comparable sample of firms not affected by regulation, the
author assesses whether the new telecommunications
regulatory regime has been "captured" (unduly
influenced) by consumer groups, BT, or BT's competitor.
He concludes that some regulatory decisions have favored
consumers, some have accommodated BT, and some have favored
BT's competitor and that, overall, the regulatory
regime has checked monopoly power. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Viewpoint |
| author |
Dnes, Antony |
| author_facet |
Dnes, Antony |
| author_sort |
Dnes, Antony |
| title |
Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture |
| title_short |
Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture |
| title_full |
Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture |
| title_fullStr |
Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Post-Privatization Performance-Regulating Telecommunications in the U.K : Testing for Regulatory Capture |
| title_sort |
post-privatization performance-regulating telecommunications in the u.k : testing for regulatory capture |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1995/10/696999/post-privatization-performance-regulating-telecommunications-uk-testing-regulatory-capture http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11647 |
| _version_ |
1764417493728755712 |