Sovereign Defaults and Expropriations : Empirical Regularities
This paper uses a large cross-country dataset to empirically examine factors associated with sovereign defaults on external private creditors and expropriation of foreign direct investments in developing countries since the 1970s. In the long run,...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/10/16793520/sovereign-defaults-expropriations-empirical-regularities http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12055 |
| Summary: | This paper uses a large cross-country
dataset to empirically examine factors associated with
sovereign defaults on external private creditors and
expropriation of foreign direct investments in developing
countries since the 1970s. In the long run, sovereign
defaults and expropriations are likely to occur in the same
countries. In the short run, however, these events are
uncorrelated. Defaults are more likely to occur following
periods of rapid debt accumulation, when growth is low, and
in countries with weak policy performance, and defaults are
not strongly persistent over time. In contrast,
expropriations are not systematically related to the level
of foreign direct investment, to growth, or to policy
performance. Expropriations are however less likely under
right-wing governments, and are strongly persistent over
time. There is also little evidence that a history of recent
defaults is associated with expropriations, and vice versa.
The paper discusses the implications of these findings for
models that emphasize retaliation as means for sustaining
sovereign borrowing and foreign investment in equilibrium,
as well as the implications for political risk insurance
against the two types of events. |
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