Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms
Although transfer of agricultural land ownership through land reform had positive impacts on productivity, investment, and political empowerment in many cases, institutional arrangements in West Bengal -- which made tenancy heritable and imposed a...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17066318/sharecropping-affect-productivity-long-term-investment-evidence-west-bengal s-tenancy-reforms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12185 |
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okr-10986-121852021-04-23T14:03:05Z Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms Deininger, Klaus Jin, Songqing Yadav, Vandana ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AGRARIAN REFORM AGRICULTURAL LAND AGRICULTURE BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BENEFICIARIES BORROWING CAPITAL STOCK CLAIMANTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS CREDIT ACCESS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATIONING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCOPE ELASTICITY EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EQUIPMENT FAMILY LABOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED EFFECT MODEL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECT HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTS HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INEFFICIENCY INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT DECISION INVESTMENT DECISIONS ISSUANCE LAND OWNERSHIP LAND POLICIES LAND PRICES LAND REFORM LAND REFORMS LAND TENURE LAND USE LAND VALUES LANDLORDS LEASE AGREEMENTS LEASES LEASING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS LEGAL RIGHTS LIMITED LIABILITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LONG-TERM INVESTMENT LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARKET OPERATION MARKET TRANSACTIONS MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATION OPPORTUNITY COST OUTPUT LOSS PERFECT INFORMATION POINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL POWER PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCE RENTS RISK AVERSE SAVINGS SIDE EFFECTS TENANTS TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSFER OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WEALTH Although transfer of agricultural land ownership through land reform had positive impacts on productivity, investment, and political empowerment in many cases, institutional arrangements in West Bengal -- which made tenancy heritable and imposed a prohibition on subleasing -- imply that early land reform benefits may not be sustained and gains from this policy remain well below potential. Data from a listing of 96,000 households in 200 villages, complemented by a detailed survey of 1,800 owner-cum tenants, point toward binding policy constraints and large contemporaneous inefficiency of share tenancy that is exacerbated by strong disincentives to investment. A conservative estimate puts the efficiency losses from such arrangements in any period at 25 percent. 2013-01-28T22:58:33Z 2013-01-28T22:58:33Z 2012-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17066318/sharecropping-affect-productivity-long-term-investment-evidence-west-bengal s-tenancy-reforms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12185 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6293 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia India |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AGRARIAN REFORM AGRICULTURAL LAND AGRICULTURE BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BENEFICIARIES BORROWING CAPITAL STOCK CLAIMANTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS CREDIT ACCESS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATIONING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCOPE ELASTICITY EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EQUIPMENT FAMILY LABOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED EFFECT MODEL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECT HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTS HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INEFFICIENCY INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT DECISION INVESTMENT DECISIONS ISSUANCE LAND OWNERSHIP LAND POLICIES LAND PRICES LAND REFORM LAND REFORMS LAND TENURE LAND USE LAND VALUES LANDLORDS LEASE AGREEMENTS LEASES LEASING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS LEGAL RIGHTS LIMITED LIABILITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LONG-TERM INVESTMENT LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARKET OPERATION MARKET TRANSACTIONS MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATION OPPORTUNITY COST OUTPUT LOSS PERFECT INFORMATION POINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL POWER PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCE RENTS RISK AVERSE SAVINGS SIDE EFFECTS TENANTS TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSFER OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION AGRARIAN REFORM AGRICULTURAL LAND AGRICULTURE BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER BENEFICIARIES BORROWING CAPITAL STOCK CLAIMANTS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS CREDIT ACCESS CREDIT CONSTRAINTS CREDIT MARKET CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT RATIONING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCOPE ELASTICITY EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES EQUIPMENT FAMILY LABOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED EFFECT MODEL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECT HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTS HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INCOME INEFFICIENCY INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT DECISION INVESTMENT DECISIONS ISSUANCE LAND OWNERSHIP LAND POLICIES LAND PRICES LAND REFORM LAND REFORMS LAND TENURE LAND USE LAND VALUES LANDLORDS LEASE AGREEMENTS LEASES LEASING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS LEGAL RIGHTS LIMITED LIABILITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LONG-TERM INVESTMENT LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS MARGINAL BENEFITS MARKET OPERATION MARKET TRANSACTIONS MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATION OPPORTUNITY COST OUTPUT LOSS PERFECT INFORMATION POINTS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT POLITICAL POWER PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC FINANCE RENTS RISK AVERSE SAVINGS SIDE EFFECTS TENANTS TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSFER OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WEALTH Deininger, Klaus Jin, Songqing Yadav, Vandana Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia India |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper; No. 6293 |
| description |
Although transfer of agricultural land
ownership through land reform had positive impacts on
productivity, investment, and political empowerment in many
cases, institutional arrangements in West Bengal -- which
made tenancy heritable and imposed a prohibition on
subleasing -- imply that early land reform benefits may not
be sustained and gains from this policy remain well below
potential. Data from a listing of 96,000 households in 200
villages, complemented by a detailed survey of 1,800
owner-cum tenants, point toward binding policy constraints
and large contemporaneous inefficiency of share tenancy that
is exacerbated by strong disincentives to investment. A
conservative estimate puts the efficiency losses from such
arrangements in any period at 25 percent. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Deininger, Klaus Jin, Songqing Yadav, Vandana |
| author_facet |
Deininger, Klaus Jin, Songqing Yadav, Vandana |
| author_sort |
Deininger, Klaus |
| title |
Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms |
| title_short |
Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms |
| title_full |
Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms |
| title_fullStr |
Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms |
| title_sort |
does sharecropping affect productivity and long-term investment? evidence from west bengal’s tenancy reforms |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17066318/sharecropping-affect-productivity-long-term-investment-evidence-west-bengal s-tenancy-reforms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12185 |
| _version_ |
1764422177992474624 |