Government Connections and Financial Constraints : Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms
This paper examines the role of firms' government connections, defined by government intervention in the appointments of Chief Executive Officers and the status of state ownership, in determining the severity of financial constraints faced by...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/02/17386101/government-connections-financial-constraints-evidence-large-representative-sample-chinese-firms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/13145 |
Summary: | This paper examines the role of
firms' government connections, defined by government
intervention in the appointments of Chief Executive Officers
and the status of state ownership, in determining the
severity of financial constraints faced by Chinese firms. In
line with the previous literature, the paper demonstrates
that investment by non-state firms is highly sensitive to
internal cash flows, while no such sensitivity is found for
government-owned enterprises. Even within the subset of
non-state firms, government connections are associated with
substantially less severe financial constraints (less
reliance on internal cash flows to fund investment). The
paper also finds that large non-state firms with weak
government connections are especially financially
constrained, due perhaps to the formidable hold that their
state rivals have on financial resources after the
"grabbing-the-big-and-letting-go-the-small"
privatization program in China. Firms with
government-appointed Chief Executive Officers also have
significantly lower investment intensities, due perhaps to
their lower-powered incentives. The empirical results
suggest that government connections play an important role
in explaining Chinese firms' investment behavior and
financing conditions, and provide further evidence on the
nature of the misallocation of credit by China's
dominant state-owned banks. |
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