Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico
The authors consider the malaise with the present set-up of fiscal federalism in Mexico from the points of view of the main players-the federal government, the states, the municipalities, and the citizen voters-in order to identify the areas of pot...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/4242293/bargaining-new-fiscal-pact-mexico http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14106 |
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okr-10986-141062021-04-23T14:03:20Z Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico Webb, Steven B. Gonzalez, Christian Y. FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL REFORMS TAXES VALUE ADDED TAXES STATE TAXES SALES TAXES TAX COLLECTION SERVICE DELIVERY ACCOUNTABILITY NEGOTIATED REVENUE SHARING TAX ADMINISTRATION TRANSFERS ACCOUNTABILITY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY BASIC EDUCATION CITIES CITIZENS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT SERVICE DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEVOLUTION EVASION EXCISE TAXES EXECUTION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL BALANCE FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL MANAGEMENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT RESOURCES INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY LOCAL TAX MAYORS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY PROPERTY TAX BASE PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES RATIONALIZATION REGULATORY SYSTEM REVENUE SHARING ROADS SMALL MUNICIPALITIES SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE STATE GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE REVENUES STATE TAXES SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX AUTHORITY TAX BURDEN TAX COLLECTION TAX PAYMENT TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UNFUNDED MANDATES VOTERS The authors consider the malaise with the present set-up of fiscal federalism in Mexico from the points of view of the main players-the federal government, the states, the municipalities, and the citizen voters-in order to identify the areas of potential common interest as well as the direct conflicts. There is a zero-sum game on some issues, like the size of aggregate transfers, but not on others, like raising tax collection and improving accountability for service delivery. The authors consider bargain packages that combine mutually beneficial changes and thus might obtain broad enough political support. They analyze the bargaining packages in two main tracks-one concerning tax assignments, revenue sharing, and tax administration, and another concerning the conjunction of earmarked transfers and accountability for service provision. An important result is that almost all states would find it fiscally attractive to impose a sales tax that replaced part of the federal value-added tax (VAT), even if the federal government reduced revenue sharing enough to cover half the cost of reducing the VAT rate to make room for the state tax. 2013-06-21T13:43:50Z 2013-06-21T13:43:50Z 2004-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/4242293/bargaining-new-fiscal-pact-mexico http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14106 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3284 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Mexico |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL REFORMS TAXES VALUE ADDED TAXES STATE TAXES SALES TAXES TAX COLLECTION SERVICE DELIVERY ACCOUNTABILITY NEGOTIATED REVENUE SHARING TAX ADMINISTRATION TRANSFERS ACCOUNTABILITY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY BASIC EDUCATION CITIES CITIZENS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT SERVICE DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEVOLUTION EVASION EXCISE TAXES EXECUTION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL BALANCE FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL MANAGEMENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT RESOURCES INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY LOCAL TAX MAYORS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY PROPERTY TAX BASE PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES RATIONALIZATION REGULATORY SYSTEM REVENUE SHARING ROADS SMALL MUNICIPALITIES SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE STATE GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE REVENUES STATE TAXES SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX AUTHORITY TAX BURDEN TAX COLLECTION TAX PAYMENT TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UNFUNDED MANDATES VOTERS |
| spellingShingle |
FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL REFORMS TAXES VALUE ADDED TAXES STATE TAXES SALES TAXES TAX COLLECTION SERVICE DELIVERY ACCOUNTABILITY NEGOTIATED REVENUE SHARING TAX ADMINISTRATION TRANSFERS ACCOUNTABILITY AUTHORITY AUTONOMY BASIC EDUCATION CITIES CITIZENS CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION DEBT DEBT SERVICE DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY DEVOLUTION EVASION EXCISE TAXES EXECUTION FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERALISM FISCAL FISCAL BALANCE FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL MANAGEMENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT RESOURCES INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY LOCAL TAX MAYORS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE MUNICIPALITIES NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY PROPERTY TAX BASE PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICES RATIONALIZATION REGULATORY SYSTEM REVENUE SHARING ROADS SMALL MUNICIPALITIES SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE STATE GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENTS STATE REVENUES STATE TAXES SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX AUTHORITY TAX BURDEN TAX COLLECTION TAX PAYMENT TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REVENUES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UNFUNDED MANDATES VOTERS Webb, Steven B. Gonzalez, Christian Y. Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Mexico |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3284 |
| description |
The authors consider the malaise with
the present set-up of fiscal federalism in Mexico from the
points of view of the main players-the federal government,
the states, the municipalities, and the citizen voters-in
order to identify the areas of potential common interest as
well as the direct conflicts. There is a zero-sum game on
some issues, like the size of aggregate transfers, but not
on others, like raising tax collection and improving
accountability for service delivery. The authors consider
bargain packages that combine mutually beneficial changes
and thus might obtain broad enough political support. They
analyze the bargaining packages in two main tracks-one
concerning tax assignments, revenue sharing, and tax
administration, and another concerning the conjunction of
earmarked transfers and accountability for service
provision. An important result is that almost all states
would find it fiscally attractive to impose a sales tax that
replaced part of the federal value-added tax (VAT), even if
the federal government reduced revenue sharing enough to
cover half the cost of reducing the VAT rate to make room
for the state tax. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Webb, Steven B. Gonzalez, Christian Y. |
| author_facet |
Webb, Steven B. Gonzalez, Christian Y. |
| author_sort |
Webb, Steven B. |
| title |
Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico |
| title_short |
Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico |
| title_full |
Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico |
| title_fullStr |
Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico |
| title_sort |
bargaining for a new fiscal pact in mexico |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/04/4242293/bargaining-new-fiscal-pact-mexico http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14106 |
| _version_ |
1764430202497138688 |