The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance
The author uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit ins...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/4066087/political-economy-deposit-insurance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14121 |
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okr-10986-141212021-04-23T14:03:20Z The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance Laeven, Luc ACCOUNTABILITY BANK CAPITAL BANK DEPOSITS BANK REGULATION BANK RISK BANK SIZE BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BRANCH BANKING CAPITALIZATION CENTRAL BANKS COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CREDIT UNIONS DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL SETUP INSURANCE ACTIVITIES INSURANCE AGENCIES INSURANCE COMPANIES INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE INDUSTRY INSURANCE LIMITS INSURANCE POLICIES INSURANCE PRODUCTS INSURANCE REGULATION INTERNATIONAL BANKS LAWS LEGAL PROTECTION LIQUID ASSETS MORAL HAZARD NONPERFORMING LOANS PRIVATE BANKS PUBLIC DEBT RATES RISK OF BANK FAILURE SAVINGS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS STOCK MARKETS DEPOSIT INSURANCE BANK DEPOSITS DEPOSITORS DEPOSITORS SAFETY FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS BANKS CONFIDENCE IN BANKS PROXY SHAREHOLDERS The author uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where depositors are poorly educated. The author does not find that coverage is significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of institutional development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for extensive coverage. 2013-06-21T18:18:20Z 2013-06-21T18:18:20Z 2004-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/4066087/political-economy-deposit-insurance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14121 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3247 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research UNITED STATES |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY BANK CAPITAL BANK DEPOSITS BANK REGULATION BANK RISK BANK SIZE BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BRANCH BANKING CAPITALIZATION CENTRAL BANKS COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CREDIT UNIONS DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL SETUP INSURANCE ACTIVITIES INSURANCE AGENCIES INSURANCE COMPANIES INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE INDUSTRY INSURANCE LIMITS INSURANCE POLICIES INSURANCE PRODUCTS INSURANCE REGULATION INTERNATIONAL BANKS LAWS LEGAL PROTECTION LIQUID ASSETS MORAL HAZARD NONPERFORMING LOANS PRIVATE BANKS PUBLIC DEBT RATES RISK OF BANK FAILURE SAVINGS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS STOCK MARKETS DEPOSIT INSURANCE BANK DEPOSITS DEPOSITORS DEPOSITORS SAFETY FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS BANKS CONFIDENCE IN BANKS PROXY SHAREHOLDERS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY BANK CAPITAL BANK DEPOSITS BANK REGULATION BANK RISK BANK SIZE BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKING SYSTEMS BANKS BRANCH BANKING CAPITALIZATION CENTRAL BANKS COALITION GOVERNMENTS COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CREDIT UNIONS DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMS DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMS DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS ECONOMICS FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL SERVICES FINANCIAL STABILITY FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL SETUP INSURANCE ACTIVITIES INSURANCE AGENCIES INSURANCE COMPANIES INSURANCE DESIGN INSURANCE INDUSTRY INSURANCE LIMITS INSURANCE POLICIES INSURANCE PRODUCTS INSURANCE REGULATION INTERNATIONAL BANKS LAWS LEGAL PROTECTION LIQUID ASSETS MORAL HAZARD NONPERFORMING LOANS PRIVATE BANKS PUBLIC DEBT RATES RISK OF BANK FAILURE SAVINGS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS SOCIAL SECURITY SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS STOCK MARKETS DEPOSIT INSURANCE BANK DEPOSITS DEPOSITORS DEPOSITORS SAFETY FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS BANKS CONFIDENCE IN BANKS PROXY SHAREHOLDERS Laeven, Luc The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance |
| geographic_facet |
UNITED STATES |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3247 |
| description |
The author uses a political economy
framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit
insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the
significance of private interest theories in explaining
coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance coverage is
significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized
banks dominate the market and in countries where depositors
are poorly educated. The author does not find that coverage
is significantly related to political-institutional
variables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints on
the executive, or to proxies for the general level of
institutional development, such as per capita income or
property rights. These results provide evidence in support
of the private interest view, according to which risky banks
lobby for extensive coverage. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Laeven, Luc |
| author_facet |
Laeven, Luc |
| author_sort |
Laeven, Luc |
| title |
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance |
| title_short |
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance |
| title_full |
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance |
| title_fullStr |
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance |
| title_sort |
political economy of deposit insurance |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/4066087/political-economy-deposit-insurance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14121 |
| _version_ |
1764430251333517312 |