Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement
Motivated by discussions at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on multilateral disciplines with respect to competition law, the authors develop a two-country model that explores the incentives of a developing country to offer increased market acces...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2892893/trading-market-access-competition-policy-enforcement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14193 |
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okr-10986-141932021-04-23T14:03:20Z Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement Hoekman, Bernard Saggi, Kamal MARKET ACCESS; TRADING ARRANGEMENTS; COMPETITION POLICY; MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS; COMPETITION LAW & LEGISLATION; TARIFF REDUCTIONS; EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS; TRADE REGULATION; WELFARE ECONOMICS; BILATERAL TRADE; LAW ENFORCEMENT; CASE STUDIES; TRANSFER BENEFITS; CARTELS; ACCESS TO MARKETS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LAWS BERTRAND COMPETITION BILATERAL COOPERATION CARTEL COMPETITION AUTHORITIES COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETITION POLICIES COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE PRACTICES CONCESSIONS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COURNOT COMPETITION DEMAND CURVE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOMESTIC PRODUCTION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPORT CARTELS EXPORT MARKETS EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS FREE TRADE GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPORTS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LDCS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COST PRICING MARKET ACCESS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MARKET STRUCTURE MERGERS MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COMPETITION NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES NATIONAL MARKET NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OLIGOPOLY OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY DECISIONS PRICE COMPETITION PRODUCTION COSTS RECIPROCITY SUBSTITUTES TARIFF RATE TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REVENUE TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE MOTIVES TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS TRANSPORT COSTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO ZERO TARIFF Motivated by discussions at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on multilateral disciplines with respect to competition law, the authors develop a two-country model that explores the incentives of a developing country to offer increased market access (by way of a tariff reduction) in exchange for a ban on foreign export cartels by its developed country trading partner. They show that such a bargain is feasible and can generate a globally welfare-maximizing outcome. The authors also explore the incentives for bilateral cooperation when the developing country uses transfers to "pay" for competition enforcement by the developed country. A comparison of the two cases shows that there exist circumstances in which the stick (the tariff) is more effective in sustaining bilateral cooperation than the carrot (the transfer). Furthermore, the scope for cooperation is maximized when both instruments are used. An implication of the analysis is that developing countries have incentives to support an explicit WTO prohibition of export cartels. 2013-06-26T14:58:28Z 2013-06-26T14:58:28Z 2004-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2892893/trading-market-access-competition-policy-enforcement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14193 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3188 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
MARKET ACCESS; TRADING ARRANGEMENTS; COMPETITION POLICY; MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS; COMPETITION LAW & LEGISLATION; TARIFF REDUCTIONS; EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS; TRADE REGULATION; WELFARE ECONOMICS; BILATERAL TRADE; LAW ENFORCEMENT; CASE STUDIES; TRANSFER BENEFITS; CARTELS; ACCESS TO MARKETS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LAWS BERTRAND COMPETITION BILATERAL COOPERATION CARTEL COMPETITION AUTHORITIES COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETITION POLICIES COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE PRACTICES CONCESSIONS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COURNOT COMPETITION DEMAND CURVE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOMESTIC PRODUCTION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPORT CARTELS EXPORT MARKETS EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS FREE TRADE GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPORTS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LDCS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COST PRICING MARKET ACCESS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MARKET STRUCTURE MERGERS MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COMPETITION NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES NATIONAL MARKET NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OLIGOPOLY OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY DECISIONS PRICE COMPETITION PRODUCTION COSTS RECIPROCITY SUBSTITUTES TARIFF RATE TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REVENUE TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE MOTIVES TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS TRANSPORT COSTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO ZERO TARIFF |
| spellingShingle |
MARKET ACCESS; TRADING ARRANGEMENTS; COMPETITION POLICY; MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS; COMPETITION LAW & LEGISLATION; TARIFF REDUCTIONS; EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS; TRADE REGULATION; WELFARE ECONOMICS; BILATERAL TRADE; LAW ENFORCEMENT; CASE STUDIES; TRANSFER BENEFITS; CARTELS; ACCESS TO MARKETS ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ANTITRUST LAW ANTITRUST LAWS BERTRAND COMPETITION BILATERAL COOPERATION CARTEL COMPETITION AUTHORITIES COMPETITION LAW COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT COMPETITION POLICIES COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVE PRACTICES CONCESSIONS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COURNOT COMPETITION DEMAND CURVE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DOMESTIC PRODUCTION EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EQUILIBRIUM EXPORT CARTELS EXPORT MARKETS EXPORTERS EXPORTS EXTERNALITIES FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKETS FREE TRADE GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPORTS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LDCS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COST PRICING MARKET ACCESS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MARKET STRUCTURE MERGERS MULTILATERAL DISCIPLINES MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COMPETITION NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICIES NATIONAL MARKET NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OLIGOPOLY OPTIMIZATION PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY DECISIONS PRICE COMPETITION PRODUCTION COSTS RECIPROCITY SUBSTITUTES TARIFF RATE TARIFF REDUCTION TARIFF REVENUE TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE MOTIVES TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS TRANSPORT COSTS WILLINGNESS TO PAY WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO ZERO TARIFF Hoekman, Bernard Saggi, Kamal Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3188 |
| description |
Motivated by discussions at the World
Trade Organization (WTO) on multilateral disciplines with
respect to competition law, the authors develop a
two-country model that explores the incentives of a
developing country to offer increased market access (by way
of a tariff reduction) in exchange for a ban on foreign
export cartels by its developed country trading partner.
They show that such a bargain is feasible and can generate a
globally welfare-maximizing outcome. The authors also
explore the incentives for bilateral cooperation when the
developing country uses transfers to "pay" for
competition enforcement by the developed country. A
comparison of the two cases shows that there exist
circumstances in which the stick (the tariff) is more
effective in sustaining bilateral cooperation than the
carrot (the transfer). Furthermore, the scope for
cooperation is maximized when both instruments are used. An
implication of the analysis is that developing countries
have incentives to support an explicit WTO prohibition of
export cartels. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Hoekman, Bernard Saggi, Kamal |
| author_facet |
Hoekman, Bernard Saggi, Kamal |
| author_sort |
Hoekman, Bernard |
| title |
Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement |
| title_short |
Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement |
| title_full |
Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement |
| title_fullStr |
Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement |
| title_sort |
trading market access for competition policy enforcement |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2892893/trading-market-access-competition-policy-enforcement http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14193 |
| _version_ |
1764429877502541824 |