To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma
Embezzlement of resources is hampering public service delivery throughout the developing world. Research on this issue is hindered by problems of measurement. To overcome these problems, the authors use an economic experiment to investigate the det...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2892998/serve-community-or-oneself-public-servants-dilemma http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14195 |
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okr-10986-141952021-04-23T14:03:20Z To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma Barr, Abigail Lindelöw, Magnus Serneels, Pieter EMBEZZLEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS ECONOMIC MODELS CORRUPT PRACTICES PUBLIC SERVANTS MONITORING CRITERIA VOTING ARRANGEMENTS WAGE SETTLEMENTS OBSERVATION PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS NURSING STUDENTS SANCTIONS ELECTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY ADOLESCENCE BANDAGES BRIBERY COMMUNITY MEMBERS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA CROWDING DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EQUIPMENT ETHICS HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HEALTH ECONOMICS HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH PLANNING HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH WORKERS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL SYSTEMS LOW INCOME LOW INCOME COUNTRIES MEDICAL CARE MONITORING EFFORT MOTIVATION NGOS NURSING PATIENTS PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROBABILITY PROFESSIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY URBAN DWELLERS VIOLENCE WELFARE ECONOMICS WORKERS Embezzlement of resources is hampering public service delivery throughout the developing world. Research on this issue is hindered by problems of measurement. To overcome these problems, the authors use an economic experiment to investigate the determinants of corrupt behavior. They focus on three aspects of behavior: 1) Embezzling by public servants. 2) Monitoring effort by designated monitors. 3) Voting by community members when provided with an opportunity to select a monitor. The experiment allows the authors to study the effect of wages, effort observance, rules for monitor assignment, and professional norms. Their experimental subjects are Ethiopian nursing students. The authors find that service providers who earn more embezzle less, although the effect is small. Embezzlement is also lower when observance (associated with the risk of being caught and sanctioned) is high, and when service providers face an elected, rather than a randomly selected monitor. Monitors put more effort into monitoring when they face reelection, and when the public servant receives a higher wage. Communities reelect monitors who put more effort into exposing embezzlement. Framing-whereby players are referred to as "health workers" and "community members" rather than by abstract labels-affects neither mean embezzlement nor mean monitoring effort, but significantly increases the variance in both. This suggests that different types of experimental subjects respond differently to the framing, possibly because they adhere to different norms. 2013-06-26T15:23:30Z 2013-06-26T15:23:30Z 2004-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2892998/serve-community-or-oneself-public-servants-dilemma http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14195 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3187 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Ethiopia |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
EMBEZZLEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS ECONOMIC MODELS CORRUPT PRACTICES PUBLIC SERVANTS MONITORING CRITERIA VOTING ARRANGEMENTS WAGE SETTLEMENTS OBSERVATION PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS NURSING STUDENTS SANCTIONS ELECTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY ADOLESCENCE BANDAGES BRIBERY COMMUNITY MEMBERS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA CROWDING DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EQUIPMENT ETHICS HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HEALTH ECONOMICS HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH PLANNING HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH WORKERS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL SYSTEMS LOW INCOME LOW INCOME COUNTRIES MEDICAL CARE MONITORING EFFORT MOTIVATION NGOS NURSING PATIENTS PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROBABILITY PROFESSIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY URBAN DWELLERS VIOLENCE WELFARE ECONOMICS WORKERS |
| spellingShingle |
EMBEZZLEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS ECONOMIC MODELS CORRUPT PRACTICES PUBLIC SERVANTS MONITORING CRITERIA VOTING ARRANGEMENTS WAGE SETTLEMENTS OBSERVATION PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS NURSING STUDENTS SANCTIONS ELECTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY ADOLESCENCE BANDAGES BRIBERY COMMUNITY MEMBERS COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CORRUPTION COUNTRY DATA CROWDING DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EQUIPMENT ETHICS HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS HEALTH ECONOMICS HEALTH OUTCOMES HEALTH PLANNING HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SECTOR HEALTH WORKERS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL SYSTEMS LOW INCOME LOW INCOME COUNTRIES MEDICAL CARE MONITORING EFFORT MOTIVATION NGOS NURSING PATIENTS PETTY CORRUPTION POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL INSTABILITY POLITICAL RIGHTS PRIVATE SECTOR PROBABILITY PROFESSIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TRANSPARENCY UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY URBAN DWELLERS VIOLENCE WELFARE ECONOMICS WORKERS Barr, Abigail Lindelöw, Magnus Serneels, Pieter To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Ethiopia |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3187 |
| description |
Embezzlement of resources is hampering
public service delivery throughout the developing world.
Research on this issue is hindered by problems of
measurement. To overcome these problems, the authors use an
economic experiment to investigate the determinants of
corrupt behavior. They focus on three aspects of behavior:
1) Embezzling by public servants. 2) Monitoring effort by
designated monitors. 3) Voting by community members when
provided with an opportunity to select a monitor. The
experiment allows the authors to study the effect of wages,
effort observance, rules for monitor assignment, and
professional norms. Their experimental subjects are
Ethiopian nursing students. The authors find that service
providers who earn more embezzle less, although the effect
is small. Embezzlement is also lower when observance
(associated with the risk of being caught and sanctioned) is
high, and when service providers face an elected, rather
than a randomly selected monitor. Monitors put more effort
into monitoring when they face reelection, and when the
public servant receives a higher wage. Communities reelect
monitors who put more effort into exposing embezzlement.
Framing-whereby players are referred to as "health
workers" and "community members" rather than
by abstract labels-affects neither mean embezzlement nor
mean monitoring effort, but significantly increases the
variance in both. This suggests that different types of
experimental subjects respond differently to the framing,
possibly because they adhere to different norms. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Barr, Abigail Lindelöw, Magnus Serneels, Pieter |
| author_facet |
Barr, Abigail Lindelöw, Magnus Serneels, Pieter |
| author_sort |
Barr, Abigail |
| title |
To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma |
| title_short |
To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma |
| title_full |
To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma |
| title_fullStr |
To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma |
| title_full_unstemmed |
To Serve the Community or Oneself: The Public Servant's Dilemma |
| title_sort |
to serve the community or oneself: the public servant's dilemma |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2892998/serve-community-or-oneself-public-servants-dilemma http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14195 |
| _version_ |
1764429880691261440 |