Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients
This paper analyzes the impact of donor fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's decision to hire government administrators to manage donor-funded projects predicts that the n...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2879345/donor-fragmentation-bureaucratic-quality-aid-recipients http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14201 |
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okr-10986-142012021-04-23T14:03:20Z Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients Knack, Stephen Rahman, Aminur ADVERSE EFFECTS AID AID AGENCIES AID COORDINATION AID PROGRAMS BIDDING CLIMATE COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMITMENT COMMITMENTS CONTRACTORS COUNTERPART DATA SOURCES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT BANKS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISBURSEMENT DISBURSEMENTS DONOR COORDINATION DONOR COUNTRIES DONOR COUNTRY DONOR FUNDS ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL FLOWS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HEALTH SECTOR INCOME LABOR FORCE LEARNING LENDERS MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MEDIA POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY ASSESSMENTS PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR REAL RESOURCES SCHOOLS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SPONSORS SUPPLIERS TRAINING PROGRAMS DONOR FINANCE FRAGMENTATION AID COORDINATION BUREAUCRACY GOVERNMENT ROLE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY DONOR FUNDED PROJECTS FUNDS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE QUALITY ASSESSMENT MULTILATERAL AID This paper analyzes the impact of donor fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's decision to hire government administrators to manage donor-funded projects predicts that the number of administrators hired declines as the donor's share of other projects in the country increases, and as the donor's "altruism" (concern for the success of other donors' projects) increases. These hypotheses are supported by cross-country empirical tests using an index of bureaucratic quality available for aid-recipient nations over the 1982-2001 period. Declines in bureaucratic quality are associated with higher donor fragmentation (reflecting the presence of many donors, each with a small share of aid), and with smaller shares of aid coming from multilateral agencies, a proxy for donor "altruism." 2013-06-26T16:29:50Z 2013-06-26T16:29:50Z 2004-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2879345/donor-fragmentation-bureaucratic-quality-aid-recipients http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14201 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3186 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ADVERSE EFFECTS AID AID AGENCIES AID COORDINATION AID PROGRAMS BIDDING CLIMATE COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMITMENT COMMITMENTS CONTRACTORS COUNTERPART DATA SOURCES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT BANKS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISBURSEMENT DISBURSEMENTS DONOR COORDINATION DONOR COUNTRIES DONOR COUNTRY DONOR FUNDS ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL FLOWS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HEALTH SECTOR INCOME LABOR FORCE LEARNING LENDERS MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MEDIA POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY ASSESSMENTS PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR REAL RESOURCES SCHOOLS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SPONSORS SUPPLIERS TRAINING PROGRAMS DONOR FINANCE FRAGMENTATION AID COORDINATION BUREAUCRACY GOVERNMENT ROLE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY DONOR FUNDED PROJECTS FUNDS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE QUALITY ASSESSMENT MULTILATERAL AID |
| spellingShingle |
ADVERSE EFFECTS AID AID AGENCIES AID COORDINATION AID PROGRAMS BIDDING CLIMATE COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMITMENT COMMITMENTS CONTRACTORS COUNTERPART DATA SOURCES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT BANKS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISBURSEMENT DISBURSEMENTS DONOR COORDINATION DONOR COUNTRIES DONOR COUNTRY DONOR FUNDS ECONOMICS ECONOMISTS EMPLOYMENT EXPENDITURES FINANCIAL FLOWS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HEALTH SECTOR INCOME LABOR FORCE LEARNING LENDERS MANAGERS MARGINAL COST MEDIA POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY ASSESSMENTS PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR REAL RESOURCES SCHOOLS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SPONSORS SUPPLIERS TRAINING PROGRAMS DONOR FINANCE FRAGMENTATION AID COORDINATION BUREAUCRACY GOVERNMENT ROLE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY DONOR FUNDED PROJECTS FUNDS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE QUALITY ASSESSMENT MULTILATERAL AID Knack, Stephen Rahman, Aminur Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3186 |
| description |
This paper analyzes the impact of donor
fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in
aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's
decision to hire government administrators to manage
donor-funded projects predicts that the number of
administrators hired declines as the donor's share of
other projects in the country increases, and as the
donor's "altruism" (concern for the success
of other donors' projects) increases. These hypotheses
are supported by cross-country empirical tests using an
index of bureaucratic quality available for aid-recipient
nations over the 1982-2001 period. Declines in bureaucratic
quality are associated with higher donor fragmentation
(reflecting the presence of many donors, each with a small
share of aid), and with smaller shares of aid coming from
multilateral agencies, a proxy for donor "altruism." |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Knack, Stephen Rahman, Aminur |
| author_facet |
Knack, Stephen Rahman, Aminur |
| author_sort |
Knack, Stephen |
| title |
Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients |
| title_short |
Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients |
| title_full |
Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients |
| title_fullStr |
Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients |
| title_sort |
donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/2879345/donor-fragmentation-bureaucratic-quality-aid-recipients http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14201 |
| _version_ |
1764429884192456704 |