Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis
The author proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests, at the expense...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5304231/elections-special-interests-fiscal-costs-financial-crisis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14204 |
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okr-10986-142042021-04-23T14:03:21Z Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis Keefer, Philip ACCOUNTABILITY AGRICULTURE AMBITION BAILOUT COSTS BANK ASSETS BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK LIABILITIES BANK RUN BANK SIZE BANKING CRISES BANKING DEPOSITS BANKING OPERATIONS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLOWS CHECKS CITIZENS COMPETITIVENESS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION CURRENCY CURRENT ACCOUNT DEBT DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEVALUATION DISCOUNT RATES DISTRICTS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SECTORS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ELECTIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXOGENOUS SHOCKS FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SYSTEM FISCAL POLICIES FOREIGN EXCHANGE GDP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SPENDING ILLIQUIDITY INDEBTEDNESS INSURANCE JURISDICTIONS LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LENDING PRACTICES LIQUIDITY LOBBYING LOBBYISTS NATIONAL INCOME OFFSETTING PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PUBLIC SPENDING REAL INTEREST RATE RECAPITALIZATION REGULATORY POLICY REPRESENTATIVES SAVINGS SEPARATION OF POWERS SMALL BANKS SOCIAL GROUPS TERMS OF TRADE VETO VETO POWER VOTERS The author proposes a new approach to explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some countries than in others. He begins with the premise that many crises result from the willingness of politicians to cater to special interests, at the expense of broad social interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the more veto players there are; the less important are exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for politicians and special interests to forge credible agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs of financial crisis, even after controlling for the financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the efficient prevention, and resolution of financial crisis. 2013-06-26T16:45:01Z 2013-06-26T16:45:01Z 2004-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5304231/elections-special-interests-fiscal-costs-financial-crisis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14204 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3439 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY AGRICULTURE AMBITION BAILOUT COSTS BANK ASSETS BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK LIABILITIES BANK RUN BANK SIZE BANKING CRISES BANKING DEPOSITS BANKING OPERATIONS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLOWS CHECKS CITIZENS COMPETITIVENESS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION CURRENCY CURRENT ACCOUNT DEBT DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEVALUATION DISCOUNT RATES DISTRICTS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SECTORS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ELECTIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXOGENOUS SHOCKS FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SYSTEM FISCAL POLICIES FOREIGN EXCHANGE GDP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SPENDING ILLIQUIDITY INDEBTEDNESS INSURANCE JURISDICTIONS LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LENDING PRACTICES LIQUIDITY LOBBYING LOBBYISTS NATIONAL INCOME OFFSETTING PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PUBLIC SPENDING REAL INTEREST RATE RECAPITALIZATION REGULATORY POLICY REPRESENTATIVES SAVINGS SEPARATION OF POWERS SMALL BANKS SOCIAL GROUPS TERMS OF TRADE VETO VETO POWER VOTERS |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY AGRICULTURE AMBITION BAILOUT COSTS BANK ASSETS BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK LIABILITIES BANK RUN BANK SIZE BANKING CRISES BANKING DEPOSITS BANKING OPERATIONS BANKING SECTOR BANKING SYSTEM BANKS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL FLOWS CHECKS CITIZENS COMPETITIVENESS CONSTITUENCIES CORRUPTION CURRENCY CURRENT ACCOUNT DEBT DECISION MAKING DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEVALUATION DISCOUNT RATES DISTRICTS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SECTORS ECONOMIC SHOCKS ELECTIONS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXOGENOUS SHOCKS FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SYSTEM FISCAL POLICIES FOREIGN EXCHANGE GDP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SPENDING ILLIQUIDITY INDEBTEDNESS INSURANCE JURISDICTIONS LEGISLATION LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LENDING PRACTICES LIQUIDITY LOBBYING LOBBYISTS NATIONAL INCOME OFFSETTING PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS PRESIDENTS PUBLIC SPENDING REAL INTEREST RATE RECAPITALIZATION REGULATORY POLICY REPRESENTATIVES SAVINGS SEPARATION OF POWERS SMALL BANKS SOCIAL GROUPS TERMS OF TRADE VETO VETO POWER VOTERS Keefer, Philip Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3439 |
| description |
The author proposes a new approach to
explain why the costs of crisis are greater in some
countries than in others. He begins with the premise that
many crises result from the willingness of politicians to
cater to special interests, at the expense of broad social
interests. A parsimonious model predicts that the less
costly it is for average citizens to expel politicians, the
more veto players there are; the less important are
exogenous shocks, and the more difficult it is for
politicians and special interests to forge credible
agreements, the lower the costs of crisis are. Though these
predictions differ from those in the literature, empirical
evidence presented shows that they explain the fiscal costs
of financial crisis, even after controlling for the
financial sector policies believed to contribute most to the
efficient prevention, and resolution of financial crisis. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Keefer, Philip |
| author_facet |
Keefer, Philip |
| author_sort |
Keefer, Philip |
| title |
Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis |
| title_short |
Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis |
| title_full |
Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis |
| title_fullStr |
Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Elections, Special Interests, and the Fiscal Costs of Financial Crisis |
| title_sort |
elections, special interests, and the fiscal costs of financial crisis |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/10/5304231/elections-special-interests-fiscal-costs-financial-crisis http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14204 |
| _version_ |
1764430723710713856 |