Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences
This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between for...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2013
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5296837/market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences-market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14206 |
| id |
okr-10986-14206 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-142062021-04-23T14:03:21Z Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences Kee, Hiau Looi Olarreaga, Marcelo Silva, Peri AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES CENTRAL AMERICA CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DICTATORSHIP DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRODUCERS DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC FACTORS ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL STUDIES EQUILIBRIUM EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION EXPENDITURES EXPORT GROWTH EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FISHING FOREIGN EXPORTERS FOREIGN PRODUCERS FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS FREE TRADE AREA GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INCOME INTERNATIONAL TRADE LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATION LOBBYING LOBBYISTS MARKET ACCESS MINIMIS LEVEL NATIONALS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS PREFERENTIAL TARIFF PREFERENTIAL TARIFF REGIME PRODUCER SURPLUS PRODUCERS QUOTAS SOUTH AMERICA SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSTITUTION EFFECT TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PREFERENCE TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF RATES TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE ISSUES TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE PREFERENCES TRADING PARTNERS UTILITY FUNCTION WELFARE FUNCTION WORLD TRADE This paper assesses the foreign lobbying forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic framework is the one developed that is extended to explain the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight given to social welfare in the U.S. government's objective function when deciding whether or not to grant tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters. 2013-06-26T16:58:02Z 2013-06-26T16:58:02Z 2004-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5296837/market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences-market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14206 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3198 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES CENTRAL AMERICA CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DICTATORSHIP DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRODUCERS DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC FACTORS ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL STUDIES EQUILIBRIUM EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION EXPENDITURES EXPORT GROWTH EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FISHING FOREIGN EXPORTERS FOREIGN PRODUCERS FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS FREE TRADE AREA GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INCOME INTERNATIONAL TRADE LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATION LOBBYING LOBBYISTS MARKET ACCESS MINIMIS LEVEL NATIONALS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS PREFERENTIAL TARIFF PREFERENTIAL TARIFF REGIME PRODUCER SURPLUS PRODUCERS QUOTAS SOUTH AMERICA SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSTITUTION EFFECT TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PREFERENCE TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF RATES TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE ISSUES TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE PREFERENCES TRADING PARTNERS UTILITY FUNCTION WELFARE FUNCTION WORLD TRADE |
| spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AGRICULTURE ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES CENTRAL AMERICA CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DICTATORSHIP DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRODUCERS DUMPING ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC FACTORS ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL STUDIES EQUILIBRIUM EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION EXPENDITURES EXPORT GROWTH EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FISHING FOREIGN EXPORTERS FOREIGN PRODUCERS FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS FREE TRADE AREA GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INCOME INTERNATIONAL TRADE LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATION LOBBYING LOBBYISTS MARKET ACCESS MINIMIS LEVEL NATIONALS NON-TARIFF BARRIERS POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLITICAL ECONOMY PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS PREFERENTIAL TARIFF PREFERENTIAL TARIFF REGIME PRODUCER SURPLUS PRODUCERS QUOTAS SOUTH AMERICA SOUTH AMERICAN SUBSTITUTION EFFECT TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PREFERENCE TARIFF PREFERENCES TARIFF RATES TARIFF REDUCTIONS TARIFF REVENUE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE ISSUES TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE PREFERENCES TRADING PARTNERS UTILITY FUNCTION WELFARE FUNCTION WORLD TRADE Kee, Hiau Looi Olarreaga, Marcelo Silva, Peri Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No.3198 |
| description |
This paper assesses the foreign lobbying
forces behind the tariff preferences that the United States
grants to Latin American and Caribbean countries. The basic
framework is the one developed that is extended to explain
the relationship between foreign lobbying and tariff
preferences. Results suggest that returns to Latin American
and Caribbean exporters lobbying for tariff preferences in
the United States are around 50 percent. The reason for
these large returns is the relatively low estimated weight
given to social welfare in the U.S. government's
objective function when deciding whether or not to grant
tariff preferences to Latin American and Caribbean exporters. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Kee, Hiau Looi Olarreaga, Marcelo Silva, Peri |
| author_facet |
Kee, Hiau Looi Olarreaga, Marcelo Silva, Peri |
| author_sort |
Kee, Hiau Looi |
| title |
Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences |
| title_short |
Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences |
| title_full |
Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences |
| title_fullStr |
Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Market Access for Sale: Latin America's Lobbying for U.S. Tariff Preferences |
| title_sort |
market access for sale: latin america's lobbying for u.s. tariff preferences |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/01/5296837/market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences-market-access-sale-latin-americas-lobbying-tariff-preferences http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14206 |
| _version_ |
1764430729712762880 |