Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy

The authors investigate the theoretical effects of lobbying and pressure group activities on both economic efficiency and on equity. Looking at lobbying as a political activity that takes place alongside production, they find that lobbies may gener...

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Main Authors:	Campante, Filipe R., Ferreira, Francisco H.G.
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2013
Subjects:	ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE AGENTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL MARKETS CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPENSATING VARIATION CONFLICT OF INTERESTS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING PROCESS DECISION-MAKING DISCOUNT RATES DISPOSABLE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC RESOURCES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMISTS ELITES EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL SUPPORT GOVERNMENT DECREE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IMPORTS INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEFFICIENCY INHERITANCE LABOR SUPPLY LOBBYING LOBBYISTS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MINIMUM WAGES NASH EQUILIBRIUM OLIGARCHY PARETO EFFICIENCY PERFECT INFORMATION POLICY DECISIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POPULISM PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING REAL WAGES REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCIENTISTS SOCIAL WELFARE TAX RATE TAXATION TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY FUNCTION VOTING WAGES WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION LOBBYING POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES & THE POOR ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM EQUITY POLITICAL ACTIVITY & THE POOR
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3056035/inefficient-lobbying-populism-oligarchy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14442

id	okr-10986-14442
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-144422021-04-23T14:03:20Z Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy Campante, Filipe R. Ferreira, Francisco H.G. ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE AGENTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL MARKETS CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPENSATING VARIATION CONFLICT OF INTERESTS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING PROCESS DECISION-MAKING DISCOUNT RATES DISPOSABLE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC RESOURCES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMISTS ELITES EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL SUPPORT GOVERNMENT DECREE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IMPORTS INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEFFICIENCY INHERITANCE LABOR SUPPLY LOBBYING LOBBYISTS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MINIMUM WAGES NASH EQUILIBRIUM OLIGARCHY PARETO EFFICIENCY PERFECT INFORMATION POLICY DECISIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POPULISM PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING REAL WAGES REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCIENTISTS SOCIAL WELFARE TAX RATE TAXATION TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY FUNCTION VOTING WAGES WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION LOBBYING POPULISM OLIGARCHY POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES & THE POOR ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM EQUITY POLITICAL ACTIVITY & THE POOR The authors investigate the theoretical effects of lobbying and pressure group activities on both economic efficiency and on equity. Looking at lobbying as a political activity that takes place alongside production, they find that lobbies may generate economic inefficiency as part of the process of shifting the allocation of government expenditures in their favor. Outcomes of this non-electoral political process will always be biased toward the group with a comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. In a context where the main political conflict is one between "the rich" and "the poor," political equilibria may be either populist (inefficiently pro-poor) or oligarchic (inefficiently pro-rich), depending on each group's lobbying effectiveness. 2013-07-10T17:13:43Z 2013-07-10T17:13:43Z 2004-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3056035/inefficient-lobbying-populism-oligarchy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14442 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3240 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, D.C. Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE AGENTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL MARKETS CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPENSATING VARIATION CONFLICT OF INTERESTS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING PROCESS DECISION-MAKING DISCOUNT RATES DISPOSABLE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC RESOURCES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMISTS ELITES EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL SUPPORT GOVERNMENT DECREE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IMPORTS INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEFFICIENCY INHERITANCE LABOR SUPPLY LOBBYING LOBBYISTS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MINIMUM WAGES NASH EQUILIBRIUM OLIGARCHY PARETO EFFICIENCY PERFECT INFORMATION POLICY DECISIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POPULISM PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING REAL WAGES REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCIENTISTS SOCIAL WELFARE TAX RATE TAXATION TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY FUNCTION VOTING WAGES WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION LOBBYING POPULISM OLIGARCHY POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES & THE POOR ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM EQUITY POLITICAL ACTIVITY & THE POOR
spellingShingle	ABSOLUTE ADVANTAGE AGENTS ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL MARKETS CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS COALITIONS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES COMPENSATING VARIATION CONFLICT OF INTERESTS DECISION MAKING DECISION MAKING PROCESS DECISION-MAKING DISCOUNT RATES DISPOSABLE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC EFFECTS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC POLICIES ECONOMIC RESOURCES ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMISTS ELITES EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL SUPPORT GOVERNMENT DECREE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IMPORTS INCOME DISTRIBUTION INEFFICIENCY INHERITANCE LABOR SUPPLY LOBBYING LOBBYISTS MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COSTS MARGINAL PRODUCT MINIMUM WAGES NASH EQUILIBRIUM OLIGARCHY PARETO EFFICIENCY PERFECT INFORMATION POLICY DECISIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PROCESS POPULISM PRICE INCREASES PRIVATE CONSUMPTION PRIVATE GOODS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTIVITY PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC SPENDING REAL WAGES REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION SCIENTISTS SOCIAL WELFARE TAX RATE TAXATION TOTAL OUTPUT TRANSACTION COSTS UTILITY FUNCTION VOTING WAGES WEALTH WELFARE FUNCTION LOBBYING POPULISM OLIGARCHY POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS PUBLIC EXPENDITURES & THE POOR ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM EQUITY POLITICAL ACTIVITY & THE POOR Campante, Filipe R. Ferreira, Francisco H.G. Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No.3240
description	The authors investigate the theoretical effects of lobbying and pressure group activities on both economic efficiency and on equity. Looking at lobbying as a political activity that takes place alongside production, they find that lobbies may generate economic inefficiency as part of the process of shifting the allocation of government expenditures in their favor. Outcomes of this non-electoral political process will always be biased toward the group with a comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. In a context where the main political conflict is one between "the rich" and "the poor," political equilibria may be either populist (inefficiently pro-poor) or oligarchic (inefficiently pro-rich), depending on each group's lobbying effectiveness.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Campante, Filipe R. Ferreira, Francisco H.G.
author_facet	Campante, Filipe R. Ferreira, Francisco H.G.
author_sort	Campante, Filipe R.
title	Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy
title_short	Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy
title_full	Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy
title_fullStr	Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy
title_full_unstemmed	Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy
title_sort	inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy
publisher	World Bank, Washington, D.C.
publishDate	2013
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3056035/inefficient-lobbying-populism-oligarchy http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14442
_version_	1764430035415990272

Inefficient Lobbying, Populism and Oligarchy

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