Sri Lanka : Country Financial Accountability Assessment
The framework for public financial accountability in Sri Lanka is founded in the principles of governance associated with the model inherited from the British, widely accepted as appropriate for the country. The primary accountability institutions,...
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| Format: | Country Financial Accountability Assessment |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/3100541/sri-lanka-country-financial-accountability-assessment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14597 |
| Summary: | The framework for public financial
accountability in Sri Lanka is founded in the principles of
governance associated with the model inherited from the
British, widely accepted as appropriate for the country. The
primary accountability institutions, and organizations for
financial management, control, audit and legislative
scrutiny have, however, not evolved in line with the changes
in the more advanced democracies of a similar background.
This lapse has reduced the effectiveness of the system of
public financial accountability in Sri Lanka, resulting in
less than adequate assurance, that public funds are used for
the purposes intended with due consideration to economy and
efficiency. Financial accountability at the sub-national
level is less well developed than at the center. The reasons
for this are similar to those concerning the central
Government, but more acute and pronounced. Public
enterprises are characterized by excessive staff; weak
management; inefficiencies; heavy losses; dependency on
budget transfers; and delayed publication of audited
accounts, thus, further eroding public financial
accountability. Discussions with stakeholders on reforms,
centered around the urgent need to improve public financial
accountability, showing five priority areas of concern: 1)
Parliamentary control of the public purse has become
ineffective, which can be restored by strengthening the
oversight function provided by the public accounts and
public enterprises committees; 2) the accountability of the
executive is too focused on 'spending to budget',
rather than on 'managing for results', therefore,
introducing, on a progressive basis, a performance based
culture with incentives focused on achievement of outputs
and outcomes, and, holding government officials accountable
for meeting objectives and performance standards should be
considered; 3) need for strengthening the public audit
function; 4) removing obstacles, and re-visiting the
Establishment Code could prod good governance practices;
and, 5) addressing greater specificity on financial
accounting, reporting, auditing, and capacity building at
sub-national levels. |
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