Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform

This is a collection of papers that study the constraints on fiscal systems, imposed by problems of institutions, administration, and incentives in developing, and post-Socialist economies. Chapter two focuses on the administration of indirect taxa...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	McLaren, John
Format:	Publication
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Washington, DC: World Bank 2013
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING ACTUAL TAX COLLECTION ADMINISTRATION REFORM AUDITING AUDITORS AUDITS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CHECKING COLLECT TAXES COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC CHANGE ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EVASION EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS FEDERAL TAXES FEDERALISM FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION FINANCIAL CRISES FISCAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN TRADE GOOD GOVERNANCE INCOME INCOME TAX INCOME TAXES INDIRECT TAXATION INDIRECT TAXES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LICENSES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NATURAL RESOURCES OPTIMAL TAXATION POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE REVENUE GENERATION REVENUE SYSTEMS SAVINGS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE BUDGET STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STREAMS SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ARREARS TAX AUTHORITY TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION TAX COLLECTORS TAX COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TAX EVASION TAX INSPECTORS TAX LIABILITY TAX OBLIGATION TAX POLICY TAX POLICY DESIGN TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX STRUCTURES TAX SYSTEM TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRADE TAXES TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WAGES INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FISCAL CONSTRAINTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CASE STUDIES MARKET ACCESS VALUE ADDED TAXES POLITICAL FACTORS CORRUPT PRACTICES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/2166851/institutional-elements-tax-design-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15170

Description
Summary:	This is a collection of papers that study the constraints on fiscal systems, imposed by problems of institutions, administration, and incentives in developing, and post-Socialist economies. Chapter two focuses on the administration of indirect taxation, and provides a case study of indirect taxation in Tanzania. This shows how evasion can be documented, and quantified, through a case study that looks at a particular type of reform, aimed at curbing evasion: franchising, or privatizing the right to tax, which has been tried in several Tanzanian towns as a way of collecting vendor fees, for access to a public market. Chapter three is a theoretical study of evasion under a value-added tax (VAT), and the inefficiencies it can create. Chapter four studies the fiscal constraints within the federal politics of Russia, while Chapters five and six examine case studies (India) in fiscal federalism, in which the determination of fiscal outcomes is - to a considerable degree - a matter of bargaining between political entities in the center, and in the periphery. In both cases, it appears that large-scale distortions, away from an ideal tax system, emerge as a result, suggesting corruption can be fought by increasing functional specialization within a tax bureaucracy. The last chapter looks at the problem of opportunistic taxation, particularly regarding the African context, and studies various ways in which the problem can be alleviated.

Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform

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