Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform
This is a collection of papers that study the constraints on fiscal systems, imposed by problems of institutions, administration, and incentives in developing, and post-Socialist economies. Chapter two focuses on the administration of indirect taxa...
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Washington, DC: World Bank
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/2166851/institutional-elements-tax-design-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15170 |
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okr-10986-151702021-04-23T14:03:11Z Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform McLaren, John McLaren, John ACCOUNTING ACTUAL TAX COLLECTION ADMINISTRATION REFORM AUDITING AUDITORS AUDITS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CHECKING COLLECT TAXES COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC CHANGE ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EVASION EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS FEDERAL TAXES FEDERALISM FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION FINANCIAL CRISES FISCAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN TRADE GOOD GOVERNANCE INCOME INCOME TAX INCOME TAXES INDIRECT TAXATION INDIRECT TAXES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LICENSES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NATURAL RESOURCES OPTIMAL TAXATION POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE REVENUE GENERATION REVENUE SYSTEMS SAVINGS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE BUDGET STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STREAMS SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ARREARS TAX AUTHORITY TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION TAX COLLECTORS TAX COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TAX EVASION TAX INSPECTORS TAX LIABILITY TAX OBLIGATION TAX POLICY TAX POLICY DESIGN TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX STRUCTURES TAX SYSTEM TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRADE TAXES TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WAGES INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX REFORMS FISCAL CONSTRAINTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INDIRECT TAXATION CASE STUDIES TAX EVASION PRIVATIZATION TAX COLLECTION MARKET ACCESS VALUE ADDED TAXES FISCAL FEDERALISM POLITICAL FACTORS TAX COMPLIANCE CORRUPT PRACTICES This is a collection of papers that study the constraints on fiscal systems, imposed by problems of institutions, administration, and incentives in developing, and post-Socialist economies. Chapter two focuses on the administration of indirect taxation, and provides a case study of indirect taxation in Tanzania. This shows how evasion can be documented, and quantified, through a case study that looks at a particular type of reform, aimed at curbing evasion: franchising, or privatizing the right to tax, which has been tried in several Tanzanian towns as a way of collecting vendor fees, for access to a public market. Chapter three is a theoretical study of evasion under a value-added tax (VAT), and the inefficiencies it can create. Chapter four studies the fiscal constraints within the federal politics of Russia, while Chapters five and six examine case studies (India) in fiscal federalism, in which the determination of fiscal outcomes is - to a considerable degree - a matter of bargaining between political entities in the center, and in the periphery. In both cases, it appears that large-scale distortions, away from an ideal tax system, emerge as a result, suggesting corruption can be fought by increasing functional specialization within a tax bureaucracy. The last chapter looks at the problem of opportunistic taxation, particularly regarding the African context, and studies various ways in which the problem can be alleviated. 2013-08-19T18:51:07Z 2013-08-19T18:51:07Z 2003-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/2166851/institutional-elements-tax-design-reform 0-8213-5394-2 0253-7494 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15170 English en_US World Bank Technical Paper;No. 539 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Publication Publications & Research :: Publication Africa Europe and Central Asia South Asia |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTING ACTUAL TAX COLLECTION ADMINISTRATION REFORM AUDITING AUDITORS AUDITS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CHECKING COLLECT TAXES COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC CHANGE ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EVASION EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS FEDERAL TAXES FEDERALISM FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION FINANCIAL CRISES FISCAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN TRADE GOOD GOVERNANCE INCOME INCOME TAX INCOME TAXES INDIRECT TAXATION INDIRECT TAXES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LICENSES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NATURAL RESOURCES OPTIMAL TAXATION POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE REVENUE GENERATION REVENUE SYSTEMS SAVINGS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE BUDGET STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STREAMS SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ARREARS TAX AUTHORITY TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION TAX COLLECTORS TAX COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TAX EVASION TAX INSPECTORS TAX LIABILITY TAX OBLIGATION TAX POLICY TAX POLICY DESIGN TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX STRUCTURES TAX SYSTEM TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRADE TAXES TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WAGES INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX REFORMS FISCAL CONSTRAINTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INDIRECT TAXATION CASE STUDIES TAX EVASION PRIVATIZATION TAX COLLECTION MARKET ACCESS VALUE ADDED TAXES FISCAL FEDERALISM POLITICAL FACTORS TAX COMPLIANCE CORRUPT PRACTICES |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTING ACTUAL TAX COLLECTION ADMINISTRATION REFORM AUDITING AUDITORS AUDITS BUREAUCRACY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CHECKING COLLECT TAXES COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC CHANGE ECONOMISTS ELASTICITIES EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS EVASION EXPENDITURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS FEDERAL TAXES FEDERALISM FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION FINANCIAL CRISES FISCAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FISCAL POLICY FOREIGN TRADE GOOD GOVERNANCE INCOME INCOME TAX INCOME TAXES INDIRECT TAXATION INDIRECT TAXES INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY LEGISLATION LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LICENSES LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NATURAL RESOURCES OPTIMAL TAXATION POLICY MAKERS POLITICAL ECONOMY PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTIVITY PROFITABILITY PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SERVICE REVENUE GENERATION REVENUE SYSTEMS SAVINGS SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS STATE BUDGET STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STREAMS SUBSIDIARY TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX ARREARS TAX AUTHORITY TAX BASE TAX COLLECTION TAX COLLECTORS TAX COMPLIANCE TAX ENFORCEMENT TAX EVASION TAX INSPECTORS TAX LIABILITY TAX OBLIGATION TAX POLICY TAX POLICY DESIGN TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX REFORM TAX REFORMS TAX RETURNS TAX REVENUE TAX STRUCTURES TAX SYSTEM TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TRADE TAXES TRADEOFFS TRANSPARENCY WAGES INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX REFORMS FISCAL CONSTRAINTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INDIRECT TAXATION CASE STUDIES TAX EVASION PRIVATIZATION TAX COLLECTION MARKET ACCESS VALUE ADDED TAXES FISCAL FEDERALISM POLITICAL FACTORS TAX COMPLIANCE CORRUPT PRACTICES McLaren, John Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Europe and Central Asia South Asia |
| relation |
World Bank Technical Paper;No. 539 |
| description |
This is a collection of papers that
study the constraints on fiscal systems, imposed by problems
of institutions, administration, and incentives in
developing, and post-Socialist economies. Chapter two
focuses on the administration of indirect taxation, and
provides a case study of indirect taxation in Tanzania. This
shows how evasion can be documented, and quantified, through
a case study that looks at a particular type of reform,
aimed at curbing evasion: franchising, or privatizing the
right to tax, which has been tried in several Tanzanian
towns as a way of collecting vendor fees, for access to a
public market. Chapter three is a theoretical study of
evasion under a value-added tax (VAT), and the
inefficiencies it can create. Chapter four studies the
fiscal constraints within the federal politics of Russia,
while Chapters five and six examine case studies (India) in
fiscal federalism, in which the determination of fiscal
outcomes is - to a considerable degree - a matter of
bargaining between political entities in the center, and in
the periphery. In both cases, it appears that large-scale
distortions, away from an ideal tax system, emerge as a
result, suggesting corruption can be fought by increasing
functional specialization within a tax bureaucracy. The last
chapter looks at the problem of opportunistic taxation,
particularly regarding the African context, and studies
various ways in which the problem can be alleviated. |
| author2 |
McLaren, John |
| author_facet |
McLaren, John McLaren, John |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Publication |
| author |
McLaren, John |
| author_sort |
McLaren, John |
| title |
Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform |
| title_short |
Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform |
| title_full |
Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform |
| title_fullStr |
Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Institutional Elements of Tax Design and Reform |
| title_sort |
institutional elements of tax design and reform |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/01/2166851/institutional-elements-tax-design-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15170 |
| _version_ |
1764425391323217920 |