Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments
This paper deals with economic rents arising from the development of hydroelectric generation on international watercourses. The paper briefly defines the concept of economic rent and its application to hydroelectric developments. It explores two a...
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| Language: | English en_US |
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Washington, DC: World Bank
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/07/436948/measuring-apportioning-rents-hydroelectric-power-developments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15187 |
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okr-10986-151872021-04-23T14:03:11Z Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments Rothman, Mitchell AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AGRICULTURE AUCTIONS COAL COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS COST OF CAPITAL COST SAVINGS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY ECONOMIC RENT ECONOMIC RENTS ECONOMIC THOUGHT ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY ELECTRICITY DEMAND ELECTRICITY GENERATION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENTITLEMENTS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPLOITATION EXPORTS EXTERNAL COSTS EXTERNALITIES FACTOR MARKETS FISH FISHING FORESTRY FULL OPPORTUNITY COST GOVERNMENT REGULATION HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE FINANCING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPORTS INFLATION INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAND RESOURCES MACROECONOMIC REFORM MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COSTS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES METALS MINES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS NATURAL RESOURCES OIL OPPORTUNITY COST OPPORTUNITY COSTS PERFECT COMPETITION POLITICAL ECONOMY PRECIPITATION PRESENT VALUE PRICE INCREASES PRODUCERS PRODUCTION COSTS RENT TAXES RENTALS SAFETY SAFETY NETS SOURCES OF ELECTRICITY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAX REVENUES TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TIMBER TRANSITION ECONOMIES VARIABLE COSTS WAGES HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANTS INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES RENT (ECONOMIC THEORY) WATER RIGHTS CONFLICTS INTERNATIONAL LAW RIPARIAN RIGHTS SHARING ARRANGEMENTS FACTOR MARKETS SHARED WATER RESOURCES This paper deals with economic rents arising from the development of hydroelectric generation on international watercourses. The paper briefly defines the concept of economic rent and its application to hydroelectric developments. It explores two areas of precedents that shows how the concept could be applied in developments on international watercourses. First, it looks at international law on the ownership and rights of use of such watercourses. Then it looks at past instances of international watercourse development that have used the idea of rent, or rent-like concepts, to determine how to share the benefits from the development. The paper notes that international convention and practice on this topic expect that riparian countries will negotiate the sharing of benefits from international developments. What the paper then seeks is a guide to such negotiations. The paper also devotes some attention to methods for quantifying the rents generated by projects in various situations: where a competitive market exists for the project's output; where no market exists; or where the hydroelectric development is part of a multipurpose project. In general, the total benefit from a cooperative development of an international watercourse is greater than the benefits from separate independent developments. Each participant should get from the cooperative development at least as much rent as it could have obtained from an independent development. 2013-08-19T21:24:11Z 2013-08-19T21:24:11Z 2000-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/07/436948/measuring-apportioning-rents-hydroelectric-power-developments 0-8213-4798-5 0259-210X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15187 English en_US World Bank Discussion Paper;No. 419 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Publication Publications & Research :: Publication |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AGRICULTURE AUCTIONS COAL COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS COST OF CAPITAL COST SAVINGS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY ECONOMIC RENT ECONOMIC RENTS ECONOMIC THOUGHT ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY ELECTRICITY DEMAND ELECTRICITY GENERATION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENTITLEMENTS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPLOITATION EXPORTS EXTERNAL COSTS EXTERNALITIES FACTOR MARKETS FISH FISHING FORESTRY FULL OPPORTUNITY COST GOVERNMENT REGULATION HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE FINANCING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPORTS INFLATION INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAND RESOURCES MACROECONOMIC REFORM MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COSTS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES METALS MINES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS NATURAL RESOURCES OIL OPPORTUNITY COST OPPORTUNITY COSTS PERFECT COMPETITION POLITICAL ECONOMY PRECIPITATION PRESENT VALUE PRICE INCREASES PRODUCERS PRODUCTION COSTS RENT TAXES RENTALS SAFETY SAFETY NETS SOURCES OF ELECTRICITY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAX REVENUES TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TIMBER TRANSITION ECONOMIES VARIABLE COSTS WAGES HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANTS INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES RENT (ECONOMIC THEORY) WATER RIGHTS CONFLICTS INTERNATIONAL LAW RIPARIAN RIGHTS SHARING ARRANGEMENTS FACTOR MARKETS SHARED WATER RESOURCES |
| spellingShingle |
AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AGRICULTURE AUCTIONS COAL COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSUMERS COST OF CAPITAL COST SAVINGS DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY ECONOMIC RENT ECONOMIC RENTS ECONOMIC THOUGHT ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY ELECTRICITY DEMAND ELECTRICITY GENERATION EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ENTITLEMENTS ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS EQUILIBRIUM EXPENDITURES EXPLOITATION EXPORTS EXTERNAL COSTS EXTERNALITIES FACTOR MARKETS FISH FISHING FORESTRY FULL OPPORTUNITY COST GOVERNMENT REGULATION HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE FINANCING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IMPORTS INFLATION INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAND RESOURCES MACROECONOMIC REFORM MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTION MARGINAL COSTS MARKET COMPETITION MARKET POWER MARKET PRICES METALS MINES MONOPOLIES NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS NATURAL RESOURCES OIL OPPORTUNITY COST OPPORTUNITY COSTS PERFECT COMPETITION POLITICAL ECONOMY PRECIPITATION PRESENT VALUE PRICE INCREASES PRODUCERS PRODUCTION COSTS RENT TAXES RENTALS SAFETY SAFETY NETS SOURCES OF ELECTRICITY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TAX REVENUES TAXATION TELECOMMUNICATIONS TIMBER TRANSITION ECONOMIES VARIABLE COSTS WAGES HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANTS INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES RENT (ECONOMIC THEORY) WATER RIGHTS CONFLICTS INTERNATIONAL LAW RIPARIAN RIGHTS SHARING ARRANGEMENTS FACTOR MARKETS SHARED WATER RESOURCES Rothman, Mitchell Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments |
| relation |
World Bank Discussion Paper;No. 419 |
| description |
This paper deals with economic rents
arising from the development of hydroelectric generation on
international watercourses. The paper briefly defines the
concept of economic rent and its application to
hydroelectric developments. It explores two areas of
precedents that shows how the concept could be applied in
developments on international watercourses. First, it looks
at international law on the ownership and rights of use of
such watercourses. Then it looks at past instances of
international watercourse development that have used the
idea of rent, or rent-like concepts, to determine how to
share the benefits from the development. The paper notes
that international convention and practice on this topic
expect that riparian countries will negotiate the sharing of
benefits from international developments. What the paper
then seeks is a guide to such negotiations. The paper also
devotes some attention to methods for quantifying the rents
generated by projects in various situations: where a
competitive market exists for the project's output;
where no market exists; or where the hydroelectric
development is part of a multipurpose project. In general,
the total benefit from a cooperative development of an
international watercourse is greater than the benefits from
separate independent developments. Each participant should
get from the cooperative development at least as much rent
as it could have obtained from an independent development. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Publication |
| author |
Rothman, Mitchell |
| author_facet |
Rothman, Mitchell |
| author_sort |
Rothman, Mitchell |
| title |
Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments |
| title_short |
Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments |
| title_full |
Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments |
| title_fullStr |
Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Measuring and Apportioning Rents from Hydroelectric Power Developments |
| title_sort |
measuring and apportioning rents from hydroelectric power developments |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/07/436948/measuring-apportioning-rents-hydroelectric-power-developments http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15187 |
| _version_ |
1764425438392745984 |