How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combinati...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Cigno, Alessandro
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	en_US
Published:	World Bank 2013
Subjects:	account borrowing Child Labor Child Labour Development Economics economic analysis economics employment employment opportunities family members general equilibrium human capital income insurance Labor Economics labor market moral hazard Political Economy school attendance young children
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309

id	okr-10986-15309
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-153092021-04-23T14:03:21Z How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country Cigno, Alessandro account borrowing Child Labor Child Labour Development Economics economic analysis economics employment employment opportunities family members general equilibrium human capital income insurance Labor Economics labor market moral hazard Political Economy school attendance young children Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure. 2013-08-22T21:27:53Z 2013-08-22T21:27:53Z 2012-01-18 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X doi:10.1093/wber/lhr038 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309 en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank Journal Article Latin America
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	en_US
topic	account borrowing Child Labor Child Labour Development Economics economic analysis economics employment employment opportunities family members general equilibrium human capital income insurance Labor Economics labor market moral hazard Political Economy school attendance young children
spellingShingle	account borrowing Child Labor Child Labour Development Economics economic analysis economics employment employment opportunities family members general equilibrium human capital income insurance Labor Economics labor market moral hazard Political Economy school attendance young children Cigno, Alessandro How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
geographic_facet	Latin America
description	Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
format	Journal Article
author	Cigno, Alessandro
author_facet	Cigno, Alessandro
author_sort	Cigno, Alessandro
title	How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_short	How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_full	How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_fullStr	How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_full_unstemmed	How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
title_sort	how to deal with covert child labor and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country
publisher	World Bank
publishDate	2013
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309
_version_	1764430984034385920

How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

Similar Items