Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

Only a small number of studies have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast, the authors empirically examine...

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Main Authors:	Wang, Hua, Mamingi, Nlandu, Laplante, Benoît, Dasgupta, Susmita
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:	INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT POWERS FACTORIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT CUSTOMER FEEDBACK BARGAINING EMISSIONS CONTROL FINANCIAL FLOWS FINANCIAL LEVERAGE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ABATEMENT EFFORT ACCIDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AIR AIR POLLUTION CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND COD CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS ELASTICITIES EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY FOOD PROCESSING INCOME INDUSTRIAL SECTOR INSURANCE LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEGISLATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES OXYGEN PAPER INDUSTRY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION CHARGES POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DISCHARGE POLLUTION REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR SAFETY SAVINGS SOLID WASTE SUSPENDED SOLIDS TEXTILE INDUSTRY TIMBER UNEMPLOYMENT WASTE WASTEWATER WATER POLLUTION WORKERS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/01/1687150/incomplete-enforcement-pollution-regulation-bargaining-power-chinese-factories http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15751

id	okr-10986-15751
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-157512021-04-23T14:03:19Z Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories Wang, Hua Mamingi, Nlandu Laplante, Benoît Dasgupta, Susmita INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT POWERS FACTORIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT CUSTOMER FEEDBACK BARGAINING EMISSIONS CONTROL FINANCIAL FLOWS FINANCIAL LEVERAGE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ABATEMENT EFFORT ACCIDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AIR AIR POLLUTION CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND COD CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS ELASTICITIES EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FOOD PROCESSING INCOME INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL SECTOR INSURANCE LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEGISLATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES OXYGEN PAPER INDUSTRY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION CHARGES POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DISCHARGE POLLUTION REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR SAFETY SAVINGS SOLID WASTE SUSPENDED SOLIDS TEXTILE INDUSTRY TIMBER UNEMPLOYMENT WASTE WASTEWATER WATER POLLUTION WORKERS Only a small number of studies have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast, the authors empirically examine the determinants of enforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze the determinants of firms' relative bargaining power with local environmental authorities with respect to the enforcement of pollution charges. The authors show that private sector firms appear to have less bargaining power than state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings, they also show that firms facing adverse financial situations have more bargaining power than other firms and are more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than they should be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greater the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by complaints), the less bargaining power it has with local environmental authorities. 2013-09-09T21:55:26Z 2013-09-09T21:55:26Z 2002-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/01/1687150/incomplete-enforcement-pollution-regulation-bargaining-power-chinese-factories http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15751 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2756 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific China
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT POWERS FACTORIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT CUSTOMER FEEDBACK BARGAINING EMISSIONS CONTROL FINANCIAL FLOWS FINANCIAL LEVERAGE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ABATEMENT EFFORT ACCIDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AIR AIR POLLUTION CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND COD CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS ELASTICITIES EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FOOD PROCESSING INCOME INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL SECTOR INSURANCE LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEGISLATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES OXYGEN PAPER INDUSTRY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION CHARGES POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DISCHARGE POLLUTION REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR SAFETY SAVINGS SOLID WASTE SUSPENDED SOLIDS TEXTILE INDUSTRY TIMBER UNEMPLOYMENT WASTE WASTEWATER WATER POLLUTION WORKERS
spellingShingle	INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT POWERS FACTORIES LOCAL GOVERNMENT CUSTOMER FEEDBACK BARGAINING EMISSIONS CONTROL FINANCIAL FLOWS FINANCIAL LEVERAGE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ABATEMENT EFFORT ACCIDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AIR AIR POLLUTION CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND COD CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS ECONOMETRICS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS ELASTICITIES EMISSIONS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS FOOD PROCESSING INCOME INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION INDUSTRIAL SECTOR INSURANCE LABOR FORCE LABOR MARKETS LAWS LEGISLATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES OXYGEN PAPER INDUSTRY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLLUTERS POLLUTION POLLUTION ABATEMENT POLLUTION CHARGES POLLUTION CONTROL POLLUTION DISCHARGE POLLUTION REGULATION PRIVATE SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR SAFETY SAVINGS SOLID WASTE SUSPENDED SOLIDS TEXTILE INDUSTRY TIMBER UNEMPLOYMENT WASTE WASTEWATER WATER POLLUTION WORKERS Wang, Hua Mamingi, Nlandu Laplante, Benoît Dasgupta, Susmita Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
geographic_facet	East Asia and Pacific China
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 2756
description	Only a small number of studies have empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast, the authors empirically examine the determinants of enforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze the determinants of firms' relative bargaining power with local environmental authorities with respect to the enforcement of pollution charges. The authors show that private sector firms appear to have less bargaining power than state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings, they also show that firms facing adverse financial situations have more bargaining power than other firms and are more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than they should be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greater the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by complaints), the less bargaining power it has with local environmental authorities.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Wang, Hua Mamingi, Nlandu Laplante, Benoît Dasgupta, Susmita
author_facet	Wang, Hua Mamingi, Nlandu Laplante, Benoît Dasgupta, Susmita
author_sort	Wang, Hua
title	Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
title_short	Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
title_full	Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
title_fullStr	Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
title_full_unstemmed	Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
title_sort	incomplete enforcement of pollution regulation : bargaining power of chinese factories
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2013
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/01/1687150/incomplete-enforcement-pollution-regulation-bargaining-power-chinese-factories http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15751
_version_	1764429629508026368

Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation : Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

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