Suspending Suspicious Transactions
One of the powers held by many, but not all, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is the administrative power to order the postponement of reported suspicious transactions as a means of preventing the flight of suspect funds or assets beyond the rea...
Main Authors: | , , |
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Format: | Publication |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/17900338/suspending-suspicious-transactions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15804 |
Summary: | One of the powers held by many, but not
all, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is the
administrative power to order the postponement of reported
suspicious transactions as a means of preventing the flight
of suspect funds or assets beyond the reach of national law
enforcement and prosecutorial authorities during the time it
takes for those national authorities to seek and obtain a
freezing or seizing order from the judicial or other
competent authorities. The main objectives of this study are
to: inform the policy discussion on the postponement power;
and provide guidance to FIUs that already have, or are
considering, acquiring the power to postpone suspicious
transactions with a view to improving their existing
postponement regimes or shaping new ones. This joint study
was intended to capture the widest possible cross section of
FIUs. However, the highest numbers of respondents were from
European countries. While the study had no control over the
response rate, the respondent FIUs are nonetheless
representative of the overall population of FIUs on
dimensions such as type and size of FIU and geographic
representation, and provide valuable information relevant
for all FIUs with postponement power. This report presents
the results of the above-mentioned study, which, among other
things, shows the existence of a wide range of practices and
arrangements, and some gaps or omissions, in respect of a
number of important aspects of the FIU power to postpone
suspicious transactions. The study also indicates that only
a relatively small proportion of FIUs with the power to
postpone suspicious transactions are regular users of this
power, while a substantial number have not used the power at
all during the three-year period covered by the study, or
have done so infrequently. In addition, this report presents
a number of recommendations to help FIU practitioners and
policy makers establish or strengthen effective legal and
operational mechanisms for the postponement of suspicious
transactions, while taking into account the international
FIU standards, and the rule of law, in order to ensure that
the fundamental rights of all those concerned are
effectively protected. Finally, this report includes a
number of sanitized cases provided by FIUs. |
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