Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration?

Power market integration is analyzed in a two-country model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds. If the generation costs between the two countries are too similar, negative business stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that th...

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Main Authors: Auriol, Emmanuelle, Biancini, Sara
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
TAX
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17888008/powering-up-developing-countries-through-integration
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15852
id okr-10986-15852
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-158522021-04-23T14:03:23Z Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration? Auriol, Emmanuelle Biancini, Sara ADVANCED ECONOMIES ADVERSE EFFECT ADVERSE IMPACT ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT ARBITRATION ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BANK POLICY BENCHMARK BUDGET CONSTRAINT CAPACITY BUILDING CLAIMANT CLOSED ECONOMY COMMODITIES COMMON MARKET COMPETITION FOR MARKET COMPETITIVE FRINGE CONFLICT OF INTEREST CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COORDINATION FAILURE COST FUNCTIONS COST REDUCTION DEBT DEMAND FUNCTION DEMAND FUNCTIONS DEREGULATION DERIVATIVE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT AGENCY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIVIDENDS DOMESTIC MARKET DUMPING DUOPOLY ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ENERGY RESOURCES EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE EXPORTERS EXPROPRIATION EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED INVESTMENT FOREIGN FIRM FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN MARKET FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT GLOBAL INVESTMENT GLOBALIZATION GOVERNMENT BUDGET HOLDINGS IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT QUOTAS INCOME INCOME LEVELS INDEBTED COUNTRIES INEFFICIENCY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS INFRASTRUCTURES INSTRUMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTING INVESTMENT CHOICE INVESTMENT CHOICES INVESTMENT REQUIREMENT JURISDICTION JUSTICE SYSTEMS LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL COST MARGINAL COST PRICING MARGINAL COSTS MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET INTEGRATION MARKET POWER MARKET SHARE MARKET SHARES MARKET SIZE MARKET SIZES MARKET STRUCTURE MONOPOLY NATURAL RESOURCES OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS OLIGOPOLY OPEN ECONOMY OPEN MARKET OPPORTUNITY COST OPTIMAL INVESTMENT PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES POTENTIAL INVESTORS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCTION COSTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC DEBT PUBLIC FUND PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC OWNERSHIP PUBLIC UTILITIES RAMSEY PRICE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS REGIONAL INTEGRATION REGIONAL POWER REGULATOR REGULATORS REGULATORY AUTHORITY REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY BODY RESERVE RULE OF LAW SALES SHADOW PRICE SHAREHOLDERS SMALL COUNTRY SOCIAL COST SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT TARIFF REVENUES TAX TAX RATE TAX RATES TAX STRUCTURE TAXATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADING TRADING MARKET TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT TRANSPORT CHARGES TRANSPORTATION TRANSPORTATION COST TRANSPORTATION COSTS TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE TRUE UNIFORM PRICE VALUATION VARIABLE COST WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS electricity investment regulation Power market integration is analyzed in a two-country model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds. If the generation costs between the two countries are too similar, negative business stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that the subsequent integration welfare decreases in both regions. Integration is welfare enhancing when the cost difference between two regions is large enough. The benefits from export profits increase the total welfare in the exporting country, whereas the importing country benefits from lower prices. In this case, market integration also improves incentives to invest compared to autarky. The investment levels remain inefficient, however, especially for transportation facilities. Free riding reduces incentives to invest in these public-good components of the network, whereas business stealing tends to decrease the capacity to finance new investment. 2013-09-26T15:04:43Z 2013-09-26T15:04:43Z 2013-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17888008/powering-up-developing-countries-through-integration http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15852 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6494 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ADVANCED ECONOMIES
ADVERSE EFFECT
ADVERSE IMPACT
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BANK POLICY
BENCHMARK
BUDGET CONSTRAINT
CAPACITY BUILDING
CLAIMANT
CLOSED ECONOMY
COMMODITIES
COMMON MARKET
COMPETITION FOR MARKET
COMPETITIVE FRINGE
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
COORDINATION FAILURE
COST FUNCTIONS
COST REDUCTION
DEBT
DEMAND FUNCTION
DEMAND FUNCTIONS
DEREGULATION
DERIVATIVE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
DIVIDENDS
DOMESTIC MARKET
DUMPING
DUOPOLY
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
ELASTICITY
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
ENERGY RESOURCES
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE
EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE
EXPORTERS
EXPROPRIATION
EXTERNALITIES
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FIXED INVESTMENT
FOREIGN FIRM
FOREIGN FIRMS
FOREIGN MARKET
FREE TRADE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
GLOBAL INVESTMENT
GLOBALIZATION
GOVERNMENT BUDGET
HOLDINGS
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
IMPORT QUOTAS
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INDEBTED COUNTRIES
INEFFICIENCY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
INFRASTRUCTURES
INSTRUMENT
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INVESTING
INVESTMENT CHOICE
INVESTMENT CHOICES
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENT
JURISDICTION
JUSTICE SYSTEMS
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
MARGINAL COST
MARGINAL COST PRICING
MARGINAL COSTS
MARKET ECONOMIES
MARKET INTEGRATION
MARKET POWER
MARKET SHARE
MARKET SHARES
MARKET SIZE
MARKET SIZES
MARKET STRUCTURE
MONOPOLY
NATURAL RESOURCES
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS
OLIGOPOLY
OPEN ECONOMY
OPEN MARKET
OPPORTUNITY COST
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT
PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
POTENTIAL INVESTORS
PRIVATIZATION
PRODUCTION COSTS
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC DEBT
PUBLIC FUND
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
PUBLIC UTILITIES
RAMSEY PRICE
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
REGIONAL POWER
REGULATOR
REGULATORS
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
REGULATORY BODIES
REGULATORY BODY
RESERVE
RULE OF LAW
SALES
SHADOW PRICE
SHAREHOLDERS
SMALL COUNTRY
SOCIAL COST
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
TARIFF REVENUES
TAX
TAX RATE
TAX RATES
TAX STRUCTURE
TAXATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADING
TRADING MARKET
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPORT
TRANSPORT CHARGES
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION COST
TRANSPORTATION COSTS
TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
TRUE
UNIFORM PRICE
VALUATION
VARIABLE COST
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
electricity
investment
regulation
spellingShingle ADVANCED ECONOMIES
ADVERSE EFFECT
ADVERSE IMPACT
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BANK POLICY
BENCHMARK
BUDGET CONSTRAINT
CAPACITY BUILDING
CLAIMANT
CLOSED ECONOMY
COMMODITIES
COMMON MARKET
COMPETITION FOR MARKET
COMPETITIVE FRINGE
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSUMER SURPLUS
CONSUMERS
COORDINATION FAILURE
COST FUNCTIONS
COST REDUCTION
DEBT
DEMAND FUNCTION
DEMAND FUNCTIONS
DEREGULATION
DERIVATIVE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
DIVIDENDS
DOMESTIC MARKET
DUMPING
DUOPOLY
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
ELASTICITY
ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
ENERGY RESOURCES
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE
EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE
EXPORTERS
EXPROPRIATION
EXTERNALITIES
FINANCIAL CRISIS
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FIXED INVESTMENT
FOREIGN FIRM
FOREIGN FIRMS
FOREIGN MARKET
FREE TRADE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
GLOBAL INVESTMENT
GLOBALIZATION
GOVERNMENT BUDGET
HOLDINGS
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
IMPORT QUOTAS
INCOME
INCOME LEVELS
INDEBTED COUNTRIES
INEFFICIENCY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
INFRASTRUCTURES
INSTRUMENT
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
INVESTING
INVESTMENT CHOICE
INVESTMENT CHOICES
INVESTMENT REQUIREMENT
JURISDICTION
JUSTICE SYSTEMS
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
MARGINAL COST
MARGINAL COST PRICING
MARGINAL COSTS
MARKET ECONOMIES
MARKET INTEGRATION
MARKET POWER
MARKET SHARE
MARKET SHARES
MARKET SIZE
MARKET SIZES
MARKET STRUCTURE
MONOPOLY
NATURAL RESOURCES
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS
OLIGOPOLY
OPEN ECONOMY
OPEN MARKET
OPPORTUNITY COST
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT
PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
POTENTIAL INVESTORS
PRIVATIZATION
PRODUCTION COSTS
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC DEBT
PUBLIC FUND
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
PUBLIC UTILITIES
RAMSEY PRICE
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
REGIONAL POWER
REGULATOR
REGULATORS
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
REGULATORY BODIES
REGULATORY BODY
RESERVE
RULE OF LAW
SALES
SHADOW PRICE
SHAREHOLDERS
SMALL COUNTRY
SOCIAL COST
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
TARIFF REVENUES
TAX
TAX RATE
TAX RATES
TAX STRUCTURE
TAXATION
TRADE LIBERALIZATION
TRADING
TRADING MARKET
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPORT
TRANSPORT CHARGES
TRANSPORTATION
TRANSPORTATION COST
TRANSPORTATION COSTS
TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
TRUE
UNIFORM PRICE
VALUATION
VARIABLE COST
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
electricity
investment
regulation
Auriol, Emmanuelle
Biancini, Sara
Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration?
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6494
description Power market integration is analyzed in a two-country model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds. If the generation costs between the two countries are too similar, negative business stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that the subsequent integration welfare decreases in both regions. Integration is welfare enhancing when the cost difference between two regions is large enough. The benefits from export profits increase the total welfare in the exporting country, whereas the importing country benefits from lower prices. In this case, market integration also improves incentives to invest compared to autarky. The investment levels remain inefficient, however, especially for transportation facilities. Free riding reduces incentives to invest in these public-good components of the network, whereas business stealing tends to decrease the capacity to finance new investment.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Auriol, Emmanuelle
Biancini, Sara
author_facet Auriol, Emmanuelle
Biancini, Sara
author_sort Auriol, Emmanuelle
title Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration?
title_short Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration?
title_full Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration?
title_fullStr Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration?
title_full_unstemmed Powering Up Developing Countries through Integration?
title_sort powering up developing countries through integration?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2013
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17888008/powering-up-developing-countries-through-integration
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15852
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