Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan
Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeti...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17928979/elected-councils-improve-governance-experimental-evidence-local-institutions-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15869 |
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okr-10986-158692021-04-23T14:03:26Z Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben ABUSE OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY CAUSAL EFFECTS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL WAR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNIST COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE COMMUNITY MEMBERS COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT CONSENSUS CONSULTATION CONSULTATIONS CORRUPTION COUNCILS COUNTRYSIDE CREDIBILITY DATA ANALYSIS DATA COLLECTION DECISION MAKERS DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DECISIONMAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIZATION DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICTS DRINKING WATER ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICY ELECTORAL RULES EMBEZZLEMENT FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FEMALE FIELD EXPERIMENT FIGURES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOOD SHORTAGES FORMAL EDUCATION GENDER GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INEQUALITY INFANT MORTALITY INSTITUTION BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES INTENDED BENEFICIARIES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION INTERVENTIONS LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION LINE MINISTRIES LIVESTOCK LOCAL BODIES LOCAL GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL INSTITUTIONS LOCAL PARTICIPATION MARGINALIZED GROUPS NATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS POWER-HOLDERS PREPARATION PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SERVICE QUANTITATIVE DATA RECONSTRUCTION REHABILITATION RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR RENTS REVOLUTION RURAL AREAS RURAL POPULATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL COHESION SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIOECONOMIC DATA SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAXATION TRANSPARENCY VILLAGE VILLAGE ELDERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGER VILLAGERS VILLAGES YOUTH Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking. 2013-09-26T17:57:43Z 2013-09-26T17:57:43Z 2013-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17928979/elected-councils-improve-governance-experimental-evidence-local-institutions-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15869 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6510 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia Afghanistan |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ABUSE OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY CAUSAL EFFECTS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL WAR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNIST COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE COMMUNITY MEMBERS COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT CONSENSUS CONSULTATION CONSULTATIONS CORRUPTION COUNCILS COUNTRYSIDE CREDIBILITY DATA ANALYSIS DATA COLLECTION DECISION MAKERS DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DECISIONMAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIZATION DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICTS DRINKING WATER ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICY ELECTORAL RULES EMBEZZLEMENT FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FEMALE FIELD EXPERIMENT FIGURES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOOD SHORTAGES FORMAL EDUCATION GENDER GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INEQUALITY INFANT MORTALITY INSTITUTION BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES INTENDED BENEFICIARIES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION INTERVENTIONS LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION LINE MINISTRIES LIVESTOCK LOCAL BODIES LOCAL GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL INSTITUTIONS LOCAL PARTICIPATION MARGINALIZED GROUPS NATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS POWER-HOLDERS PREPARATION PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SERVICE QUANTITATIVE DATA RECONSTRUCTION REHABILITATION RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR RENTS REVOLUTION RURAL AREAS RURAL POPULATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL COHESION SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIOECONOMIC DATA SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAXATION TRANSPARENCY VILLAGE VILLAGE ELDERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGER VILLAGERS VILLAGES YOUTH |
| spellingShingle |
ABUSE OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY CAUSAL EFFECTS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CITIZENS CIVIL WAR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES COLLECTIVE ACTION COMMUNIST COMMUNITIES COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE COMMUNITY MEMBERS COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT CONSENSUS CONSULTATION CONSULTATIONS CORRUPTION COUNCILS COUNTRYSIDE CREDIBILITY DATA ANALYSIS DATA COLLECTION DECISION MAKERS DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING DECISION-MAKING PROCESS DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES DECISIONMAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIZATION DISTRICT LEVEL DISTRICTS DRINKING WATER ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POLICY ELECTORAL RULES EMBEZZLEMENT FACTOR ENDOWMENTS FEMALE FIELD EXPERIMENT FIGURES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOOD SHORTAGES FORMAL EDUCATION GENDER GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INEQUALITY INFANT MORTALITY INSTITUTION BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES INTENDED BENEFICIARIES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTION INTERVENTIONS LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION LINE MINISTRIES LIVESTOCK LOCAL BODIES LOCAL GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL INSTITUTIONS LOCAL PARTICIPATION MARGINALIZED GROUPS NATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICIANS POWER-HOLDERS PREPARATION PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SERVICE QUANTITATIVE DATA RECONSTRUCTION REHABILITATION RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR RENTS REVOLUTION RURAL AREAS RURAL POPULATION SEPARATION OF POWERS SOCIAL CAPITAL SOCIAL COHESION SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIOECONOMIC DATA SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS TAXATION TRANSPARENCY VILLAGE VILLAGE ELDERS VILLAGE LEVEL VILLAGER VILLAGERS VILLAGES YOUTH Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia Afghanistan |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6510 |
| description |
Using data from a field experiment in
500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions
affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid
distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils
exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves.
However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to
either the council or customary leaders, the creation of
elected councils increases embezzlement and makes
decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage
the distribution jointly with customary leaders also
increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can
improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and
existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben |
| author_facet |
Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Enikolopov, Ruben |
| author_sort |
Beath, Andrew |
| title |
Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_short |
Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_full |
Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_fullStr |
Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan |
| title_sort |
do elected councils improve governance? experimental evidence on local institutions in afghanistan |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17928979/elected-councils-improve-governance-experimental-evidence-local-institutions-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15869 |
| _version_ |
1764431810324856832 |