A Public Strategy for Compliance Monitoring
Theoretical accounts of compliance with court orders emphasize the importance of transparency. Most empirical studies of compliance center on high profile political cases, largely ignoring the high-volume, quotidian claims against the state for bas...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/06/17945127/public-strategy-compliance-monitoring http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15886 |
| Summary: | Theoretical accounts of compliance with
court orders emphasize the importance of transparency. Most
empirical studies of compliance center on high profile
political cases, largely ignoring the high-volume, quotidian
claims against the state for basic services that constitute
the largest share of court dockets in many jurisdictions.
This paper uses a unique dataset on compliance with orders
from the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Costa Rica to examine the determinants of compliance in low
salience cases. It finds that orders issued just after the
Court announced, in a press conference, that it was
monitoring compliance were implemented roughly two months
sooner than orders issued just prior to the press
conference. These findings suggest that publicity can
motivate compliance even in low salience cases. |
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