Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046 |
| Summary: | Starting with the hypothesis that
behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in
public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of
how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might
be better motivated in the public sector. The basis for this
study is "an accidental experiment" resulting from
the World Bank's operational engagement in Cameroon. In
2008, World Bank staff successfully concluded preparation on
a project to support the Government of Cameroon to improve
transparency, efficiency, and accountability of public
finance management. The US$15 million project supported a
number of ministries to strengthen a broad range of
management systems and capacities. Independently and
concurrently, other Bank staff initiated a low-profile,
technical assistance project to improve performance in
Cameroon's Customs, supported by a small trade
facilitation grant of approximately US$300,000. One approach
appears to have succeeded in initiating change while the
other has signally failed. The two projects of different
scale, scope and design in the same governance environment
offer a very interesting natural experiment (unplanned but
accidental for that reason) that allows insights into the
nature of institutional change and the role of behavior and
incentives and approaches that offer greater prospects for
making reform possible. The paper confirms the value of
using ideas from behavioral economics, both to design
institutional reforms and to critically assess the approach
to institutional reform taken by development agencies such
as the World Bank. |
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