Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2013
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046 |
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okr-10986-16046 |
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| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST AUTHORITY AUTHORIZATION BASIC BEST PRACTICES BLOG BUDGET EXECUTION BUDGET FORMULATION BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET MONITORING BUDGET SYSTEM BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS REVENUE CUSTOMS REVENUES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DOCUMENTATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENVIRONMENTS EQUIPMENT EVASION EXECUTION FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL PRESSURES FRAUD GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM INNOVATION INSPECTION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LEARNING LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITERATURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS MARKET ECONOMY MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PERCEPTION PERCEPTIONS PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESSES PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROSPECT THEORY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SUPPORT RATIONALIZATION RESULT RESULTS REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE PERFORMANCE SEARCH STATE FUNDS STATE SECTOR STONE SUPERVISION SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TECHNOCRACY TECHNOCRATS TRADE FACILITATION TRAINING COURSES TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY TREASURY UNEMPLOYMENT USERS WEB |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST AUTHORITY AUTHORIZATION BASIC BEST PRACTICES BLOG BUDGET EXECUTION BUDGET FORMULATION BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET MONITORING BUDGET SYSTEM BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS REVENUE CUSTOMS REVENUES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DOCUMENTATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENVIRONMENTS EQUIPMENT EVASION EXECUTION FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL PRESSURES FRAUD GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM INNOVATION INSPECTION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LEARNING LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITERATURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS MARKET ECONOMY MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PERCEPTION PERCEPTIONS PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESSES PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROSPECT THEORY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SUPPORT RATIONALIZATION RESULT RESULTS REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE PERFORMANCE SEARCH STATE FUNDS STATE SECTOR STONE SUPERVISION SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TECHNOCRACY TECHNOCRATS TRADE FACILITATION TRAINING COURSES TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY TREASURY UNEMPLOYMENT USERS WEB Raballand, Gaël Rajaram, Anand Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Cameroon |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6595 |
| description |
Starting with the hypothesis that
behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in
public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of
how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might
be better motivated in the public sector. The basis for this
study is "an accidental experiment" resulting from
the World Bank's operational engagement in Cameroon. In
2008, World Bank staff successfully concluded preparation on
a project to support the Government of Cameroon to improve
transparency, efficiency, and accountability of public
finance management. The US$15 million project supported a
number of ministries to strengthen a broad range of
management systems and capacities. Independently and
concurrently, other Bank staff initiated a low-profile,
technical assistance project to improve performance in
Cameroon's Customs, supported by a small trade
facilitation grant of approximately US$300,000. One approach
appears to have succeeded in initiating change while the
other has signally failed. The two projects of different
scale, scope and design in the same governance environment
offer a very interesting natural experiment (unplanned but
accidental for that reason) that allows insights into the
nature of institutional change and the role of behavior and
incentives and approaches that offer greater prospects for
making reform possible. The paper confirms the value of
using ideas from behavioral economics, both to design
institutional reforms and to critically assess the approach
to institutional reform taken by development agencies such
as the World Bank. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Raballand, Gaël Rajaram, Anand |
| author_facet |
Raballand, Gaël Rajaram, Anand |
| author_sort |
Raballand, Gaël |
| title |
Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon |
| title_short |
Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon |
| title_full |
Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon |
| title_fullStr |
Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon |
| title_sort |
behavioral economics and public sector reform : an accidental experiment and lessons from cameroon |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2013 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046 |
| _version_ |
1764432115477250048 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-160462021-04-23T14:03:27Z Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon Raballand, Gaël Rajaram, Anand ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST AUTHORITY AUTHORIZATION BASIC BEST PRACTICES BLOG BUDGET EXECUTION BUDGET FORMULATION BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET MONITORING BUDGET SYSTEM BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS REVENUE CUSTOMS REVENUES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DOCUMENTATION E-MAIL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENVIRONMENTS EQUIPMENT EVASION EXECUTION FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL PRESSURES FRAUD GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM INNOVATION INSPECTION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LEARNING LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITERATURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS MARKET ECONOMY MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PERCEPTION PERCEPTIONS PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESSES PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROSPECT THEORY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SUPPORT RATIONALIZATION RESULT RESULTS REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE PERFORMANCE SEARCH STATE FUNDS STATE SECTOR STONE SUPERVISION SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TECHNOCRACY TECHNOCRATS TRADE FACILITATION TRAINING COURSES TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY TREASURY UNEMPLOYMENT USERS WEB Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public sector. The basis for this study is "an accidental experiment" resulting from the World Bank's operational engagement in Cameroon. In 2008, World Bank staff successfully concluded preparation on a project to support the Government of Cameroon to improve transparency, efficiency, and accountability of public finance management. The US$15 million project supported a number of ministries to strengthen a broad range of management systems and capacities. Independently and concurrently, other Bank staff initiated a low-profile, technical assistance project to improve performance in Cameroon's Customs, supported by a small trade facilitation grant of approximately US$300,000. One approach appears to have succeeded in initiating change while the other has signally failed. The two projects of different scale, scope and design in the same governance environment offer a very interesting natural experiment (unplanned but accidental for that reason) that allows insights into the nature of institutional change and the role of behavior and incentives and approaches that offer greater prospects for making reform possible. The paper confirms the value of using ideas from behavioral economics, both to design institutional reforms and to critically assess the approach to institutional reform taken by development agencies such as the World Bank. 2013-10-02T21:54:53Z 2013-10-02T21:54:53Z 2013-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6595 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Cameroon |