Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon

Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public...

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Main Authors: Raballand, Gaël, Rajaram, Anand
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2013
Subjects:
WEB
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046
id okr-10986-16046
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTING
ADMINISTRATIVE COST
AUTHORITY
AUTHORIZATION
BASIC
BEST PRACTICES
BLOG
BUDGET EXECUTION
BUDGET FORMULATION
BUDGET MANAGEMENT
BUDGET MONITORING
BUDGET SYSTEM
BUREAUCRACY
CAPABILITIES
CAPABILITY
CAPACITY BUILDING
CITIZENS
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
CONSENSUS
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUTION
CORRUPTION
CUSTOMS
CUSTOMS CLEARANCE
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
CUSTOMS REVENUE
CUSTOMS REVENUES
DECISION MAKING
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT
DOCUMENTATION
E-MAIL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EMBEZZLEMENT
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENVIRONMENTS
EQUIPMENT
EVASION
EXECUTION
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FISCAL PRESSURES
FRAUD
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
HUMAN RESOURCE
HUMAN RESOURCES
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION SYSTEM
INNOVATION
INSPECTION
INSTITUTION
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
INTERNAL AUDIT
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
LEARNING
LEGISLATION
LEGITIMACY
LITERATURE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
MARKET ECONOMY
MINISTERS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
NATIONAL BUDGET
NATIONS
OPEN ACCESS
OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLE
ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY
PERCEPTION
PERCEPTIONS
PERVERSE INCENTIVES
POLITICAL AUTHORITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROCUREMENT
PROCUREMENT PROCESSES
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
PROSPECT THEORY
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
PUBLIC SUPPORT
RATIONALIZATION
RESULT
RESULTS
REVENUE COLLECTION
REVENUE PERFORMANCE
SEARCH
STATE FUNDS
STATE SECTOR
STONE
SUPERVISION
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
TARGETS
TAXATION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
TECHNOCRACY
TECHNOCRATS
TRADE FACILITATION
TRAINING COURSES
TRANSACTION
TRANSPARENCY
TREASURY
UNEMPLOYMENT
USERS
WEB
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCOUNTING
ADMINISTRATIVE COST
AUTHORITY
AUTHORIZATION
BASIC
BEST PRACTICES
BLOG
BUDGET EXECUTION
BUDGET FORMULATION
BUDGET MANAGEMENT
BUDGET MONITORING
BUDGET SYSTEM
BUREAUCRACY
CAPABILITIES
CAPABILITY
CAPACITY BUILDING
CITIZENS
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
CONSENSUS
CONSTITUENCIES
CONSTITUTION
CORRUPTION
CUSTOMS
CUSTOMS CLEARANCE
CUSTOMS OFFICIALS
CUSTOMS REVENUE
CUSTOMS REVENUES
DECISION MAKING
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT
DOCUMENTATION
E-MAIL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
EMBEZZLEMENT
ENTERPRISE SURVEY
ENVIRONMENTS
EQUIPMENT
EVASION
EXECUTION
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FISCAL PRESSURES
FRAUD
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
HUMAN RESOURCE
HUMAN RESOURCES
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION SYSTEM
INNOVATION
INSPECTION
INSTITUTION
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
INTERNAL AUDIT
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
LEARNING
LEGISLATION
LEGITIMACY
LITERATURE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
MARKET ECONOMY
MINISTERS
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
NATIONAL BUDGET
NATIONS
OPEN ACCESS
OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLE
ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY
PERCEPTION
PERCEPTIONS
PERVERSE INCENTIVES
POLITICAL AUTHORITY
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
PRIVATE SECTOR
PROCUREMENT
PROCUREMENT PROCESSES
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
PROSPECT THEORY
PUBLIC
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC FINANCE
PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC GOODS
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM
PUBLIC SUPPORT
RATIONALIZATION
RESULT
RESULTS
REVENUE COLLECTION
REVENUE PERFORMANCE
SEARCH
STATE FUNDS
STATE SECTOR
STONE
SUPERVISION
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
TARGETS
TAXATION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
TECHNOCRACY
TECHNOCRATS
TRADE FACILITATION
TRAINING COURSES
TRANSACTION
TRANSPARENCY
TREASURY
UNEMPLOYMENT
USERS
WEB
Raballand, Gaël
Rajaram, Anand
Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
geographic_facet Africa
Cameroon
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6595
description Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public sector. The basis for this study is "an accidental experiment" resulting from the World Bank's operational engagement in Cameroon. In 2008, World Bank staff successfully concluded preparation on a project to support the Government of Cameroon to improve transparency, efficiency, and accountability of public finance management. The US$15 million project supported a number of ministries to strengthen a broad range of management systems and capacities. Independently and concurrently, other Bank staff initiated a low-profile, technical assistance project to improve performance in Cameroon's Customs, supported by a small trade facilitation grant of approximately US$300,000. One approach appears to have succeeded in initiating change while the other has signally failed. The two projects of different scale, scope and design in the same governance environment offer a very interesting natural experiment (unplanned but accidental for that reason) that allows insights into the nature of institutional change and the role of behavior and incentives and approaches that offer greater prospects for making reform possible. The paper confirms the value of using ideas from behavioral economics, both to design institutional reforms and to critically assess the approach to institutional reform taken by development agencies such as the World Bank.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Raballand, Gaël
Rajaram, Anand
author_facet Raballand, Gaël
Rajaram, Anand
author_sort Raballand, Gaël
title Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
title_short Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
title_full Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
title_fullStr Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
title_full_unstemmed Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon
title_sort behavioral economics and public sector reform : an accidental experiment and lessons from cameroon
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2013
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046
_version_ 1764432115477250048
spelling okr-10986-160462021-04-23T14:03:27Z Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon Raballand, Gaël Rajaram, Anand ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST AUTHORITY AUTHORIZATION BASIC BEST PRACTICES BLOG BUDGET EXECUTION BUDGET FORMULATION BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET MONITORING BUDGET SYSTEM BUREAUCRACY CAPABILITIES CAPABILITY CAPACITY BUILDING CITIZENS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS CONSENSUS CONSTITUENCIES CONSTITUTION CORRUPTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS REVENUE CUSTOMS REVENUES DECISION MAKING DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXT DOCUMENTATION E-MAIL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EMBEZZLEMENT ENTERPRISE SURVEY ENVIRONMENTS EQUIPMENT EVASION EXECUTION FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL PRESSURES FRAUD GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE HUMAN RESOURCE HUMAN RESOURCES HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM INNOVATION INSPECTION INSTITUTION INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS LEARNING LEGISLATION LEGITIMACY LITERATURE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS MARKET ECONOMY MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY PERCEPTION PERCEPTIONS PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL AUTHORITY POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESSES PROJECT MANAGEMENT PROSPECT THEORY PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC FINANCE PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SUPPORT RATIONALIZATION RESULT RESULTS REVENUE COLLECTION REVENUE PERFORMANCE SEARCH STATE FUNDS STATE SECTOR STONE SUPERVISION SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TARGETS TAXATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TECHNOCRACY TECHNOCRATS TRADE FACILITATION TRAINING COURSES TRANSACTION TRANSPARENCY TREASURY UNEMPLOYMENT USERS WEB Starting with the hypothesis that behaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor in public sector performance, this paper explores the notion of how behavioral change (and thus institutional change) might be better motivated in the public sector. The basis for this study is "an accidental experiment" resulting from the World Bank's operational engagement in Cameroon. In 2008, World Bank staff successfully concluded preparation on a project to support the Government of Cameroon to improve transparency, efficiency, and accountability of public finance management. The US$15 million project supported a number of ministries to strengthen a broad range of management systems and capacities. Independently and concurrently, other Bank staff initiated a low-profile, technical assistance project to improve performance in Cameroon's Customs, supported by a small trade facilitation grant of approximately US$300,000. One approach appears to have succeeded in initiating change while the other has signally failed. The two projects of different scale, scope and design in the same governance environment offer a very interesting natural experiment (unplanned but accidental for that reason) that allows insights into the nature of institutional change and the role of behavior and incentives and approaches that offer greater prospects for making reform possible. The paper confirms the value of using ideas from behavioral economics, both to design institutional reforms and to critically assess the approach to institutional reform taken by development agencies such as the World Bank. 2013-10-02T21:54:53Z 2013-10-02T21:54:53Z 2013-09 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/09/18220963/behavioral-economics-public-sector-reform-accidental-experiment-lessons-cameroon http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16046 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6595 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Cameroon