Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies
More than regulations, laws on the books, or voluntary codes, enforcement is a key to creating an effective business environment and good corporate governance, at least in developing countries and transition economies. A framework is presented to h...
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Format: | Journal Article |
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Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
2013
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/17590623/enforcement-good-corporate-governance-developing-countries-transition-economies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16398 |
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Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
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World Bank |
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English en_US |
topic |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTING AGENCY COSTS ARBITRAGE ARBITRATION ASSET SALES AUDITS BANK LENDING BANK REGULATION BANK SUPERVISORS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BIDS BOND BROKERS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL MARKETS CASH BALANCE CASH BALANCES CENTRAL BANKS CHECKS CIVIL LAW CLASS ACTION CODES OF CONDUCT COLLATERAL COMMON LAW COMPETITION POLICY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACT LAW CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE LAW CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT HISTORIES DEBT DEBT CONTRACTS DEREGULATION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC THEORIES EMERGING MARKETS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTS EXCHANGE COMMISSION EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS EXPENDITURES EXTERNAL FINANCE EXTERNAL FINANCING FINANCIAL CONTRACTS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FIRM PERFORMANCE FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN STOCK GLOBALIZATION GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE MECHANISM GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNMENT ACTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION HOSTILE TAKEOVERS HUMAN CAPITAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURES INCOME INDIVIDUAL FIRM INDIVIDUAL FIRMS INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS INDIVIDUAL MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEMS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSIDER TRADING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT BANKS INVESTMENT STRATEGIES INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT VENTURES JUDICIAL SYSTEM JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JURISDICTION JURISDICTIONS LABOR MARKETS LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL MECHANISM LEGAL SYSTEM LEGAL SYSTEMS LENDERS LIABILITY LIQUIDITY LOCAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MARKET COMPETITION MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET MANIPULATION MARKET REGULATION MARKET RETURNS MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDER MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONOPOLY NATURAL RESOURCES OIL OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OUTPUT OUTPUTS OUTSIDE INVESTORS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PAYMENT SERVICES PAYMENTS SYSTEMS POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR REPUTATION POOR REPUTATIONS PREPAYMENTS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT PRIVATE PARTIES PRIVATE PROPERTY PROFIT OPPORTUNITIES PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC MARKETS PUBLIC POLICY RATE OF RETURN RATES OF RETURN REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REPUTATION REPUTATIONS RISK DIVERSIFICATION RISK OF EXPROPRIATION RULE OF LAW SECURITIES SECURITIES EXCHANGE SECURITIES LAW SECURITIES MARKET SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SELF-REGULATION SELF-REGULATORY AGENCIES SETTLEMENT SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL COSTS STATE CAPTURE STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKETS TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS TRADE ASSOCIATIONS TRADEOFFS TRADES TRANSACTIONS COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TURNOVER VALUABLE ASSETS VALUATION WEAK ENFORCEMENT |
spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTING AGENCY COSTS ARBITRAGE ARBITRATION ASSET SALES AUDITS BANK LENDING BANK REGULATION BANK SUPERVISORS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BIDS BOND BROKERS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL MARKETS CASH BALANCE CASH BALANCES CENTRAL BANKS CHECKS CIVIL LAW CLASS ACTION CODES OF CONDUCT COLLATERAL COMMON LAW COMPETITION POLICY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACT LAW CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE LAW CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT HISTORIES DEBT DEBT CONTRACTS DEREGULATION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC THEORIES EMERGING MARKETS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTS EXCHANGE COMMISSION EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS EXPENDITURES EXTERNAL FINANCE EXTERNAL FINANCING FINANCIAL CONTRACTS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FIRM PERFORMANCE FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN STOCK GLOBALIZATION GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE MECHANISM GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNMENT ACTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION HOSTILE TAKEOVERS HUMAN CAPITAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURES INCOME INDIVIDUAL FIRM INDIVIDUAL FIRMS INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS INDIVIDUAL MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEMS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSIDER TRADING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT BANKS INVESTMENT STRATEGIES INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT VENTURES JUDICIAL SYSTEM JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JURISDICTION JURISDICTIONS LABOR MARKETS LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL MECHANISM LEGAL SYSTEM LEGAL SYSTEMS LENDERS LIABILITY LIQUIDITY LOCAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MARKET COMPETITION MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET MANIPULATION MARKET REGULATION MARKET RETURNS MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDER MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONOPOLY NATURAL RESOURCES OIL OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OUTPUT OUTPUTS OUTSIDE INVESTORS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PAYMENT SERVICES PAYMENTS SYSTEMS POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR REPUTATION POOR REPUTATIONS PREPAYMENTS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT PRIVATE PARTIES PRIVATE PROPERTY PROFIT OPPORTUNITIES PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC MARKETS PUBLIC POLICY RATE OF RETURN RATES OF RETURN REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REPUTATION REPUTATIONS RISK DIVERSIFICATION RISK OF EXPROPRIATION RULE OF LAW SECURITIES SECURITIES EXCHANGE SECURITIES LAW SECURITIES MARKET SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SELF-REGULATION SELF-REGULATORY AGENCIES SETTLEMENT SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL COSTS STATE CAPTURE STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKETS TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS TRADE ASSOCIATIONS TRADEOFFS TRADES TRANSACTIONS COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TURNOVER VALUABLE ASSETS VALUATION WEAK ENFORCEMENT Berglof, Erik Claessens, Stijn Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies |
description |
More than regulations, laws on the
books, or voluntary codes, enforcement is a key to creating
an effective business environment and good corporate
governance, at least in developing countries and transition
economies. A framework is presented to help explain
enforcement, the impact on corporate governance when rules
are not enforced, and what can be done to improve corporate
governance in weak enforcement environments. The limited
empirical evidence suggests that private enforcement tools
are often more effective than public tools. However, some
public enforcement is necessary, and private enforcement
mechanisms often require public laws to function. Private
initiatives are often also taken under the threat of
legislation or regulation, although in some countries
bottom-up, private-led initiatives preceded and even shaped
public laws. Concentrated ownership aligns incentives and
encourages monitoring, but it weakens other corporate
governance mechanisms and can impose significant costs.
Various steps can be taken to reduce these costs and
reinforce other corporate governance mechanisms. But
political economy constraints, resulting from the
intermingling of business and politics, often prevent
improvements in the enforcement environment and the adoption
and implementation of public laws. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Berglof, Erik Claessens, Stijn |
author_facet |
Berglof, Erik Claessens, Stijn |
author_sort |
Berglof, Erik |
title |
Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies |
title_short |
Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies |
title_full |
Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies |
title_fullStr |
Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies |
title_sort |
enforcement and good corporate governance in developing countries and transition economies |
publisher |
Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/17590623/enforcement-good-corporate-governance-developing-countries-transition-economies http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16398 |
_version_ |
1764433475196157952 |
spelling |
okr-10986-163982021-04-23T14:03:30Z Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies Berglof, Erik Claessens, Stijn ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACCOUNTING AGENCY COSTS ARBITRAGE ARBITRATION ASSET SALES AUDITS BANK LENDING BANK REGULATION BANK SUPERVISORS BANKING REGULATION BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BIDS BOND BROKERS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL MARKETS CASH BALANCE CASH BALANCES CENTRAL BANKS CHECKS CIVIL LAW CLASS ACTION CODES OF CONDUCT COLLATERAL COMMON LAW COMPETITION POLICY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTRACT LAW CORPORATE FINANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEHAVIOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS CORPORATE LAW CORPORATE OWNERSHIP CREDIT BUREAUS CREDIT HISTORIES DEBT DEBT CONTRACTS DEREGULATION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC THEORIES EMERGING MARKETS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTS EXCHANGE COMMISSION EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS EXPENDITURES EXTERNAL FINANCE EXTERNAL FINANCING FINANCIAL CONTRACTS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL MARKET FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FIRM PERFORMANCE FOREIGN FIRMS FOREIGN INVESTORS FOREIGN STOCK GLOBALIZATION GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE ISSUES GOVERNANCE MECHANISM GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS GOVERNANCE PRACTICES GOVERNMENT ACTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION HOSTILE TAKEOVERS HUMAN CAPITAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURES INCOME INDIVIDUAL FIRM INDIVIDUAL FIRMS INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS INDIVIDUAL MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEMS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INSIDER TRADING INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INVESTMENT BANKS INVESTMENT STRATEGIES INVESTOR PROTECTION JOINT VENTURES JUDICIAL SYSTEM JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JURISDICTION JURISDICTIONS LABOR MARKETS LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT LEGAL MECHANISM LEGAL SYSTEM LEGAL SYSTEMS LENDERS LIABILITY LIQUIDITY LOCAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MARKET COMPETITION MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MARKET FAILURE MARKET FAILURES MARKET MANIPULATION MARKET REGULATION MARKET RETURNS MINORITY INVESTORS MINORITY SHAREHOLDER MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS MONOPOLY NATURAL RESOURCES OIL OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OUTPUT OUTPUTS OUTSIDE INVESTORS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES PAYMENT SERVICES PAYMENTS SYSTEMS POLITICAL ECONOMY POOR REPUTATION POOR REPUTATIONS PREPAYMENTS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT PRIVATE PARTIES PRIVATE PROPERTY PROFIT OPPORTUNITIES PROPERTY RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC MARKETS PUBLIC POLICY RATE OF RETURN RATES OF RETURN REGULATORS REGULATORY AGENCIES REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REPUTATION REPUTATIONS RISK DIVERSIFICATION RISK OF EXPROPRIATION RULE OF LAW SECURITIES SECURITIES EXCHANGE SECURITIES LAW SECURITIES MARKET SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SELF-REGULATION SELF-REGULATORY AGENCIES SETTLEMENT SHAREHOLDER SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL COSTS STATE CAPTURE STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING STOCK EXCHANGES STOCK MARKET STOCK MARKETS TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS TRADE ASSOCIATIONS TRADEOFFS TRADES TRANSACTIONS COSTS TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPARENCY TURNOVER VALUABLE ASSETS VALUATION WEAK ENFORCEMENT More than regulations, laws on the books, or voluntary codes, enforcement is a key to creating an effective business environment and good corporate governance, at least in developing countries and transition economies. A framework is presented to help explain enforcement, the impact on corporate governance when rules are not enforced, and what can be done to improve corporate governance in weak enforcement environments. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private enforcement tools are often more effective than public tools. However, some public enforcement is necessary, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Private initiatives are often also taken under the threat of legislation or regulation, although in some countries bottom-up, private-led initiatives preceded and even shaped public laws. Concentrated ownership aligns incentives and encourages monitoring, but it weakens other corporate governance mechanisms and can impose significant costs. Various steps can be taken to reduce these costs and reinforce other corporate governance mechanisms. But political economy constraints, resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, often prevent improvements in the enforcement environment and the adoption and implementation of public laws. 2013-12-19T17:44:32Z 2013-12-19T17:44:32Z 2006-02-21 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/02/17590623/enforcement-good-corporate-governance-developing-countries-transition-economies World Bank Research Observer doi:10.1093/wbro/lkj005 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16398 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research :: Journal Article |