Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient : Designing for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality

Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient : Designing for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality

Conditional cash transfer programs are now used extensively to encourage poor parents to increase investments in their children's human capital. These programs can be large and expensive, motivating a quest for greater efficiency through incre...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	de Janvry, Alain, Sadoulet, Elisabeth
Format:	Journal
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2014
Subjects:	ACCOUNT ADULTS AGRICULTURAL WORKERS BIRTH ORDER BUDGET FOR EDUCATION CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS CASH TRANSFERS CHILD HEALTH CHILD LABOR DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN EDUCATION BUDGET ENROLLMENT ENROLLMENT RATE ENROLLMENT RATES FAMILY MEMBERS FOOD CONSUMPTION FOOD POLICY FOOD-FOR-EDUCATION GENDER DIFFERENCES GIRLS HIGHER GRADES HIGHER INEQUALITY HUMAN CAPITAL HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT ILLITERACY ILLITERATE PARENTS INCOME INEQUALITY LITERACY LITERATE PARENTS NUTRITION NUTRITIONAL SUPPLEMENTS PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION POOR POOR CHILDREN POOR COUNTRIES POOR FAMILIES POOR HOUSEHOLDS POOR PARENTS POOR RURAL CHILDREN POVERTY REDUCTION PRIMARY SCHOOL PRIMARY SCHOOL CHILDREN PRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTS PROGRAM DESIGNS RE-ENTRY RETURN TO EDUCATION RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL CHILDREN RURAL COMMUNITIES RURAL SCHOOLS SCHOOL ATTENDANCE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT SCHOOL PARTICIPATION SCHOOL SYSTEM SCHOOL YEAR SCHOOL YEARS SCHOOLING SCHOOLS SECONDARY EDUCATION SECONDARY SCHOOL SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL SERVICES TARGETED TRANSFERS TARGETING TRANSFER AMOUNTS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/17753198/making-conditional-cash-transfer-programs-more-efficient-designing-maximum-effect-conditionality http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16466

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Summary:	Conditional cash transfer programs are now used extensively to encourage poor parents to increase investments in their children's human capital. These programs can be large and expensive, motivating a quest for greater efficiency through increased impact of the programs' imposed conditions on human capital formation. This requires designing the programs' targeting and calibration rules specifically to achieve this result. Using data from the Progresa randomized experiment in Mexico, this article shows that large efficiency gains can be achieved by taking into account how much the probability of a child's enrollment is affected by a conditional transfer. Rules for targeting and calibration can be made easy to implement by selecting indicators that are simple, observable, and verifiable and that cannot be manipulated by beneficiaries. The Mexico case shows that these efficiency gains can be achieved without increasing inequality among poor households.

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