Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia

External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may d...

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Main Authors:	Friebel, Guido, Guriev, Sergei
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2014
Subjects:	labor markets migration in-kind payments
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17747612/attaching-workers-through-in-kind-payments-theory-evidence-russia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16475

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recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-164752021-04-23T14:03:29Z Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia Friebel, Guido Guriev, Sergei labor markets migration in-kind payments External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise 'attachment' strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacle to migration has not yet been considered in the literature. The article shows that the feasibility of attachment depends on the inherited structure of local labor markets: attachment can exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficiently concentrated. Attachment is beneficial for both employers and employees but hurts the unemployed and the self-employed. An analysis of matched household-firm data from the Russian Federation corroborates the theory. 2014-01-03T18:13:10Z 2014-01-03T18:13:10Z 2005-10-05 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17747612/attaching-workers-through-in-kind-payments-theory-evidence-russia World Bank Economic Review doi:10.1093/wber/lhi012 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16475 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	labor markets migration in-kind payments
spellingShingle	labor markets migration in-kind payments Friebel, Guido Guriev, Sergei Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia
geographic_facet	Europe and Central Asia Russian Federation
description	External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise 'attachment' strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacle to migration has not yet been considered in the literature. The article shows that the feasibility of attachment depends on the inherited structure of local labor markets: attachment can exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficiently concentrated. Attachment is beneficial for both employers and employees but hurts the unemployed and the self-employed. An analysis of matched household-firm data from the Russian Federation corroborates the theory.
format	Journal Article
author	Friebel, Guido Guriev, Sergei
author_facet	Friebel, Guido Guriev, Sergei
author_sort	Friebel, Guido
title	Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia
title_short	Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia
title_full	Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia
title_fullStr	Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia
title_full_unstemmed	Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia
title_sort	attaching workers through in-kind payments : theory and evidence from russia
publisher	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17747612/attaching-workers-through-in-kind-payments-theory-evidence-russia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16475
_version_	1764433327720235008

Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments : Theory and Evidence from Russia

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