Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders
What affects a country's decision of whether to formally engage in a trade dispute directly related to its exporting interests? This article empirically examines determinants of affected country participation decisions in formal trade litigati...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17748199/participation-wto-dispute-settlement-complainants-interested-parties-free-riders http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16479 |
| id |
okr-10986-16479 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-164792021-04-23T14:03:29Z Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders Bown, Chad P. AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ANTIDUMPING PETITIONS AUCTION CHECKS CONTINUED DUMPING CUSTOMS CUSTOMS UNION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANEL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DISPUTE ° ¨ SETTLEMENT DISPUTE ° ¨ SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC RELATIONS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMICS RESEARCH EUROPEAN UNION EXPORT PROMOTION EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FEDERAL RESERVE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COST FREE RIDERS FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FREE TRADE AREA FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES GLOBAL ECONOMY GOVERNMENT POLICIES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPORT DATA IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTED PRODUCTS IMPORTING COUNTRIES IMPORTS INFORMATION SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL ISSUES LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MARGINAL EFFECTS MARKET ACCESS MARKET DIVERSIFICATION MARKET SHARE MOST FAVORED NATION MULTILATERAL TRADE PANEL DECISIONS PANEL PROCESS PANEL REPORT PANEL STAGE POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL TRADE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REMEDIES SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS SPECIAL TREATMENT SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES TARIFF DATA TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTA TERMS OF TRADE TRADE BARRIER TRADE CONCESSIONS TRADE DATA TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE DISPUTE TRADE DISPUTES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REVIEW TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM TRADE PREFERENCES TRADE REMEDIES TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE RETALIATION TRADING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT RULES URUGUAY ROUND VALUE OF EXPORTS VALUE OF TRADE WITHDRAWAL WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WORLD TRADING SYSTEM WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS WTO What affects a country's decision of whether to formally engage in a trade dispute directly related to its exporting interests? This article empirically examines determinants of affected country participation decisions in formal trade litigation arising under the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 1995 and 2000. It investigates determinants of nonparticipation and examines whether the incentives generated by the system's rules and procedures discourage active engagement in dispute settlement by developing country members in particular. Though the size of exports at stake is found to be an important economic determinant affecting the decision to participate in challenges to a WTO-inconsistent policy, the evidence also shows that measures of a country's retaliatory and legal capacity as well as its international political economy relationships matter. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of an implicit 'institutional bias' generated by the system's rules and incentives that particularly affects developing economy participation in dispute settlement. 2014-01-03T18:42:43Z 2014-01-03T18:42:43Z 2005-08-24 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17748199/participation-wto-dispute-settlement-complainants-interested-parties-free-riders World Bank Economic Review doi:10.1093/wber/lhi009 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16479 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research :: Journal Article |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ANTIDUMPING PETITIONS AUCTION CHECKS CONTINUED DUMPING CUSTOMS CUSTOMS UNION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANEL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DISPUTE ° ¨ SETTLEMENT DISPUTE ° ¨ SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC RELATIONS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMICS RESEARCH EUROPEAN UNION EXPORT PROMOTION EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FEDERAL RESERVE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COST FREE RIDERS FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FREE TRADE AREA FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES GLOBAL ECONOMY GOVERNMENT POLICIES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPORT DATA IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTED PRODUCTS IMPORTING COUNTRIES IMPORTS INFORMATION SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL ISSUES LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MARGINAL EFFECTS MARKET ACCESS MARKET DIVERSIFICATION MARKET SHARE MOST FAVORED NATION MULTILATERAL TRADE PANEL DECISIONS PANEL PROCESS PANEL REPORT PANEL STAGE POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL TRADE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REMEDIES SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS SPECIAL TREATMENT SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES TARIFF DATA TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTA TERMS OF TRADE TRADE BARRIER TRADE CONCESSIONS TRADE DATA TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE DISPUTE TRADE DISPUTES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REVIEW TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM TRADE PREFERENCES TRADE REMEDIES TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE RETALIATION TRADING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT RULES URUGUAY ROUND VALUE OF EXPORTS VALUE OF TRADE WITHDRAWAL WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WORLD TRADING SYSTEM WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS WTO |
| spellingShingle |
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING MEASURES ANTIDUMPING PETITIONS AUCTION CHECKS CONTINUED DUMPING CUSTOMS CUSTOMS UNION DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANEL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DISPUTE ° ¨ SETTLEMENT DISPUTE ° ¨ SETTLEMENT SYSTEM DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES ECONOMIC OUTCOMES ECONOMIC RELATIONS ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMICS RESEARCH EUROPEAN UNION EXPORT PROMOTION EXPORTER EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FEDERAL RESERVE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK FINANCIAL SUPPORT FIXED COST FREE RIDERS FREE TRADE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FREE TRADE AREA FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES GLOBAL ECONOMY GOVERNMENT POLICIES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPORT DATA IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTED PRODUCTS IMPORTING COUNTRIES IMPORTS INFORMATION SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGAL ASSISTANCE LEGAL ISSUES LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MARGINAL EFFECTS MARKET ACCESS MARKET DIVERSIFICATION MARKET SHARE MOST FAVORED NATION MULTILATERAL TRADE PANEL DECISIONS PANEL PROCESS PANEL REPORT PANEL STAGE POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES PREFERENTIAL ACCESS PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL TRADE REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS REMEDIES SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS SPECIAL TREATMENT SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES TARIFF DATA TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATE QUOTA TERMS OF TRADE TRADE BARRIER TRADE CONCESSIONS TRADE DATA TRADE DEFLECTION TRADE DISPUTE TRADE DISPUTES TRADE FLOWS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY REVIEW TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM TRADE PREFERENCES TRADE REMEDIES TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE RETALIATION TRADING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT RULES URUGUAY ROUND VALUE OF EXPORTS VALUE OF TRADE WITHDRAWAL WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WORLD TRADING SYSTEM WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS WTO Bown, Chad P. Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders |
| description |
What affects a country's decision
of whether to formally engage in a trade dispute directly
related to its exporting interests? This article empirically
examines determinants of affected country participation
decisions in formal trade litigation arising under the World
Trade Organization (WTO) between 1995 and 2000. It
investigates determinants of nonparticipation and examines
whether the incentives generated by the system's rules
and procedures discourage active engagement in dispute
settlement by developing country members in particular.
Though the size of exports at stake is found to be an
important economic determinant affecting the decision to
participate in challenges to a WTO-inconsistent policy, the
evidence also shows that measures of a country's
retaliatory and legal capacity as well as its international
political economy relationships matter. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis of an implicit
'institutional bias' generated by the
system's rules and incentives that particularly affects
developing economy participation in dispute settlement. |
| format |
Journal Article |
| author |
Bown, Chad P. |
| author_facet |
Bown, Chad P. |
| author_sort |
Bown, Chad P. |
| title |
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders |
| title_short |
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders |
| title_full |
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders |
| title_fullStr |
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders |
| title_sort |
participation in wto dispute settlement : complainants, interested parties, and free riders |
| publisher |
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/05/17748199/participation-wto-dispute-settlement-complainants-interested-parties-free-riders http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16479 |
| _version_ |
1764433340548513792 |