Russian Federation : National and Regional Trends in Regulatory Burden and Corruption
Using data from business environment and enterprise performance survey (BEEPS) and other enterprise surveys, studies have shown that firm entry, growth and productivity are impeded by corruption and overly burdensome regulation. Most of these studi...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/02/17385483/russian-federation-national-regional-trends-regulatory-burden-corruption http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16566 |
| Summary: | Using data from business environment and
enterprise performance survey (BEEPS) and other enterprise
surveys, studies have shown that firm entry, growth and
productivity are impeded by corruption and overly burdensome
regulation. Most of these studies have been based on
cross-country data (e.g. Barseghyan, 2008), or
country-specific studies of firms in China (e.g. Cai et al.,
2011; Cull and Xu, 2005), Mexico (Bruhn, 2011) and other
nations. Other studies, however, are specific to Russia
(e.g. Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2007). Cross-regional
variation in corruption and regulatory burden in Russia are
potentially important factors in explaining differential
performance in private sector development, income levels and
growth rates. The intended audiences of this note are
policymakers and policy analysts in the non-governmental
organization (NGO) and academic communities who are
interested in regulatory reform, corruption, and related
aspects of the business environment in Russia. A broad range
of evidence shows that overly burdensome regulation and
corruption are significant impediments to firm entry,
productivity and growth. Cross-regional variation in
corruption and regulatory burden in Russia is a potentially
important factor in explaining differential performance in
private sector development, income levels and growth rates.
Moreover, further research can investigate the extent to
which distortions in various regulatory and administrative
areas and transactions may be redundant, in their effects on
firm entry and growth. Reforms in a limited number of areas
may show disappointing results, if there are remaining
distortions sufficient to deter entry or expansion.
Rent-seekers may be able to substitute one regulatory
barrier for another in blocking competitors. |
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