Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians
Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This pap...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400395/promises-promises-vote-buying-electoral-mobilization-strategies-non-credible-politicians http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16868 |
| Summary: | Vote-buying is pervasive, but not
everywhere. What explains significant variations across
countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to
mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral
promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly
models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they
decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or
promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more
on vote-buying when they are less credible, target
vote-buying to those who do not believe their political
promises, and only buy votes from those who would have
received post-electoral transfers in a world of full
political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on
vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with
vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society. |
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