Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians
Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This pap...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400395/promises-promises-vote-buying-electoral-mobilization-strategies-non-credible-politicians http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16868 |
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okr-10986-168682021-04-23T14:03:32Z Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip VOTE BUYING CLIENT ELECTION ADMISNITRATION CREDIBLE COMMITTMENT POLICITAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS BUDGET CONSTRAINT GOVERNMENT SPENDING BUDGET CYCLE GOVERNMENT FINANCING BUSINESS CYCLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES COLLECTIVE ACTION VOTERS CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES NATIONAL INCOME DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC POLITIES ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION FRAUD ELECTORAL PROCESS EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL TRANSPARENCY GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT FINANCING GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS GOVERNMENT RESOURCES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PRESIDENTIAL RACE POLITICAL INCENTIVES POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SCIENCE PRESIDENTIAL RACE PUBLIC GOOD SOCIAL WELFARE TAX REVENUES TRANSFER PROGRAMS VOTER BEHAVIOR VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR VOTING BLOCS WELFARE BENEFITS WELFARE CONSEQUENCES WELFARE LOSS TRANSFER PROGRAMS WELFARE SERVICES Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more on vote-buying when they are less credible, target vote-buying to those who do not believe their political promises, and only buy votes from those who would have received post-electoral transfers in a world of full political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society. 2014-02-04T17:53:18Z 2014-02-04T17:53:18Z 2013-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400395/promises-promises-vote-buying-electoral-mobilization-strategies-non-credible-politicians http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16868 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6653 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
VOTE BUYING CLIENT ELECTION ADMISNITRATION CREDIBLE COMMITTMENT POLICITAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS BUDGET CONSTRAINT GOVERNMENT SPENDING BUDGET CYCLE GOVERNMENT FINANCING BUSINESS CYCLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES COLLECTIVE ACTION VOTERS CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES NATIONAL INCOME DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC POLITIES ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION FRAUD ELECTORAL PROCESS EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL TRANSPARENCY GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT FINANCING GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS GOVERNMENT RESOURCES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PRESIDENTIAL RACE POLITICAL INCENTIVES POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SCIENCE PRESIDENTIAL RACE PUBLIC GOOD SOCIAL WELFARE TAX REVENUES TRANSFER PROGRAMS VOTER BEHAVIOR VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR VOTING BLOCS WELFARE BENEFITS WELFARE CONSEQUENCES WELFARE LOSS TRANSFER PROGRAMS WELFARE SERVICES |
| spellingShingle |
VOTE BUYING CLIENT ELECTION ADMISNITRATION CREDIBLE COMMITTMENT POLICITAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS BUDGET CONSTRAINT GOVERNMENT SPENDING BUDGET CYCLE GOVERNMENT FINANCING BUSINESS CYCLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES COLLECTIVE ACTION VOTERS CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES NATIONAL INCOME DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY DEMOCRATIC POLITIES ECONOMIC GROWTH ELECTION ELECTION FRAUD ELECTORAL PROCESS EXPENDITURE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE FISCAL TRANSPARENCY GENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GOVERNMENT FINANCING GOVERNMENT POLICIES GOVERNMENT POLICY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS GOVERNMENT RESOURCES GOVERNMENT SPENDING GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH NATIONAL BUDGET NATIONAL INCOME NEW DEMOCRACIES PARTY LEADERS POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PRESIDENTIAL RACE POLITICAL INCENTIVES POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL SCIENCE PRESIDENTIAL RACE PUBLIC GOOD SOCIAL WELFARE TAX REVENUES TRANSFER PROGRAMS VOTER BEHAVIOR VOTING VOTING BEHAVIOR VOTING BLOCS WELFARE BENEFITS WELFARE CONSEQUENCES WELFARE LOSS TRANSFER PROGRAMS WELFARE SERVICES Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6653 |
| description |
Vote-buying is pervasive, but not
everywhere. What explains significant variations across
countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to
mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral
promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly
models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they
decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or
promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more
on vote-buying when they are less credible, target
vote-buying to those who do not believe their political
promises, and only buy votes from those who would have
received post-electoral transfers in a world of full
political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on
vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with
vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip |
| author_facet |
Hanusch, Marek Keefer, Philip |
| author_sort |
Hanusch, Marek |
| title |
Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians |
| title_short |
Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians |
| title_full |
Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians |
| title_fullStr |
Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians |
| title_sort |
promises, promises : vote-buying and the electoral mobilization strategies of non-credible politicians |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/10/18400395/promises-promises-vote-buying-electoral-mobilization-strategies-non-credible-politicians http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16868 |
| _version_ |
1764434748520792064 |