The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform
Bureaucratic reform is a priority of donor organizations, including the World Bank, but is notoriously difficult to implement. In many countries, politicians have little interest in the basic financial and personnel management systems that are esse...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/11/18474749/organization-political-parties-politics-bureaucratic-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16926 |
| id |
okr-10986-16926 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-169262021-04-23T14:03:32Z The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform Cruz, Cesi Keefer, Philip ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS AGREEMENTS ANALYTICAL CAPACITY BANK BENEFICIARIES BEST PRACTICE BORROWING BUDGET ENVELOPE BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET PLANNING BUDGET PREPARATION BUDGET REFORMS BUDGETS BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION CASH TRANSFERS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM COLLAPSE COMPETITION CONFIDENCE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACTS CORRUPTION COSTS OF SERVICE PROVISION DEBT DEBT MANAGEMENT DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DISCRETION DONOR AGENCIES DONOR COLLABORATION ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EDUCATION PROGRAMS FINANCE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENTS HEALTH CARE HEALTH PROGRAM INCENTIVES INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFRASTRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL SETTING INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL REVIEW LAND LEADERSHIP LOANS LOCAL GOVERNMENT MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT MEDIA MINISTER MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATURAL RESOURCES OPERATIONAL PROCESSES ORGANIZATIONS OUTCOME INDICATOR OUTCOMES PATRONAGE PER PER CAPITA INCOME PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL SYSTEMS POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTEREST POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POLITICS PRIVATE GOODS PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS PROJECTS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AREAS PUBLIC SECTORS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES REFORM PROJECT REFORM PROJECTS REGULATION REPORTS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REVENUE REVENUES RULE OF LAW RULING PARTY SANCTIONS SECTORAL OBJECTIVES SERVICE PROVISION SERVICE QUALITY SERVICES SOCIAL PROGRAMS SPENDING STATES STRATEGIES STRATEGY SUBSIDIES TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX INCIDENCE TAX LAW TAX POLICY TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TAXPAYERS UNCERTAINTY UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS VOTERS Bureaucratic reform is a priority of donor organizations, including the World Bank, but is notoriously difficult to implement. In many countries, politicians have little interest in the basic financial and personnel management systems that are essential to political oversight of bureaucratic performance. To explain this, this paper presents a new perspective on the political economy of bureaucracy. Politicians in some countries belong to parties that are organized to allow party members to act collectively to limit leader shirking. This is particularly the case with programmatic parties. Such politicians have stronger incentives to pursue public policies that require a well-functioning public administration. Novel evidence offers robust support for this argument. From a sample of 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, the paper finds that public sector reforms are more likely to succeed in countries with programmatic political parties. 2014-02-05T16:04:17Z 2014-02-05T16:04:17Z 2013-11 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/11/18474749/organization-political-parties-politics-bureaucratic-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16926 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6686 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS AGREEMENTS ANALYTICAL CAPACITY BANK BENEFICIARIES BEST PRACTICE BORROWING BUDGET ENVELOPE BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET PLANNING BUDGET PREPARATION BUDGET REFORMS BUDGETS BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION CASH TRANSFERS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM COLLAPSE COMPETITION CONFIDENCE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACTS CORRUPTION COSTS OF SERVICE PROVISION DEBT DEBT MANAGEMENT DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DISCRETION DONOR AGENCIES DONOR COLLABORATION ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EDUCATION PROGRAMS FINANCE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENTS HEALTH CARE HEALTH PROGRAM INCENTIVES INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFRASTRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL SETTING INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL REVIEW LAND LEADERSHIP LOANS LOCAL GOVERNMENT MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT MEDIA MINISTER MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATURAL RESOURCES OPERATIONAL PROCESSES ORGANIZATIONS OUTCOME INDICATOR OUTCOMES PATRONAGE PER PER CAPITA INCOME PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL SYSTEMS POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTEREST POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POLITICS PRIVATE GOODS PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS PROJECTS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AREAS PUBLIC SECTORS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES REFORM PROJECT REFORM PROJECTS REGULATION REPORTS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REVENUE REVENUES RULE OF LAW RULING PARTY SANCTIONS SECTORAL OBJECTIVES SERVICE PROVISION SERVICE QUALITY SERVICES SOCIAL PROGRAMS SPENDING STATES STRATEGIES STRATEGY SUBSIDIES TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX INCIDENCE TAX LAW TAX POLICY TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TAXPAYERS UNCERTAINTY UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS VOTERS |
| spellingShingle |
ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS AGREEMENTS ANALYTICAL CAPACITY BANK BENEFICIARIES BEST PRACTICE BORROWING BUDGET ENVELOPE BUDGET MANAGEMENT BUDGET PLANNING BUDGET PREPARATION BUDGET REFORMS BUDGETS BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION CASH TRANSFERS CIVIL SERVICE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM COLLAPSE COMPETITION CONFIDENCE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CONTRACTS CORRUPTION COSTS OF SERVICE PROVISION DEBT DEBT MANAGEMENT DECENTRALIZATION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DISCRETION DONOR AGENCIES DONOR COLLABORATION ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC POLICY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EDUCATION PROGRAMS FINANCE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE REFORM GOVERNMENTS HEALTH CARE HEALTH PROGRAM INCENTIVES INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFRASTRUCTURE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT INSTITUTIONAL REFORM INSTITUTIONAL SETTING INVESTIGATION JUDICIAL REVIEW LAND LEADERSHIP LOANS LOCAL GOVERNMENT MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT MEDIA MINISTER MINISTERS MINISTRY OF FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET NATURAL RESOURCES OPERATIONAL PROCESSES ORGANIZATIONS OUTCOME INDICATOR OUTCOMES PATRONAGE PER PER CAPITA INCOME PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL SYSTEMS POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL INTEREST POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POLITICS PRIVATE GOODS PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS PROJECTS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PUBLIC PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICIES PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AREAS PUBLIC SECTORS REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES REFORM PROJECT REFORM PROJECTS REGULATION REPORTS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REVENUE REVENUES RULE OF LAW RULING PARTY SANCTIONS SECTORAL OBJECTIVES SERVICE PROVISION SERVICE QUALITY SERVICES SOCIAL PROGRAMS SPENDING STATES STRATEGIES STRATEGY SUBSIDIES TAX TAX ADMINISTRATION TAX INCIDENCE TAX LAW TAX POLICY TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TAXPAYERS UNCERTAINTY UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS VOTERS Cruz, Cesi Keefer, Philip The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6686 |
| description |
Bureaucratic reform is a priority of
donor organizations, including the World Bank, but is
notoriously difficult to implement. In many countries,
politicians have little interest in the basic financial and
personnel management systems that are essential to political
oversight of bureaucratic performance. To explain this, this
paper presents a new perspective on the political economy of
bureaucracy. Politicians in some countries belong to parties
that are organized to allow party members to act
collectively to limit leader shirking. This is particularly
the case with programmatic parties. Such politicians have
stronger incentives to pursue public policies that require a
well-functioning public administration. Novel evidence
offers robust support for this argument. From a sample of
439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries,
the paper finds that public sector reforms are more likely
to succeed in countries with programmatic political parties. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Cruz, Cesi Keefer, Philip |
| author_facet |
Cruz, Cesi Keefer, Philip |
| author_sort |
Cruz, Cesi |
| title |
The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform |
| title_short |
The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform |
| title_full |
The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform |
| title_fullStr |
The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform |
| title_sort |
organization of political parties and the politics of bureaucratic reform |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/11/18474749/organization-political-parties-politics-bureaucratic-reform http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16926 |
| _version_ |
1764434915109109760 |