Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess featur...
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2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/17579929/social-investment-funds-organizational-approach-improved-development-assistance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130 |
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okr-10986-171302021-04-23T14:03:29Z Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance Jack, William ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTONOMY BENEFICIARIES BRIBES CAPACITY BUILDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE BIDDING CORRUPT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECONCENTRATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVOLUTION DISCRETION ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMICS RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT EXPENDITURE EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL FUNDING EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FUNGIBLE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT GRANTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HOUSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN RESOURCES INCOME INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT FUND INVESTMENT FUNDS LOAN LOCAL CAPACITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL OFFICIALS MEDIA MINISTERS MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MISAPPROPRIATION MORAL HAZARD MORAL HAZARDS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OPTIMAL CONTRACT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES PENALTIES PERFECT INFORMATION PERSONAL INCOME PHYSICAL ASSETS POLICE POLICE OFFICER POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PORTFOLIO POVERTY REDUCTION PROCUREMENT PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS PUBLIC PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS RATE OF RETURN RETURN RETURNS RISK TAKING SANCTIONS SOCIAL CAPITAL TAX TAXATION TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT URBAN AREAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE USER CHARGES This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds. 2014-02-20T22:58:27Z 2014-02-20T22:58:27Z 2001-04 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/17579929/social-investment-funds-organizational-approach-improved-development-assistance World Bank Research Observer http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTONOMY BENEFICIARIES BRIBES CAPACITY BUILDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE BIDDING CORRUPT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECONCENTRATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVOLUTION DISCRETION ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMICS RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT EXPENDITURE EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL FUNDING EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FUNGIBLE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT GRANTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HOUSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN RESOURCES INCOME INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT FUND INVESTMENT FUNDS LOAN LOCAL CAPACITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL OFFICIALS MEDIA MINISTERS MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MISAPPROPRIATION MORAL HAZARD MORAL HAZARDS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OPTIMAL CONTRACT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES PENALTIES PERFECT INFORMATION PERSONAL INCOME PHYSICAL ASSETS POLICE POLICE OFFICER POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PORTFOLIO POVERTY REDUCTION PROCUREMENT PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS PUBLIC PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS RATE OF RETURN RETURN RETURNS RISK TAKING SANCTIONS SOCIAL CAPITAL TAX TAXATION TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT URBAN AREAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE USER CHARGES |
spellingShingle |
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTONOMY BENEFICIARIES BRIBES CAPACITY BUILDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE BIDDING CORRUPT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECONCENTRATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVOLUTION DISCRETION ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMICS RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT EXPENDITURE EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL FUNDING EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FUNGIBLE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT GRANTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HOUSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN RESOURCES INCOME INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT FUND INVESTMENT FUNDS LOAN LOCAL CAPACITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL OFFICIALS MEDIA MINISTERS MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MISAPPROPRIATION MORAL HAZARD MORAL HAZARDS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OPTIMAL CONTRACT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES PENALTIES PERFECT INFORMATION PERSONAL INCOME PHYSICAL ASSETS POLICE POLICE OFFICER POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PORTFOLIO POVERTY REDUCTION PROCUREMENT PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS PUBLIC PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS RATE OF RETURN RETURN RETURNS RISK TAKING SANCTIONS SOCIAL CAPITAL TAX TAXATION TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT URBAN AREAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE USER CHARGES Jack, William Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance |
description |
This paper examines the design of social
investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect
agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good
projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service
provision, SIFs possess features of administratively
delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where
existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance
to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a
useful administrative alternative. This article reviews
several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff
and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical
guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds. |
format |
Journal Article |
author |
Jack, William |
author_facet |
Jack, William |
author_sort |
Jack, William |
title |
Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance |
title_short |
Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance |
title_full |
Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance |
title_fullStr |
Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance |
title_full_unstemmed |
Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance |
title_sort |
social investment funds : an organizational approach to improved development assistance |
publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/17579929/social-investment-funds-organizational-approach-improved-development-assistance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130 |
_version_ |
1764433453705592832 |