Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance

This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess featur...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jack, William
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
en_US
Published: Washington, DC: World Bank 2014
Subjects:
TAX
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/17579929/social-investment-funds-organizational-approach-improved-development-assistance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130
id okr-10986-17130
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-171302021-04-23T14:03:29Z Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance Jack, William ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS AUCTION AUCTIONS AUTONOMY BENEFICIARIES BRIBES CAPACITY BUILDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SOCIETY COLLUSION COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVE BIDDING CORRUPT CORRUPTION DECENTRALIZATION DECONCENTRATION DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVOLUTION DISCRETION ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMICS RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT EXPENDITURE EXPROPRIATION EXTERNAL FUNDING EXTERNALITIES FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL FEDERALISM FUNGIBLE GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNMENT GRANTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HOUSING HUMAN DEVELOPMENT HUMAN RESOURCES INCOME INEQUALITY INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT FUND INVESTMENT FUNDS LOAN LOCAL CAPACITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVEL LOCAL OFFICIALS MEDIA MINISTERS MINISTRIES OF FINANCE MISAPPROPRIATION MORAL HAZARD MORAL HAZARDS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OPTIMAL CONTRACT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES PENALTIES PERFECT INFORMATION PERSONAL INCOME PHYSICAL ASSETS POLICE POLICE OFFICER POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PORTFOLIO POVERTY REDUCTION PROCUREMENT PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC PUBLIC CHOICE PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS PUBLIC PROJECTS PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTORS PUBLIC SERVICES PUBLIC SPENDING PUBLIC WORKS RATE OF RETURN RETURN RETURNS RISK TAKING SANCTIONS SOCIAL CAPITAL TAX TAXATION TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSITION COUNTRIES TRANSITION ECONOMIES TRANSPORT URBAN AREAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE USER CHARGES This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds. 2014-02-20T22:58:27Z 2014-02-20T22:58:27Z 2001-04 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/17579929/social-investment-funds-organizational-approach-improved-development-assistance World Bank Research Observer http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENCY PROBLEMS
AUCTION
AUCTIONS
AUTONOMY
BENEFICIARIES
BRIBES
CAPACITY BUILDING
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SOCIETY
COLLUSION
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORRUPT
CORRUPTION
DECENTRALIZATION
DECONCENTRATION
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
DEVELOPMENT BANK
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
DEVOLUTION
DISCRETION
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
EMPLOYMENT
EXPENDITURE
EXPROPRIATION
EXTERNAL FUNDING
EXTERNALITIES
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FUNGIBLE
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT GRANTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
HOUSING
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN RESOURCES
INCOME INEQUALITY
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
INSTRUMENT
INSURANCE
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INVESTMENT FUND
INVESTMENT FUNDS
LOAN
LOCAL CAPACITY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVEL
LOCAL OFFICIALS
MEDIA
MINISTERS
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MISAPPROPRIATION
MORAL HAZARD
MORAL HAZARDS
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
OPTIMAL CONTRACT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
PENALTIES
PERFECT INFORMATION
PERSONAL INCOME
PHYSICAL ASSETS
POLICE
POLICE OFFICER
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
PORTFOLIO
POVERTY REDUCTION
PROCUREMENT
PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC
PUBLIC CHOICE
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
PUBLIC PROJECTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC SPENDING
PUBLIC WORKS
RATE OF RETURN
RETURN
RETURNS
RISK TAKING
SANCTIONS
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TAX
TAXATION
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSITION COUNTRIES
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPORT
URBAN AREAS
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
USER CHARGES
spellingShingle ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENCY PROBLEMS
AUCTION
AUCTIONS
AUTONOMY
BENEFICIARIES
BRIBES
CAPACITY BUILDING
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SOCIETY
COLLUSION
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORRUPT
CORRUPTION
DECENTRALIZATION
DECONCENTRATION
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
DEVELOPMENT BANK
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
DEVOLUTION
DISCRETION
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
ECONOMICS RESEARCH
EMPLOYMENT
EXPENDITURE
EXPROPRIATION
EXTERNAL FUNDING
EXTERNALITIES
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL FEDERALISM
FUNGIBLE
GOOD GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT GRANTS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
HOUSING
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN RESOURCES
INCOME INEQUALITY
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
INSTRUMENT
INSURANCE
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INVESTMENT FUND
INVESTMENT FUNDS
LOAN
LOCAL CAPACITY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVEL
LOCAL OFFICIALS
MEDIA
MINISTERS
MINISTRIES OF FINANCE
MISAPPROPRIATION
MORAL HAZARD
MORAL HAZARDS
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
OPTIMAL CONTRACT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
PENALTIES
PERFECT INFORMATION
PERSONAL INCOME
PHYSICAL ASSETS
POLICE
POLICE OFFICER
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
PORTFOLIO
POVERTY REDUCTION
PROCUREMENT
PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
PROPERTY RIGHTS
PUBLIC
PUBLIC CHOICE
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
PUBLIC PROJECTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC SPENDING
PUBLIC WORKS
RATE OF RETURN
RETURN
RETURNS
RISK TAKING
SANCTIONS
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TAX
TAXATION
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION COSTS
TRANSITION COUNTRIES
TRANSITION ECONOMIES
TRANSPORT
URBAN AREAS
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
USER CHARGES
Jack, William
Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
description This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds.
format Journal Article
author Jack, William
author_facet Jack, William
author_sort Jack, William
title Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
title_short Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
title_full Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
title_fullStr Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
title_full_unstemmed Social Investment Funds : An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
title_sort social investment funds : an organizational approach to improved development assistance
publisher Washington, DC: World Bank
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/03/17579929/social-investment-funds-organizational-approach-improved-development-assistance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130
_version_ 1764433453705592832