Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nomin...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
Washington, DC: World Bank
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/17742611/lobbying-counterlobbying-structure-tariff-protection-poor-rich-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164 |
| Summary: | A political economy model of protection
is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns
of protection. Three propositions are derived that are
consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection
in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates
escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher
on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect
agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing,
whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations
for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the
endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly
consistent with observed patterns of protection. |
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