Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries

A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nomin...

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Main Authors:	Cadot, Olivier, Melo, Jaime de, Olarreaga, Marcelo
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Washington, DC: World Bank 2014
Subjects:	AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/17742611/lobbying-counterlobbying-structure-tariff-protection-poor-rich-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164

id	okr-10986-17164
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-171642021-04-23T14:03:29Z Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection. 2014-02-26T14:34:03Z 2014-02-26T14:34:03Z 2004-09 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/17742611/lobbying-counterlobbying-structure-tariff-protection-poor-rich-countries World Bank Economic Review http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164 English en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Washington, DC: World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO
spellingShingle	AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
description	A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection.
format	Journal Article
author	Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo
author_facet	Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo
author_sort	Cadot, Olivier
title	Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
title_short	Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
title_full	Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
title_fullStr	Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
title_full_unstemmed	Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
title_sort	lobbying, counterlobbying, and the structure of tariff protection in poor and rich countries
publisher	Washington, DC: World Bank
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/17742611/lobbying-counterlobbying-structure-tariff-protection-poor-rich-countries http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164
_version_	1764433395252723712

Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries

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