Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection
What kinds of changes in foreign competition lead domestic industries to seek import protection? To address this question this paper uses detailed monthly U.S. import data to investigate changes in import composition during a 24-month window immedi...
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2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/03/19189979/import-dynamics-demands-protection http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17301 |
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okr-10986-173012021-04-23T14:03:37Z Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection Hillberry, Russell McCalman, Phillip ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES AVERAGE PRICE BENCHMARK BUSINESS CYCLES CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CARTEL COLLECTED TARIFF COMMERCE COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSTRUCTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS VALUE DEVELOPMENT POLICY DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DUMPING ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY EQUILIBRIUM ESCAPE CLAUSE EXCESS SUPPLY EXCHANGE RATES EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FAIR FINANCIAL CRISIS FOREIGN COMPETITION FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS GLOBAL TRADING GROWTH RATE HOME MARKET IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT DATA IMPORT PRICE IMPORT PRICES IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT RELIEF IMPORT STATISTICS IMPORT VALUE IMPORT VALUES IMPORT VOLUME IMPORTS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION IRON MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET SHARE MERCHANDISE MONOPOLY NATIONAL ECONOMIES NATIONAL TREATMENT PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PRICE VOLATILITY PROTECTIONISM RECIPROCITY RENT SEEKING SALE TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CLASSIFICATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE ACT TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DATA TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION UNFAIR COMPETITION WAREHOUSE WORLD TRADE WTO What kinds of changes in foreign competition lead domestic industries to seek import protection? To address this question this paper uses detailed monthly U.S. import data to investigate changes in import composition during a 24-month window immediately preceding the filing of a petition for protection. A decomposition methodology allows a comparison of imports from two groups of countries supplying the same product: those that are named in the petition and those that are not. The same decomposition can be applied to products quite similar to the imports in question, but not subject to a petition. The results suggest that industries typically seek protection when faced with a specific pattern of shocks. First, a persistent positive relative supply shock favors imports from named countries. Second, a negative demand shock hits imports from all sources just prior to domestic industries' petition for protection. The relative supply shock is a broad one; it applies both to named commodities and to the comparison product group. The import demand shock, by contrast, is narrow, hitting only named products. The latter shock is also large: import growth over the two-year window is 15 percentage points lower in named products than in reference products, with most of this gap arising in the final two quarters before the petition. The negative import demand shock appears to be a key event in the run-up to the filing of a petition. It has been missed by previous studies using more aggregated data. 2014-03-18T19:46:20Z 2014-03-18T19:46:20Z 2014-03 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/03/19189979/import-dynamics-demands-protection http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17301 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6796 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
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Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES AVERAGE PRICE BENCHMARK BUSINESS CYCLES CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CARTEL COLLECTED TARIFF COMMERCE COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSTRUCTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS VALUE DEVELOPMENT POLICY DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DUMPING ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY EQUILIBRIUM ESCAPE CLAUSE EXCESS SUPPLY EXCHANGE RATES EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FAIR FINANCIAL CRISIS FOREIGN COMPETITION FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS GLOBAL TRADING GROWTH RATE HOME MARKET IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT DATA IMPORT PRICE IMPORT PRICES IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT RELIEF IMPORT STATISTICS IMPORT VALUE IMPORT VALUES IMPORT VOLUME IMPORTS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION IRON MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET SHARE MERCHANDISE MONOPOLY NATIONAL ECONOMIES NATIONAL TREATMENT PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PRICE VOLATILITY PROTECTIONISM RECIPROCITY RENT SEEKING SALE TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CLASSIFICATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE ACT TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DATA TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION UNFAIR COMPETITION WAREHOUSE WORLD TRADE WTO |
spellingShingle |
ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES AVERAGE PRICE BENCHMARK BUSINESS CYCLES CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CARTEL COLLECTED TARIFF COMMERCE COMPETITIVE MARKETS CONSTRUCTION CUSTOMS CUSTOMS VALUE DEVELOPMENT POLICY DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC MARKET DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DUMPING ECONOMIC COOPERATION ECONOMIC RESEARCH ECONOMIC THEORY EQUILIBRIUM ESCAPE CLAUSE EXCESS SUPPLY EXCHANGE RATES EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FAIR FINANCIAL CRISIS FOREIGN COMPETITION FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS GLOBAL TRADING GROWTH RATE HOME MARKET IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT DATA IMPORT PRICE IMPORT PRICES IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT RELIEF IMPORT STATISTICS IMPORT VALUE IMPORT VALUES IMPORT VOLUME IMPORTS INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION IRON MARKET CONDITIONS MARKET SHARE MERCHANDISE MONOPOLY NATIONAL ECONOMIES NATIONAL TREATMENT PREFERENTIAL TRADE PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PRICE VOLATILITY PROTECTIONISM RECIPROCITY RENT SEEKING SALE TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF CLASSIFICATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE ACT TRADE AGREEMENTS TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DATA TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION UNFAIR COMPETITION WAREHOUSE WORLD TRADE WTO Hillberry, Russell McCalman, Phillip Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6796 |
description |
What kinds of changes in foreign
competition lead domestic industries to seek import
protection? To address this question this paper uses
detailed monthly U.S. import data to investigate changes in
import composition during a 24-month window immediately
preceding the filing of a petition for protection. A
decomposition methodology allows a comparison of imports
from two groups of countries supplying the same product:
those that are named in the petition and those that are not.
The same decomposition can be applied to products quite
similar to the imports in question, but not subject to a
petition. The results suggest that industries typically seek
protection when faced with a specific pattern of shocks.
First, a persistent positive relative supply shock favors
imports from named countries. Second, a negative demand
shock hits imports from all sources just prior to domestic
industries' petition for protection. The relative
supply shock is a broad one; it applies both to named
commodities and to the comparison product group. The import
demand shock, by contrast, is narrow, hitting only named
products. The latter shock is also large: import growth over
the two-year window is 15 percentage points lower in named
products than in reference products, with most of this gap
arising in the final two quarters before the petition. The
negative import demand shock appears to be a key event in
the run-up to the filing of a petition. It has been missed
by previous studies using more aggregated data. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Hillberry, Russell McCalman, Phillip |
author_facet |
Hillberry, Russell McCalman, Phillip |
author_sort |
Hillberry, Russell |
title |
Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection |
title_short |
Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection |
title_full |
Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection |
title_fullStr |
Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection |
title_full_unstemmed |
Import Dynamics and Demands for Protection |
title_sort |
import dynamics and demands for protection |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/03/19189979/import-dynamics-demands-protection http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17301 |
_version_ |
1764436842951737344 |