Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study

Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders and brokers (without licenses) follow various...

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Main Authors:	Cantens, Thomas, Kaminski, Jonathan, Raballand, Gaël, Tchapa, Tchouawou
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING AMOUNT OF DUTIES AREA OF CUSTOMS BANK ACCOUNT BARRIER TO ENTRY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BOTTLENECKS BROKER BROKERAGE BROKERS BUSES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS FORMATION BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS MODELS BUSINESS RELATIONS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS BUSINESS SERVICES BUSINESSES CAR CARS CHECKS COLLATERAL COMMERCE COMMODITY COMPUTER HARDWARE COMPUTERS CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS CREDIT MARKET CUSTOMER BASE CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS AGENT CUSTOMS AREA CUSTOMS BROKERS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CONTROL CUSTOMS DUTIES CUSTOMS INFORMATION CUSTOMS OFFICE CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS OFFICES CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS PROCESS CUSTOMS REFORM CUSTOMS REGULATIONS CUSTOMS REVENUES DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANK DIRECT SALES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ELECTRONIC DEVICES END CUSTOMERS ENTRY POINT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN TRADE FRAUD FREIGHT ID IMAGE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION ASYMMETRY INFORMATION FLOWS INFORMATION SHARING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEVEL OF RISK LIABILITY LICENSE LICENSES LITIGATION MANUFACTURING MARKET DEMAND MARKET FAILURES MARKET SEGMENT MARKET STRUCTURE MARKETING MARKETING STRATEGIES MATERIAL MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MIDDLEMEN MORAL HAZARD NECESSARY SKILLS NEIGHBORHOODS NETWORKS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCES PERSONAL INCOME PETROLEUM PRODUCTS POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMY PORT AUTHORITY PRODUCT CATEGORY PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGINS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REBATES REGIONAL NETWORKS RELIABILITY RESULT RESULTS RETURN RISK EXPOSURE RISK PROFILE ROUTE SAVINGS SAVINGS RATE SERVICE PROVIDER SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL CAPITAL SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS STANDARDIZATION STOCKS SUPPLY CHAIN TAX TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS TAX RATES TAXATION TELEPHONE TIRES TRACEABILITY TRADE FACILITATION TRADING TRANSACTION TRANSIT TRANSIT SERVICE TRANSIT SERVICE PROVIDER TRANSIT SERVICES TRANSPORT TRANSPORT POLICY TRUE VALUE CHAIN VEHICLE VEHICLES WAGES WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSES WEB WORKING CAPITAL
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19148129/customs-brokers-informal-sectors-cameroon-case-study http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17335

id	okr-10986-17335
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-173352021-04-23T14:03:37Z Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study Cantens, Thomas Kaminski, Jonathan Raballand, Gaël Tchapa, Tchouawou ACCOUNTING AMOUNT OF DUTIES AREA OF CUSTOMS BANK ACCOUNT BARRIER TO ENTRY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BOTTLENECKS BROKER BROKERAGE BROKERS BUSES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS FORMATION BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS MODELS BUSINESS RELATIONS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS BUSINESS SERVICES BUSINESSES CAR CARS CHECKS COLLATERAL COMMERCE COMMODITY COMPUTER HARDWARE COMPUTERS CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS CREDIT MARKET CUSTOMER BASE CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS AGENT CUSTOMS AREA CUSTOMS BROKERS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CONTROL CUSTOMS DUTIES CUSTOMS INFORMATION CUSTOMS OFFICE CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS OFFICES CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS PROCESS CUSTOMS REFORM CUSTOMS REGULATIONS CUSTOMS REVENUES DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANK DIRECT SALES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ELECTRONIC DEVICES END CUSTOMERS ENTRY POINT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN TRADE FRAUD FREIGHT ID IMAGE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION ASYMMETRY INFORMATION FLOWS INFORMATION SHARING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEVEL OF RISK LIABILITY LICENSE LICENSES LITIGATION MANUFACTURING MARKET DEMAND MARKET FAILURES MARKET SEGMENT MARKET STRUCTURE MARKETING MARKETING STRATEGIES MATERIAL MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MIDDLEMEN MORAL HAZARD NECESSARY SKILLS NEIGHBORHOODS NETWORKS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCES PERSONAL INCOME PETROLEUM PRODUCTS POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMY PORT AUTHORITY PRODUCT CATEGORY PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGINS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REBATES REGIONAL NETWORKS RELIABILITY RESULT RESULTS RETURN RISK EXPOSURE RISK PROFILE ROUTE SAVINGS SAVINGS RATE SERVICE PROVIDER SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL CAPITAL SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS STANDARDIZATION STOCKS SUPPLY CHAIN TAX TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS TAX RATES TAXATION TELEPHONE TIRES TRACEABILITY TRADE FACILITATION TRADING TRANSACTION TRANSIT TRANSIT SERVICE TRANSIT SERVICE PROVIDER TRANSIT SERVICES TRANSPORT TRANSPORT POLICY TRUE VALUE CHAIN VEHICLE VEHICLES WAGES WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSES WEB WORKING CAPITAL Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders and brokers (without licenses) follow various business models and practices, which are product-specific. Overall, what matters first are customs brokers' practices. Information asymmetries mark transactions between brokers and importers and are accompanied by misperceptions of the costs and risks of informal brokers working among informal importers. In a low-governance environment with widespread informal practices, blanket policies should be avoided in order to discourage activities of unprofessional and systematic bribe-taker brokers. It is also essential that customs officials disrupt information asymmetries and better disseminate information to informal importers on customs processes and official costs. Finally, customs should more strongly sanction some informal brokers in order to reduce collusion with some customs officers. 2014-03-18T21:36:36Z 2014-03-18T21:36:36Z 2014-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19148129/customs-brokers-informal-sectors-cameroon-case-study http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17335 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6788 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Cameroon
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	ACCOUNTING AMOUNT OF DUTIES AREA OF CUSTOMS BANK ACCOUNT BARRIER TO ENTRY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BOTTLENECKS BROKER BROKERAGE BROKERS BUSES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS FORMATION BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS MODELS BUSINESS RELATIONS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS BUSINESS SERVICES BUSINESSES CAR CARS CHECKS COLLATERAL COMMERCE COMMODITY COMPUTER HARDWARE COMPUTERS CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS CREDIT MARKET CUSTOMER BASE CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS AGENT CUSTOMS AREA CUSTOMS BROKERS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CONTROL CUSTOMS DUTIES CUSTOMS INFORMATION CUSTOMS OFFICE CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS OFFICES CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS PROCESS CUSTOMS REFORM CUSTOMS REGULATIONS CUSTOMS REVENUES DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANK DIRECT SALES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ELECTRONIC DEVICES END CUSTOMERS ENTRY POINT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN TRADE FRAUD FREIGHT ID IMAGE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION ASYMMETRY INFORMATION FLOWS INFORMATION SHARING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEVEL OF RISK LIABILITY LICENSE LICENSES LITIGATION MANUFACTURING MARKET DEMAND MARKET FAILURES MARKET SEGMENT MARKET STRUCTURE MARKETING MARKETING STRATEGIES MATERIAL MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MIDDLEMEN MORAL HAZARD NECESSARY SKILLS NEIGHBORHOODS NETWORKS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCES PERSONAL INCOME PETROLEUM PRODUCTS POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMY PORT AUTHORITY PRODUCT CATEGORY PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGINS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REBATES REGIONAL NETWORKS RELIABILITY RESULT RESULTS RETURN RISK EXPOSURE RISK PROFILE ROUTE SAVINGS SAVINGS RATE SERVICE PROVIDER SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL CAPITAL SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS STANDARDIZATION STOCKS SUPPLY CHAIN TAX TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS TAX RATES TAXATION TELEPHONE TIRES TRACEABILITY TRADE FACILITATION TRADING TRANSACTION TRANSIT TRANSIT SERVICE TRANSIT SERVICE PROVIDER TRANSIT SERVICES TRANSPORT TRANSPORT POLICY TRUE VALUE CHAIN VEHICLE VEHICLES WAGES WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSES WEB WORKING CAPITAL
spellingShingle	ACCOUNTING AMOUNT OF DUTIES AREA OF CUSTOMS BANK ACCOUNT BARRIER TO ENTRY BARRIERS TO ENTRY BOTTLENECKS BROKER BROKERAGE BROKERS BUSES BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT BUSINESS FORMATION BUSINESS MODEL BUSINESS MODELS BUSINESS RELATIONS BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS BUSINESS SERVICES BUSINESSES CAR CARS CHECKS COLLATERAL COMMERCE COMMODITY COMPUTER HARDWARE COMPUTERS CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS CREDIT MARKET CUSTOMER BASE CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS CUSTOMS CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS CUSTOMS AGENT CUSTOMS AREA CUSTOMS BROKERS CUSTOMS CLEARANCE CUSTOMS CONTROL CUSTOMS DUTIES CUSTOMS INFORMATION CUSTOMS OFFICE CUSTOMS OFFICERS CUSTOMS OFFICES CUSTOMS OFFICIALS CUSTOMS PROCESS CUSTOMS REFORM CUSTOMS REGULATIONS CUSTOMS REVENUES DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANK DIRECT SALES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ELECTRONIC DEVICES END CUSTOMERS ENTRY POINT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN TRADE FRAUD FREIGHT ID IMAGE INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES INFORMATION ASYMMETRY INFORMATION FLOWS INFORMATION SHARING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INTEREST RATE INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEVEL OF RISK LIABILITY LICENSE LICENSES LITIGATION MANUFACTURING MARKET DEMAND MARKET FAILURES MARKET SEGMENT MARKET STRUCTURE MARKETING MARKETING STRATEGIES MATERIAL MEDIUM ENTERPRISES MIDDLEMEN MORAL HAZARD NECESSARY SKILLS NEIGHBORHOODS NETWORKS OPEN ACCESS OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY PERFORMANCES PERSONAL INCOME PETROLEUM PRODUCTS POLICE POLITICAL ECONOMY PORT AUTHORITY PRODUCT CATEGORY PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MARGINS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REBATES REGIONAL NETWORKS RELIABILITY RESULT RESULTS RETURN RISK EXPOSURE RISK PROFILE ROUTE SAVINGS SAVINGS RATE SERVICE PROVIDER SMALL BUSINESS SOCIAL CAPITAL SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONS STANDARDIZATION STOCKS SUPPLY CHAIN TAX TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS TAX RATES TAXATION TELEPHONE TIRES TRACEABILITY TRADE FACILITATION TRADING TRANSACTION TRANSIT TRANSIT SERVICE TRANSIT SERVICE PROVIDER TRANSIT SERVICES TRANSPORT TRANSPORT POLICY TRUE VALUE CHAIN VEHICLE VEHICLES WAGES WAREHOUSE WAREHOUSES WEB WORKING CAPITAL Cantens, Thomas Kaminski, Jonathan Raballand, Gaël Tchapa, Tchouawou Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study
geographic_facet	Africa Cameroon
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 6788
description	Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders and brokers (without licenses) follow various business models and practices, which are product-specific. Overall, what matters first are customs brokers' practices. Information asymmetries mark transactions between brokers and importers and are accompanied by misperceptions of the costs and risks of informal brokers working among informal importers. In a low-governance environment with widespread informal practices, blanket policies should be avoided in order to discourage activities of unprofessional and systematic bribe-taker brokers. It is also essential that customs officials disrupt information asymmetries and better disseminate information to informal importers on customs processes and official costs. Finally, customs should more strongly sanction some informal brokers in order to reduce collusion with some customs officers.
format	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author	Cantens, Thomas Kaminski, Jonathan Raballand, Gaël Tchapa, Tchouawou
author_facet	Cantens, Thomas Kaminski, Jonathan Raballand, Gaël Tchapa, Tchouawou
author_sort	Cantens, Thomas
title	Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study
title_short	Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study
title_full	Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study
title_fullStr	Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study
title_full_unstemmed	Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study
title_sort	customs, brokers, and informal sectors : a cameroon case study
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2014
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/02/19148129/customs-brokers-informal-sectors-cameroon-case-study http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17335
_version_	1764436892244246528

Customs, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study

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