Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them?
The author examines the implications of demutualization of financial exchanges for their roles as self-regulatory organizations. Many regulators and exchanges believe that conflicts of interest increase when exchanges convert to for-profit business...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278814/conflicts-interest-self-regulation-can-demutualized-exchanges-successfully-manage http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17428 |
| id |
okr-10986-17428 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-174282021-04-23T14:03:37Z Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? Carson, John W. SECURITIES MARKETS STOCK MARKETS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAPITAL MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS CONFLCIT MANAGEMENT BROKER ROLE CLEARING SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT POWERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STOCK OWNERSHIP CONTRACTING SECURITIES MARKETS STOCK MARKETS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAPITAL MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS CONFLCIT MANAGEMENT BROKER ROLE CLEARING SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT POWERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STOCK OWNERSHIP CONTRACTING ACCOUNTING ASIAN STOCK EXCHANGES BENCHMARKS BROKERS BUSINESS PARTNERS BUSINESS SERVICES CALL CAPITAL ADEQUACY CAPITAL FORMATION CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COST OF CAPITAL CUSTODY DEALERS DEPOSITORY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS DRAFTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ETHICAL STANDARDS FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FIREWALLS FUTURES FUTURES EXCHANGES FUTURES MARKETS FUTURES TRADING INSIDER TRADING INTEGRITY INVESTMENT MARKETS INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INVESTOR PROTECTION LEGISLATION LIQUIDITY MARGIN REQUIREMENTS MATCHING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS NASDAQ NYSE OBLIGATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE POLICY DECISIONS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCERS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY POWERS REGULATORY SYSTEMS RISK MANAGEMENT SECURITIES SECURITIES EXCHANGES SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES TRADING SEGREGATION SETTLEMENT STOCK OPTIONS TRADERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES The author examines the implications of demutualization of financial exchanges for their roles as self-regulatory organizations. Many regulators and exchanges believe that conflicts of interest increase when exchanges convert to for-profit businesses. Demutualization also changes the nature of an exchange's regulatory role as broker-dealers' ownership interests are reduced. These factors are leading to reduced regulatory roles for exchanges in many jurisdictions. The resulting changes have significant implications for regulation of financial markets, especially as exchanges are the only self-regulating organizations (SROs) in most countries. Major changes in the role of exchanges require a rethinking of the allocation of regulatory functions and the role of self-regulation, as well as stronger mechanisms to mitigate conflicts of interest. Carson looks at the views of both exchanges and regulators on these issues in Asian, European, and North American jurisdictions where major exchanges have converted to for-profit businesses. He finds that views on the conflicts of interest faced by demutualized exchanges vary widely. In addition, the tools and processes used by exchanges and regulators to manage conflicts also differ significantly across jurisdictions. The author concludes that new and greater conflicts result from demutualization and canvasses the regulatory responses in the jurisdictions examined. 2014-03-27T19:58:39Z 2014-03-27T19:58:39Z 2003-12 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278814/conflicts-interest-self-regulation-can-demutualized-exchanges-successfully-manage http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17428 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3183 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
SECURITIES MARKETS STOCK MARKETS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAPITAL MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS CONFLCIT MANAGEMENT BROKER ROLE CLEARING SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT POWERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STOCK OWNERSHIP CONTRACTING SECURITIES MARKETS STOCK MARKETS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAPITAL MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS CONFLCIT MANAGEMENT BROKER ROLE CLEARING SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT POWERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STOCK OWNERSHIP CONTRACTING ACCOUNTING ASIAN STOCK EXCHANGES BENCHMARKS BROKERS BUSINESS PARTNERS BUSINESS SERVICES CALL CAPITAL ADEQUACY CAPITAL FORMATION CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COST OF CAPITAL CUSTODY DEALERS DEPOSITORY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS DRAFTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ETHICAL STANDARDS FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FIREWALLS FUTURES FUTURES EXCHANGES FUTURES MARKETS FUTURES TRADING INSIDER TRADING INTEGRITY INVESTMENT MARKETS INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INVESTOR PROTECTION LEGISLATION LIQUIDITY MARGIN REQUIREMENTS MATCHING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS NASDAQ NYSE OBLIGATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE POLICY DECISIONS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCERS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY POWERS REGULATORY SYSTEMS RISK MANAGEMENT SECURITIES SECURITIES EXCHANGES SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES TRADING SEGREGATION SETTLEMENT STOCK OPTIONS TRADERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES |
| spellingShingle |
SECURITIES MARKETS STOCK MARKETS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAPITAL MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS CONFLCIT MANAGEMENT BROKER ROLE CLEARING SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT POWERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STOCK OWNERSHIP CONTRACTING SECURITIES MARKETS STOCK MARKETS CONFLICT OF INTEREST CAPITAL MARKETS SECURITIES REGULATION SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS CONFLCIT MANAGEMENT BROKER ROLE CLEARING SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT POWERS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STOCK OWNERSHIP CONTRACTING ACCOUNTING ASIAN STOCK EXCHANGES BENCHMARKS BROKERS BUSINESS PARTNERS BUSINESS SERVICES CALL CAPITAL ADEQUACY CAPITAL FORMATION CAPITAL MARKET CAPITAL MARKETS COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITION POLICY COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COST OF CAPITAL CUSTODY DEALERS DEPOSITORY DISCLOSURE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS DRAFTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ETHICAL STANDARDS FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FIREWALLS FUTURES FUTURES EXCHANGES FUTURES MARKETS FUTURES TRADING INSIDER TRADING INTEGRITY INVESTMENT MARKETS INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INVESTOR PROTECTION LEGISLATION LIQUIDITY MARGIN REQUIREMENTS MATCHING MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS NASDAQ NYSE OBLIGATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE POLICY DECISIONS PRIVATIZATION PRODUCERS PUBLIC GOODS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGULATORY POWERS REGULATORY SYSTEMS RISK MANAGEMENT SECURITIES SECURITIES EXCHANGES SECURITIES MARKETS SECURITIES TRADING SEGREGATION SETTLEMENT STOCK OPTIONS TRADERS TRANSITION ECONOMIES Carson, John W. Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3183 |
| description |
The author examines the implications of
demutualization of financial exchanges for their roles as
self-regulatory organizations. Many regulators and exchanges
believe that conflicts of interest increase when exchanges
convert to for-profit businesses. Demutualization also
changes the nature of an exchange's regulatory role as
broker-dealers' ownership interests are reduced. These
factors are leading to reduced regulatory roles for
exchanges in many jurisdictions. The resulting changes have
significant implications for regulation of financial
markets, especially as exchanges are the only
self-regulating organizations (SROs) in most countries.
Major changes in the role of exchanges require a rethinking
of the allocation of regulatory functions and the role of
self-regulation, as well as stronger mechanisms to mitigate
conflicts of interest. Carson looks at the views of both
exchanges and regulators on these issues in Asian, European,
and North American jurisdictions where major exchanges have
converted to for-profit businesses. He finds that views on
the conflicts of interest faced by demutualized exchanges
vary widely. In addition, the tools and processes used by
exchanges and regulators to manage conflicts also differ
significantly across jurisdictions. The author concludes
that new and greater conflicts result from demutualization
and canvasses the regulatory responses in the jurisdictions examined. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Carson, John W. |
| author_facet |
Carson, John W. |
| author_sort |
Carson, John W. |
| title |
Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? |
| title_short |
Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? |
| title_full |
Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? |
| title_fullStr |
Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation : Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully Manage Them? |
| title_sort |
conflicts of interest in self-regulation : can demutualized exchanges successfully manage them? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/12/5278814/conflicts-interest-self-regulation-can-demutualized-exchanges-successfully-manage http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17428 |
| _version_ |
1764437017091899392 |