Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence

An understanding of corporate governance theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund management. The absence of a market for corporate control hinders the translation of lessons fr...

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Main Authors: Hess, David, Impavido, Gregorio
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2495953/governance-public-pension-funds-lessons-corporate-governance-international-evidence
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18125
id okr-10986-18125
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-181252021-04-23T14:03:41Z Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence Hess, David Impavido, Gregorio ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADVERSE SELECTION AGENCY PROBLEMS ASSET DIVERSIFICATION ASSETS AUDITS AUTHORITY BANK DEPOSITS BANKRUPTCY BANKS CIVIL SERVICE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM CORRUPTION COST OF LIVING COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS CREDIT RATINGS DECISION-MAKERS DECISION-MAKING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIES OF SCALE EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH EXTERNAL AUDITORS FINANCIAL HEALTH FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FINANCIAL INTERESTS FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FINANCIAL SECTOR FOREIGN MARKETS GOVERNMENT BONDS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT SERVICES HOUSING INCENTIVE EFFECTS INCOME INFLATION INSOLVENCY INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS INSURANCE INSURANCE PREMIUMS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNAL AUDIT INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION INTERNAL CONTROLS LABOR MARKET LARGE SHAREHOLDERS LAWS LEGISLATION LIQUIDITY LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANDATES MORAL HAZARD MOTIVATIONS MUNICIPAL BONDS NATIONAL PENSIONS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PROPERTY VALUES PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOVERNANCE REPRESENTATIVES RESOURCE ALLOCATION RETIREMENT RETURN ON ASSETS RISK AVERSION SAVINGS SAVINGS ACCOUNTS SHAREHOLDERS SOCIAL SECURITY STATE TRUSTEES UNEMPLOYMENT WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS PENSION FUNDS ADMINISTRATION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT REGULATORY BODIES REGULATORY CONTROL WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY An understanding of corporate governance theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund management. The absence of a market for corporate control hinders the translation of lessons from the private sector corporate world to public pension governance. The establishment of a fit, and proper governing body for public pension funds, thus may be even more important than the maintenance of a comparable body for private sector corporations. In particular, behavioral controls should be carefully designed. 2014-04-30T20:30:44Z 2014-04-30T20:30:44Z 2003-08 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2495953/governance-public-pension-funds-lessons-corporate-governance-international-evidence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18125 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3110 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENCY PROBLEMS
ASSET DIVERSIFICATION
ASSETS
AUDITS
AUTHORITY
BANK DEPOSITS
BANKRUPTCY
BANKS
CIVIL SERVICE
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVENESS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
CORRUPTION
COST OF LIVING
COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS
CREDIT RATINGS
DECISION-MAKERS
DECISION-MAKING
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
EXTERNAL AUDITORS
FINANCIAL HEALTH
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FINANCIAL INTERESTS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FOREIGN MARKETS
GOVERNMENT BONDS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
HOUSING
INCENTIVE EFFECTS
INCOME
INFLATION
INSOLVENCY
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
INSURANCE
INSURANCE PREMIUMS
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INTERNAL AUDIT
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION
INTERNAL CONTROLS
LABOR MARKET
LARGE SHAREHOLDERS
LAWS
LEGISLATION
LIQUIDITY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
MANDATES
MORAL HAZARD
MOTIVATIONS
MUNICIPAL BONDS
NATIONAL
PENSIONS
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
PROPERTY VALUES
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
REPRESENTATIVES
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
RETIREMENT
RETURN ON ASSETS
RISK AVERSION
SAVINGS
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
SHAREHOLDERS
SOCIAL SECURITY
STATE
TRUSTEES
UNEMPLOYMENT
WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS
PENSION FUNDS ADMINISTRATION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT
REGULATORY BODIES
REGULATORY CONTROL
WEALTH
GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
spellingShingle ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
ADVERSE SELECTION
AGENCY PROBLEMS
ASSET DIVERSIFICATION
ASSETS
AUDITS
AUTHORITY
BANK DEPOSITS
BANKRUPTCY
BANKS
CIVIL SERVICE
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVENESS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
CORRUPTION
COST OF LIVING
COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS
CREDIT RATINGS
DECISION-MAKERS
DECISION-MAKING
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
EXTERNAL AUDITORS
FINANCIAL HEALTH
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FINANCIAL INTERESTS
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
FINANCIAL SECTOR
FOREIGN MARKETS
GOVERNMENT BONDS
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT SERVICES
HOUSING
INCENTIVE EFFECTS
INCOME
INFLATION
INSOLVENCY
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
INSURANCE
INSURANCE PREMIUMS
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INTERNAL AUDIT
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION
INTERNAL CONTROLS
LABOR MARKET
LARGE SHAREHOLDERS
LAWS
LEGISLATION
LIQUIDITY
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
MANDATES
MORAL HAZARD
MOTIVATIONS
MUNICIPAL BONDS
NATIONAL
PENSIONS
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
PROPERTY VALUES
PUBLIC GOOD
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
REPRESENTATIVES
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
RETIREMENT
RETURN ON ASSETS
RISK AVERSION
SAVINGS
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
SHAREHOLDERS
SOCIAL SECURITY
STATE
TRUSTEES
UNEMPLOYMENT
WEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS
PENSION FUNDS ADMINISTRATION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT
REGULATORY BODIES
REGULATORY CONTROL
WEALTH
GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
Hess, David
Impavido, Gregorio
Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3110
description An understanding of corporate governance theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund management. The absence of a market for corporate control hinders the translation of lessons from the private sector corporate world to public pension governance. The establishment of a fit, and proper governing body for public pension funds, thus may be even more important than the maintenance of a comparable body for private sector corporations. In particular, behavioral controls should be carefully designed.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Hess, David
Impavido, Gregorio
author_facet Hess, David
Impavido, Gregorio
author_sort Hess, David
title Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence
title_short Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence
title_full Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence
title_fullStr Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence
title_full_unstemmed Governance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence
title_sort governance of public pension funds : lessons from corporate governance and international evidence
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/08/2495953/governance-public-pension-funds-lessons-corporate-governance-international-evidence
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18125
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