Governance and Economic Growth

Governance and Economic Growth

Because protection of property rights cannot be appropriated by any individual, it is widely recognized as being the state's responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that protection of property rights leads to higher invest...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Gradstein, Mark
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:	AGGREGATE INCOME AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATION BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY CAPACITY BUILDING CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CAPITAL MARKET COLLECTIVE ACTION CONDITIONALITY CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIFFERENCES IN INCOME DIMINISHING RETURNS DIMINISHING RETURNS TO SCALE DYNAMIC SETTING ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REVIEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPIRICAL SUPPORT ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION ENFORCEABILITY EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL SECTOR GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNANCE REFORMS GROSS INCOME GROWTH MODEL GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HOUSEHOLD INCOME HUMAN CAPITAL IMPORTS INCOME INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCKS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LINEAR REGRESSIONS LOW INCOME MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA NEGATIVE IMPACT OIL PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICE FORCE POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POOR COUNTRIES POOR COUNTRY POSITIVE EFFECTS POVERTY ANALYSIS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS SOCIAL CAPITAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS TAX EVASION TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR GOVERNMENT ROLE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT POWERS LAW ENFORCEMENT UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/07/2480795/governance-economic-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18146

Description
Summary:	Because protection of property rights cannot be appropriated by any individual, it is widely recognized as being the state's responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that protection of property rights leads to higher investment levels and faster growth. The extent of property rights protection differs significantly across countries. The author integrates the emergence of property rights within a simple growth framework. Drawing on North (1990), he presents a model where economic performance and enforcement of property rights may reinforce each other. Initial conditions determine the economy's convergence to a high-income or a low-income steady state. Existing empirical evidence offers tentative support for this theory.

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