Governance and Economic Growth
Because protection of property rights cannot be appropriated by any individual, it is widely recognized as being the state's responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that protection of property rights leads to higher invest...
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Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/07/2480795/governance-economic-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18146 |
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okr-10986-181462021-04-23T14:03:41Z Governance and Economic Growth Gradstein, Mark AGGREGATE INCOME AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATION BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY CAPACITY BUILDING CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CAPITAL MARKET COLLECTIVE ACTION CONDITIONALITY CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIFFERENCES IN INCOME DIMINISHING RETURNS DIMINISHING RETURNS TO SCALE DYNAMIC SETTING ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REVIEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPIRICAL SUPPORT ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION ENFORCEABILITY EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL SECTOR GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNANCE REFORMS GROSS INCOME GROWTH MODEL GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HOUSEHOLD INCOME HUMAN CAPITAL IMPORTS INCOME INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCKS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LINEAR REGRESSIONS LOW INCOME MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA NEGATIVE IMPACT OIL PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICE FORCE POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POOR COUNTRIES POOR COUNTRY POSITIVE EFFECTS POVERTY ANALYSIS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS SOCIAL CAPITAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS TAX EVASION TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC GROWTH RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS GOVERNMENT ROLE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT POWERS LAW ENFORCEMENT UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE Because protection of property rights cannot be appropriated by any individual, it is widely recognized as being the state's responsibility. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that protection of property rights leads to higher investment levels and faster growth. The extent of property rights protection differs significantly across countries. The author integrates the emergence of property rights within a simple growth framework. Drawing on North (1990), he presents a model where economic performance and enforcement of property rights may reinforce each other. Initial conditions determine the economy's convergence to a high-income or a low-income steady state. Existing empirical evidence offers tentative support for this theory. 2014-05-01T22:00:31Z 2014-05-01T22:00:31Z 2003-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/07/2480795/governance-economic-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18146 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3098 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
AGGREGATE INCOME AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATION BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY CAPACITY BUILDING CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CAPITAL MARKET COLLECTIVE ACTION CONDITIONALITY CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIFFERENCES IN INCOME DIMINISHING RETURNS DIMINISHING RETURNS TO SCALE DYNAMIC SETTING ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REVIEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPIRICAL SUPPORT ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION ENFORCEABILITY EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL SECTOR GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNANCE REFORMS GROSS INCOME GROWTH MODEL GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HOUSEHOLD INCOME HUMAN CAPITAL IMPORTS INCOME INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCKS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LINEAR REGRESSIONS LOW INCOME MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA NEGATIVE IMPACT OIL PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICE FORCE POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POOR COUNTRIES POOR COUNTRY POSITIVE EFFECTS POVERTY ANALYSIS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS SOCIAL CAPITAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS TAX EVASION TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC GROWTH RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS GOVERNMENT ROLE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT POWERS LAW ENFORCEMENT UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE |
spellingShingle |
AGGREGATE INCOME AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATION BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION BUREAUCRATIC EFFICIENCY CAPACITY BUILDING CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CAPITAL MARKET COLLECTIVE ACTION CONDITIONALITY CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CROSS- COUNTRY DIFFERENCES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DIFFERENCES IN INCOME DIMINISHING RETURNS DIMINISHING RETURNS TO SCALE DYNAMIC SETTING ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC REVIEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS EMPIRICAL STUDIES EMPIRICAL SUPPORT ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION ENFORCEABILITY EQUILIBRIUM FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL SECTOR GOOD GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS GOVERNANCE QUALITY GOVERNANCE REFORMS GROSS INCOME GROWTH MODEL GROWTH RATE GROWTH RATES HOUSEHOLD INCOME HUMAN CAPITAL IMPORTS INCOME INCOME LEVEL INCOME SHOCKS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKET POLICIES LINEAR REGRESSIONS LOW INCOME MARKET ECONOMIES MARKET ECONOMY MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA NEGATIVE IMPACT OIL PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICE FORCE POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTABILITY POOR COUNTRIES POOR COUNTRY POSITIVE EFFECTS POVERTY ANALYSIS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC ECONOMICS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS RENT SEEKING RULE OF LAW SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS SOCIAL CAPITAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS TAX EVASION TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC GROWTH RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR PROPERTY RIGHTS GOVERNMENT ROLE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT ENFORCEMENT POWERS LAW ENFORCEMENT UNEMPLOYMENT GOVERNANCE Gradstein, Mark Governance and Economic Growth |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3098 |
description |
Because protection of property rights
cannot be appropriated by any individual, it is widely
recognized as being the state's responsibility.
Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that protection
of property rights leads to higher investment levels and
faster growth. The extent of property rights protection
differs significantly across countries. The author
integrates the emergence of property rights within a simple
growth framework. Drawing on North (1990), he presents a
model where economic performance and enforcement of property
rights may reinforce each other. Initial conditions
determine the economy's convergence to a high-income or
a low-income steady state. Existing empirical evidence
offers tentative support for this theory. |
format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
author |
Gradstein, Mark |
author_facet |
Gradstein, Mark |
author_sort |
Gradstein, Mark |
title |
Governance and Economic Growth |
title_short |
Governance and Economic Growth |
title_full |
Governance and Economic Growth |
title_fullStr |
Governance and Economic Growth |
title_full_unstemmed |
Governance and Economic Growth |
title_sort |
governance and economic growth |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2014 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/07/2480795/governance-economic-growth http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18146 |
_version_ |
1764438985623470080 |