Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?

The debate on fiscal policy in Europe centers on how to let automatic stabilizers work while achieving fiscal consolidation. There is significant agreement on the importance of using fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical instrument, as monetary polic...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Perry, Guillermo
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
GDP
MDB
OIL
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438506/can-fiscal-rules-help-reduce-macroeconomic-volatility-latin-america-caribbean-region
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18172
id okr-10986-18172
recordtype oai_dc
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCOUNTING
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BENCHMARK
BUDGET DEFICITS
BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS
BUDGETARY PROCESS
CAPACITY BUILDING
CAPITAL FLOWS
CAPITAL GOODS
CENTRAL BANK
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
COALITIONS
CONSERVATISM
CONSOLIDATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
DEBT
DEFAULT RISK
DEPOSITS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ELASTICITIES
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ENACTMENT
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPANSIONARY FISCAL
EXPANSIONARY POLICIES
EXPANSIONARY POLICY
EXPENDITURE
EXPENDITURES
EXPORTS
FINANCIAL DEEPENING
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FINANCIER
FISCAL
FISCAL BALANCE
FISCAL COSTS
FISCAL CRISES
FISCAL CRISIS
FISCAL POLICIES
FISCAL POLICY
FISCAL REVENUES
FISCAL RULES
FISCAL STANCE
FISCAL STRESS
FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
GDP
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
GOVERNMENT POLICY
GROWTH RATE
HUMAN CAPITAL
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INFLATION
INTEREST RATES
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
LABOR MARKETS
LAWS
LDCS
LEGISLATION
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOW INTEREST RATES
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
MDB
MONETARY POLICIES
MONETARY POLICY
OIL
OIL PRICES
OPPOSITION PARTIES
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL
PENALTIES
PERVERSE INCENTIVES
POLITICAL CONSENSUS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICIANS
POTENTIAL OUTPUT
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FINANCES
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS
PUBLIC SPENDING
REAL EXCHANGE RATE
REAL GDP
REVENUE AVAILABILITY
ROYALTY
SAFETY NETS
SAVINGS
SOCIAL TRANSFERS
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
TERMS OF TRADE
TOTAL REVENUE
UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
VETO MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS
FISCAL ADMINISTRATION
FISCAL POLICY
MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
SOLVENCY
COUNTER-CYCLICAL INTERVENTIONS
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS
VETO
spellingShingle ACCOUNTING
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
BENCHMARK
BUDGET DEFICITS
BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS
BUDGETARY PROCESS
CAPACITY BUILDING
CAPITAL FLOWS
CAPITAL GOODS
CENTRAL BANK
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
COALITIONS
CONSERVATISM
CONSOLIDATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
DEBT
DEFAULT RISK
DEPOSITS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ELASTICITIES
ELASTICITY
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ENACTMENT
EQUILIBRIUM
EXPANSIONARY FISCAL
EXPANSIONARY POLICIES
EXPANSIONARY POLICY
EXPENDITURE
EXPENDITURES
EXPORTS
FINANCIAL DEEPENING
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
FINANCIAL MARKETS
FINANCIER
FISCAL
FISCAL BALANCE
FISCAL COSTS
FISCAL CRISES
FISCAL CRISIS
FISCAL POLICIES
FISCAL POLICY
FISCAL REVENUES
FISCAL RULES
FISCAL STANCE
FISCAL STRESS
FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
GDP
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
GOVERNMENT POLICY
GROWTH RATE
HUMAN CAPITAL
INCOME
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
INFLATION
INTEREST RATES
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
LABOR MARKETS
LAWS
LDCS
LEGISLATION
LOCAL AUTHORITIES
LOW INTEREST RATES
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
MDB
MONETARY POLICIES
MONETARY POLICY
OIL
OIL PRICES
OPPOSITION PARTIES
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL
PENALTIES
PERVERSE INCENTIVES
POLITICAL CONSENSUS
POLITICAL ECONOMY
POLITICIANS
POTENTIAL OUTPUT
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FINANCES
PUBLIC INVESTMENTS
PUBLIC SPENDING
REAL EXCHANGE RATE
REAL GDP
REVENUE AVAILABILITY
ROYALTY
SAFETY NETS
SAVINGS
SOCIAL TRANSFERS
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
TERMS OF TRADE
TOTAL REVENUE
UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
VETO MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS
FISCAL ADMINISTRATION
FISCAL POLICY
MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
SOLVENCY
COUNTER-CYCLICAL INTERVENTIONS
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS
VETO
Perry, Guillermo
Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?
geographic_facet Latin America & Caribbean
Caribbean
Latin America
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3080
description The debate on fiscal policy in Europe centers on how to let automatic stabilizers work while achieving fiscal consolidation. There is significant agreement on the importance of using fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical instrument, as monetary policy can no longer play this role. In contrast, most of the discussion on fiscal policy in Latin America and the Carribean region (LAC) deals just on solvency issues, largely ignoring the effects of the economic cycle. This is surprising as LAC economies are much more volatile than their European counterparts and have been generally applying pro-cyclical fiscal policies that exacerbate volatility. Some analysts and policymakers appear to think that counter-cyclical fiscal policies are a luxury that only industrial countries can indulge in or, at least, that LAC countries (with the exception of Chile) that have successfully put in place a counter-cyclical fiscal policy need to deal first with pressing adjustment and solvency issues before they attempt to reduce the highly pro-cyclical character of their fiscal policies. The author argues that this is a major mistake because the costs of pro-cyclical fiscal policies in LAC are huge in growth and welfare terms, especially for the poor, and because pro-cyclical policies and rules tend to develop a deficit bias, thus ending up being nonsustainable and noncredible. Perry illustrates both propositions. He then examines the causes of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies in LAC and discusses how well-designed fiscal rules may help to deal with the political economy and credibility factors behind pro-cyclicality. He also examines conflicts between flexibility and credibility in rules, showing how a good design can both facilitate the operation of automatic stabilizers while at the same time supporting solvency goals and enhancing credibility. Perry evaluates the experience with different fiscal rules and institutions in LAC to see the extent they have helped or can help to achieve the twin goals of avoiding deficit and pro-cyclical biases.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Perry, Guillermo
author_facet Perry, Guillermo
author_sort Perry, Guillermo
title Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?
title_short Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?
title_full Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?
title_fullStr Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?
title_full_unstemmed Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?
title_sort can fiscal rules help reduce macroeconomic volatility in the latin america and caribbean region?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438506/can-fiscal-rules-help-reduce-macroeconomic-volatility-latin-america-caribbean-region
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18172
_version_ 1764439049546760192
spelling okr-10986-181722021-04-23T14:03:41Z Can Fiscal Rules Help Reduce Macroeconomic Volatility in the Latin America and Caribbean Region? Perry, Guillermo ACCOUNTING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BENCHMARK BUDGET DEFICITS BUDGETARY INSTITUTIONS BUDGETARY PROCESS CAPACITY BUILDING CAPITAL FLOWS CAPITAL GOODS CENTRAL BANK CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COALITIONS CONSERVATISM CONSOLIDATION CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM DEBT DEFAULT RISK DEPOSITS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC INSTABILITY ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ELASTICITIES ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ENACTMENT EQUILIBRIUM EXPANSIONARY FISCAL EXPANSIONARY POLICIES EXPANSIONARY POLICY EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORTS FINANCIAL DEEPENING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTEGRATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIER FISCAL FISCAL BALANCE FISCAL COSTS FISCAL CRISES FISCAL CRISIS FISCAL POLICIES FISCAL POLICY FISCAL REVENUES FISCAL RULES FISCAL STANCE FISCAL STRESS FISCAL TRANSPARENCY GDP GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES GOVERNMENT POLICY GROWTH RATE HUMAN CAPITAL INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INFLATION INTEREST RATES INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS LABOR MARKETS LAWS LDCS LEGISLATION LOCAL AUTHORITIES LOW INTEREST RATES MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION MDB MONETARY POLICIES MONETARY POLICY OIL OIL PRICES OPPOSITION PARTIES ORGANIZATIONAL CAPITAL PENALTIES PERVERSE INCENTIVES POLITICAL CONSENSUS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICIANS POTENTIAL OUTPUT PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FINANCES PUBLIC INVESTMENTS PUBLIC SPENDING REAL EXCHANGE RATE REAL GDP REVENUE AVAILABILITY ROYALTY SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SOCIAL TRANSFERS SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS TERMS OF TRADE TOTAL REVENUE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS VETO MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS FISCAL ADMINISTRATION FISCAL POLICY MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION SOLVENCY COUNTER-CYCLICAL INTERVENTIONS POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS VETO The debate on fiscal policy in Europe centers on how to let automatic stabilizers work while achieving fiscal consolidation. There is significant agreement on the importance of using fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical instrument, as monetary policy can no longer play this role. In contrast, most of the discussion on fiscal policy in Latin America and the Carribean region (LAC) deals just on solvency issues, largely ignoring the effects of the economic cycle. This is surprising as LAC economies are much more volatile than their European counterparts and have been generally applying pro-cyclical fiscal policies that exacerbate volatility. Some analysts and policymakers appear to think that counter-cyclical fiscal policies are a luxury that only industrial countries can indulge in or, at least, that LAC countries (with the exception of Chile) that have successfully put in place a counter-cyclical fiscal policy need to deal first with pressing adjustment and solvency issues before they attempt to reduce the highly pro-cyclical character of their fiscal policies. The author argues that this is a major mistake because the costs of pro-cyclical fiscal policies in LAC are huge in growth and welfare terms, especially for the poor, and because pro-cyclical policies and rules tend to develop a deficit bias, thus ending up being nonsustainable and noncredible. Perry illustrates both propositions. He then examines the causes of the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies in LAC and discusses how well-designed fiscal rules may help to deal with the political economy and credibility factors behind pro-cyclicality. He also examines conflicts between flexibility and credibility in rules, showing how a good design can both facilitate the operation of automatic stabilizers while at the same time supporting solvency goals and enhancing credibility. Perry evaluates the experience with different fiscal rules and institutions in LAC to see the extent they have helped or can help to achieve the twin goals of avoiding deficit and pro-cyclical biases. 2014-05-05T20:13:58Z 2014-05-05T20:13:58Z 2003-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438506/can-fiscal-rules-help-reduce-macroeconomic-volatility-latin-america-caribbean-region http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18172 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3080 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Caribbean Latin America