U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round

On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6 percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9 percent. A pre...

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Main Author: Nogues, Julio J.
Format: Policy Research Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438512/contingent-protection-against-honey-imports-development-aspects-doha-round
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18178
id okr-10986-18178
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-181782021-04-23T14:03:41Z U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round Nogues, Julio J. HONEY ANTIDUMPING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTIES TRADE AGREEMENTS PROTECTIONISM TRADE REGULATION COST OF PRODUCTION FACTORS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SUBSIDIES SOCIAL IMPACT CONSUMER PRICES LITIGATION COSTS PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING DUTIES CAPACITY BUILDING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS CONTINGENT PROTECTION COUNTERVAILING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTY COUNTERVAILING MEASURES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRICES DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC TAXES DUMPING ECONOMIC POLICIES EXPORT GROWTH EXPORT MARKET EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN EXPORTERS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IMPORT BARRIERS IMPORT DUTY IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT QUANTITIES IMPORT RELIEF IMPORT VOLUME IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INCOME INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL PRICES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC LEGISLATION NEGATIVE EFFECT NORMAL VALUE POSITIVE DETERMINATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION PROCESS PROTECTION MEASURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST POLICIES STATISTICAL DATA SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TRADE TRADE EFFECTS TRADE PERFORMANCE TRADE POLICY TRADING SYSTEM UNFAIR COMPETITION URUGUAY ROUND WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6 percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9 percent. A previous antidumping investigation in 1995 ended with a suspension "agreement" that curtailed U.S. imports from China by around 30 percent. Millions of beekeepers around the world, most of them poor, make a living from honey production, and a free and competitive world market would help raise their standards of living. Nevertheless, the sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism followed by the United States, the world's top importer, to include successful exporters under the effects of its contingent protection measures sends a clear message that other countries should think twice before investing in expanding honey exports to the United States. In addition to looking into the trade effects of these contingent protection measures, the author concludes that under the regulatory arrangements of the DOC, Argentina's beekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. For example, responding to the DOC's lengthy and sophisticated questionnaires that sought to determine cost of production went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers. In the absence of information, the DOC resorted to evidence presented by the petitioners which was riddled with errors. The available evidence suggests that had beekeepers been capable of responding to the questionnaires, the margin of dumping would had been lower, if at all existent. This and other evidence discussed by the author suggest the urgent need to introduce reforms into the World Trade Organization antidumping and subsidy agreements. At the minimum what is required is a consensus that all respondents be given the same opportunity by the international trade rules. The author argues that at present this is not the case and offers suggestions for reforms. 2014-05-05T20:38:36Z 2014-05-05T20:38:36Z 2003-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438512/contingent-protection-against-honey-imports-development-aspects-doha-round http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18178 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3088 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific Latin America & Caribbean
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic HONEY
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROTECTIONISM
TRADE REGULATION
COST OF PRODUCTION FACTORS
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
SUBSIDIES
SOCIAL IMPACT
CONSUMER PRICES
LITIGATION COSTS
PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE
ANTIDUMPING
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
CAPACITY BUILDING
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVENESS
CONSUMERS
CONTINGENT PROTECTION
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
COUNTERVAILING DUTY
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
DEVELOPMENT
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
DOMESTIC PRICES
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
DOMESTIC TAXES
DUMPING
ECONOMIC POLICIES
EXPORT GROWTH
EXPORT MARKET
EXPORT PRICES
EXPORT SUBSIDIES
EXPORTERS
EXPORTING COUNTRIES
EXPORTING COUNTRY
EXPORTS
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN EXPORTERS
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
IMPORT BARRIERS
IMPORT DUTY
IMPORT PROTECTION
IMPORT QUANTITIES
IMPORT RELIEF
IMPORT VOLUME
IMPORTING COUNTRY
IMPORTS
INCOME
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
INTERNATIONAL PRICES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ITC
LEGISLATION
NEGATIVE EFFECT
NORMAL VALUE
POSITIVE DETERMINATION
PRODUCERS
PRODUCTION COSTS
PRODUCTION PROCESS
PROTECTION MEASURES
PROTECTIONISM
PROTECTIONIST POLICIES
STATISTICAL DATA
SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS
TAX SYSTEMS
TAXATION
TRADE
TRADE EFFECTS
TRADE PERFORMANCE
TRADE POLICY
TRADING SYSTEM
UNFAIR COMPETITION
URUGUAY ROUND
WORLD TRADE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
WTO
PRODUCTION COSTS
AGRICULTURE
spellingShingle HONEY
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROTECTIONISM
TRADE REGULATION
COST OF PRODUCTION FACTORS
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
SUBSIDIES
SOCIAL IMPACT
CONSUMER PRICES
LITIGATION COSTS
PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE
ANTIDUMPING
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
CAPACITY BUILDING
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
COMPETITIVENESS
CONSUMERS
CONTINGENT PROTECTION
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
COUNTERVAILING DUTY
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
DEVELOPMENT
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
DOMESTIC PRICES
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
DOMESTIC TAXES
DUMPING
ECONOMIC POLICIES
EXPORT GROWTH
EXPORT MARKET
EXPORT PRICES
EXPORT SUBSIDIES
EXPORTERS
EXPORTING COUNTRIES
EXPORTING COUNTRY
EXPORTS
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
FOREIGN EXPORTERS
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
IMPORT BARRIERS
IMPORT DUTY
IMPORT PROTECTION
IMPORT QUANTITIES
IMPORT RELIEF
IMPORT VOLUME
IMPORTING COUNTRY
IMPORTS
INCOME
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
INTERNATIONAL PRICES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ITC
LEGISLATION
NEGATIVE EFFECT
NORMAL VALUE
POSITIVE DETERMINATION
PRODUCERS
PRODUCTION COSTS
PRODUCTION PROCESS
PROTECTION MEASURES
PROTECTIONISM
PROTECTIONIST POLICIES
STATISTICAL DATA
SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS
TAX SYSTEMS
TAXATION
TRADE
TRADE EFFECTS
TRADE PERFORMANCE
TRADE POLICY
TRADING SYSTEM
UNFAIR COMPETITION
URUGUAY ROUND
WORLD TRADE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
WTO
PRODUCTION COSTS
AGRICULTURE
Nogues, Julio J.
U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
geographic_facet East Asia and Pacific
Latin America & Caribbean
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3088
description On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6 percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9 percent. A previous antidumping investigation in 1995 ended with a suspension "agreement" that curtailed U.S. imports from China by around 30 percent. Millions of beekeepers around the world, most of them poor, make a living from honey production, and a free and competitive world market would help raise their standards of living. Nevertheless, the sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism followed by the United States, the world's top importer, to include successful exporters under the effects of its contingent protection measures sends a clear message that other countries should think twice before investing in expanding honey exports to the United States. In addition to looking into the trade effects of these contingent protection measures, the author concludes that under the regulatory arrangements of the DOC, Argentina's beekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. For example, responding to the DOC's lengthy and sophisticated questionnaires that sought to determine cost of production went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers. In the absence of information, the DOC resorted to evidence presented by the petitioners which was riddled with errors. The available evidence suggests that had beekeepers been capable of responding to the questionnaires, the margin of dumping would had been lower, if at all existent. This and other evidence discussed by the author suggest the urgent need to introduce reforms into the World Trade Organization antidumping and subsidy agreements. At the minimum what is required is a consensus that all respondents be given the same opportunity by the international trade rules. The author argues that at present this is not the case and offers suggestions for reforms.
format Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
author Nogues, Julio J.
author_facet Nogues, Julio J.
author_sort Nogues, Julio J.
title U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
title_short U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
title_full U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
title_fullStr U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
title_full_unstemmed U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
title_sort u.s. contingent protection against honey imports : development aspects and the doha round
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2014
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438512/contingent-protection-against-honey-imports-development-aspects-doha-round
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18178
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