U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round
On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6 percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9 percent. A pre...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2014
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438512/contingent-protection-against-honey-imports-development-aspects-doha-round http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18178 |
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okr-10986-181782021-04-23T14:03:41Z U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round Nogues, Julio J. HONEY ANTIDUMPING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTIES TRADE AGREEMENTS PROTECTIONISM TRADE REGULATION COST OF PRODUCTION FACTORS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SUBSIDIES SOCIAL IMPACT CONSUMER PRICES LITIGATION COSTS PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING DUTIES CAPACITY BUILDING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS CONTINGENT PROTECTION COUNTERVAILING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTY COUNTERVAILING MEASURES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRICES DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC TAXES DUMPING ECONOMIC POLICIES EXPORT GROWTH EXPORT MARKET EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN EXPORTERS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IMPORT BARRIERS IMPORT DUTY IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT QUANTITIES IMPORT RELIEF IMPORT VOLUME IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INCOME INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL PRICES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC LEGISLATION NEGATIVE EFFECT NORMAL VALUE POSITIVE DETERMINATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION PROCESS PROTECTION MEASURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST POLICIES STATISTICAL DATA SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TRADE TRADE EFFECTS TRADE PERFORMANCE TRADE POLICY TRADING SYSTEM UNFAIR COMPETITION URUGUAY ROUND WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6 percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9 percent. A previous antidumping investigation in 1995 ended with a suspension "agreement" that curtailed U.S. imports from China by around 30 percent. Millions of beekeepers around the world, most of them poor, make a living from honey production, and a free and competitive world market would help raise their standards of living. Nevertheless, the sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism followed by the United States, the world's top importer, to include successful exporters under the effects of its contingent protection measures sends a clear message that other countries should think twice before investing in expanding honey exports to the United States. In addition to looking into the trade effects of these contingent protection measures, the author concludes that under the regulatory arrangements of the DOC, Argentina's beekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. For example, responding to the DOC's lengthy and sophisticated questionnaires that sought to determine cost of production went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers. In the absence of information, the DOC resorted to evidence presented by the petitioners which was riddled with errors. The available evidence suggests that had beekeepers been capable of responding to the questionnaires, the margin of dumping would had been lower, if at all existent. This and other evidence discussed by the author suggest the urgent need to introduce reforms into the World Trade Organization antidumping and subsidy agreements. At the minimum what is required is a consensus that all respondents be given the same opportunity by the international trade rules. The author argues that at present this is not the case and offers suggestions for reforms. 2014-05-05T20:38:36Z 2014-05-05T20:38:36Z 2003-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438512/contingent-protection-against-honey-imports-development-aspects-doha-round http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18178 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3088 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research East Asia and Pacific Latin America & Caribbean |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
HONEY ANTIDUMPING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTIES TRADE AGREEMENTS PROTECTIONISM TRADE REGULATION COST OF PRODUCTION FACTORS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SUBSIDIES SOCIAL IMPACT CONSUMER PRICES LITIGATION COSTS PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING DUTIES CAPACITY BUILDING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS CONTINGENT PROTECTION COUNTERVAILING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTY COUNTERVAILING MEASURES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRICES DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC TAXES DUMPING ECONOMIC POLICIES EXPORT GROWTH EXPORT MARKET EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN EXPORTERS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IMPORT BARRIERS IMPORT DUTY IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT QUANTITIES IMPORT RELIEF IMPORT VOLUME IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INCOME INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL PRICES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC LEGISLATION NEGATIVE EFFECT NORMAL VALUE POSITIVE DETERMINATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION PROCESS PROTECTION MEASURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST POLICIES STATISTICAL DATA SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TRADE TRADE EFFECTS TRADE PERFORMANCE TRADE POLICY TRADING SYSTEM UNFAIR COMPETITION URUGUAY ROUND WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE |
| spellingShingle |
HONEY ANTIDUMPING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTIES TRADE AGREEMENTS PROTECTIONISM TRADE REGULATION COST OF PRODUCTION FACTORS WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SUBSIDIES SOCIAL IMPACT CONSUMER PRICES LITIGATION COSTS PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE ANTIDUMPING ANTIDUMPING DUTIES CAPACITY BUILDING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPETITIVENESS CONSUMERS CONTINGENT PROTECTION COUNTERVAILING DUTIES COUNTERVAILING DUTY COUNTERVAILING MEASURES DEVELOPMENT DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC PRICES DOMESTIC PRODUCTION DOMESTIC TAXES DUMPING ECONOMIC POLICIES EXPORT GROWTH EXPORT MARKET EXPORT PRICES EXPORT SUBSIDIES EXPORTERS EXPORTING COUNTRIES EXPORTING COUNTRY EXPORTS FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOREIGN EXPORTERS GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IMPORT BARRIERS IMPORT DUTY IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORT QUANTITIES IMPORT RELIEF IMPORT VOLUME IMPORTING COUNTRY IMPORTS INCOME INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INTERNATIONAL MARKETS INTERNATIONAL PRICES INTERNATIONAL TRADE ITC LEGISLATION NEGATIVE EFFECT NORMAL VALUE POSITIVE DETERMINATION PRODUCERS PRODUCTION COSTS PRODUCTION PROCESS PROTECTION MEASURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST POLICIES STATISTICAL DATA SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS TAX SYSTEMS TAXATION TRADE TRADE EFFECTS TRADE PERFORMANCE TRADE POLICY TRADING SYSTEM UNFAIR COMPETITION URUGUAY ROUND WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO PRODUCTION COSTS AGRICULTURE Nogues, Julio J. U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific Latin America & Caribbean |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3088 |
| description |
On December 10, 2001 the U.S. Department
of Commerce (DOC) imposed steep antidumping duties against
honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 32.6
percent to 183.8 percent, and a countervailing duty against
Argentina of 5.9 percent. A previous antidumping
investigation in 1995 ended with a suspension
"agreement" that curtailed U.S. imports from China
by around 30 percent. Millions of beekeepers around the
world, most of them poor, make a living from honey
production, and a free and competitive world market would
help raise their standards of living. Nevertheless, the
sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism
followed by the United States, the world's top
importer, to include successful exporters under the effects
of its contingent protection measures sends a clear message
that other countries should think twice before investing in
expanding honey exports to the United States. In addition to
looking into the trade effects of these contingent
protection measures, the author concludes that under the
regulatory arrangements of the DOC, Argentina's
beekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. For
example, responding to the DOC's lengthy and
sophisticated questionnaires that sought to determine cost
of production went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers.
In the absence of information, the DOC resorted to evidence
presented by the petitioners which was riddled with errors.
The available evidence suggests that had beekeepers been
capable of responding to the questionnaires, the margin of
dumping would had been lower, if at all existent. This and
other evidence discussed by the author suggest the urgent
need to introduce reforms into the World Trade Organization
antidumping and subsidy agreements. At the minimum what is
required is a consensus that all respondents be given the
same opportunity by the international trade rules. The
author argues that at present this is not the case and
offers suggestions for reforms. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Nogues, Julio J. |
| author_facet |
Nogues, Julio J. |
| author_sort |
Nogues, Julio J. |
| title |
U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round |
| title_short |
U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round |
| title_full |
U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round |
| title_fullStr |
U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round |
| title_full_unstemmed |
U.S. Contingent Protection against Honey Imports : Development Aspects and the Doha Round |
| title_sort |
u.s. contingent protection against honey imports : development aspects and the doha round |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2014 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/06/2438512/contingent-protection-against-honey-imports-development-aspects-doha-round http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18178 |
| _version_ |
1764439067807711232 |